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Problem Description 
The purpose of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of issues related to performance with 
regards to venture capital trade sale exits. 
The students will perform a qualitative multiple case study covering a series of previously 
performed venture capital trade sale exits. 
 
Assignment given: January 17th, 2011. 
Supervisor: Associate Professor dr. polit. Roger Sørheim, IØT, NTNU. 
 
  
ii 
 
  
iii 
 
Preface 
This written work is the master’s thesis of the authors, who currently pursue a Master of Science 
degree in Industrial Economics and Technology Management at the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology (NTNU). The thesis is prepared as the final report in the course TIØ4945 
– Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Master Thesis.  
The main components of this study are the theoretical findings from a literature review 
conducted during the fall of 2010 and the empirical findings from a multiple-case study 
conducted during the spring of 2011. Since the cases contain sensitive information, all case 
companies and affiliated actors are made anonymous. For the same reason, interview transcripts 
are not included in this thesis. 
The authors wish to thank their academic supervisor, Associate Professor dr. polit. Roger 
Sørheim at the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, NTNU. Dr. 
Sørheim’s passion for the research field, invaluable comments and guidance, and dedication to 
our success have been instrumental for the end result.  
Moreover, thanks go to other individuals that have helped refine and improve the thesis. 
Specifically, the authors want to thank Professor Peter R. Russo and Adjunct Professor Barry 
Horwitz, both at Boston University School of Management, and Professor Andrew Zacharakis at 
Babson College, for their introductions to interviewees. The authors have also appreciated the 
inspiring environment of the NTNU School of Entrepreneurship. Finally, the authors would like 
to thank the interviewees for participating in the multiple-case study presented in this thesis. 
These participants have given the authors invaluable insights in the field of study.   
This thesis undoubtedly still contains defects, but these are mainly due to the authors’ own 
limitations. 
 
 
Trondheim, May 27th, 2011. 
 
 
Erik Aasprong Engløkk    Alexander Østebø Høiby    Robert Jansen Haarstad 
 
  
iv 
 
  
v 
 
Abstract 
Even though venture capital trade sale exits are the most common and successful exit vehicle, 
historically most academic attention has been given to IPO exits. This thesis takes the first steps 
towards opening the black box that is trade sale exits. The thesis is paper-based, and the main 
academic contributions belong to the four papers appended. This document opens with an 
introduction to the field of study as well as overall reflections in order to offer the reader a 
contextual background. Paper one is based on a literature review, while paper two through four 
are based on an inductive multiple-case study covering 19 venture capital trade sale exits from 
Norway and the U.S.  
Paper one conducts an extensive literature review of venture capital exits in general, leading up 
to the development of a model denoted “The Road to Venture Capital Exit”. This model identifies 
the variables that influence the exit process in the different phases, and describes how these 
variables influence the exit process. 
Paper two explores the relation between pre-planned exit strategies and value-adding, and 
suggests the existence of two different venture capitalist mindsets; the Tailor and the Architect. 
The Tailor uses exit possibilities as an addition to traditional deal evaluation criteria, has a pre-
planned exit strategy, and adds value with exit in mind. The Architect does not use exit 
possibilities as an evaluation criteria, and adds value in a more general manner. 
Paper three examines the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur 
during the trade sale exit process, finding that this relationship is characterized more by 
consensus and cooperation than by conflict and defection. Further, it is found that four factors 
influence the relationship during the exit process, and are determining for the conflict level. 
These factors are: pre-investment alignment, strategic hurdles and personal motives faced by 
the entrepreneur, the reputation and connectedness of the venture capitalist, and the probability 
for entrepreneurial recycling. 
Paper four explores the role of financial advisors in trade sale exits, by looking closer at why 
advisors are utilized, as well as by examining the factors determining the choice of a specific 
advisor. It is found that advisors are considered especially useful in bargaining situations, 
through playing the role of bad cops, and also by letting venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
focus on their primary tasks. With regards to selection criteria, venture capitalists emphasize 
industry experience, prior relations and the size of the advisory firm. Finally, the findings are 
integrated in a framework explaining the role of financial advisors in venture capital trade sale 
exits. 
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1. Introduction 
Venture capital firms (VCFs) provide much needed risk-capital to entrepreneurial ventures. 
These ventures typically do not pay dividends, and the returns generated by the investments are 
instead harvested via an exit event, indicating that a profitable exit lies at the heart of venture 
capital.  
Trade sales by far dominate as the most common exit vehicle. However, this dominance is not 
reflected in the academic literature on venture capital, where the issue of trade sale exits is a 
black box. The authors of this thesis seek to take the first steps towards opening that black box, 
by exploring the issue of venture capital trade sale exits. The thesis is paper-based, with the 
main academic contributions belonging to the four papers appended to this document.  
To offer the reader sufficient context within which to place the papers, this document opens by 
giving a general introduction to the phenomenon of venture capital. Thereafter we move on to 
argue the importance of trade sale exits by highlighting relevant statistics. The following section 
gives some overall reflections on the methodologies utilized in this research project. Next, the 
aim and main findings of each paper are presented in summarized form. Finally, we conclude 
and offer some overall implications of the thesis.  
As stated, the reader’s emphasis should be on the four papers appended. Paper one gives a 
thorough review of previous research on venture capital exits. Paper two through four are based 
on a multiple-case study of 19 completed trade sale exit processes performed by Norwegian and 
U.S. venture capitalists (VCs). These papers each focus on a specific theme. Paper two examines 
the link between pre-planned exit strategies and value-adding efforts. Paper three looks closer 
at the VC-entrepreneur (VC-E) relationship during trade sale exit processes. Finally, paper four 
explores the role of financial advisors in venture capital trade sale exits.       
2. An Introduction to Venture Capital 
Venture capital is a professionally managed capital pool that is invested in equity securities in 
private ventures. A venture capital fund can be classified into three categories, dependent on the 
institutions or individuals investing in it. An independent venture capital fund is limited, close-
ended, and funded by third parties, while a captive fund is part of an organization, for instance a 
financial institution (Wright and Robbie, 1998). A public fund is funded by the government 
(Isaksson, 2006). In the following discussion we will emphasize the independent venture capital 
fund, as this is the most common type of fund (Sahlman, 1990) and the focus of this study. 
The conventional legal form of an independent venture capital organization is the general 
partnership, where the VCs act as general partners of the VCF. The general partners make 
investment decisions and manage the firm’s day-to-day operations. Typically, such firms are 
small and non-hierarchical, consisting of the general partners, associates and administrative 
personnel (De Clercq et al., 2006; Sahlman, 1990; Zider, 1998). A study by Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989) showed that the median VCF employed four general partners.  
The general partners raise venture capital funds, attracting capital from both institutional and 
individual investors. These investors are referred to as limited partners, as they are not involved 
in the investment decisions. Typical limited partners include pension funds, insurance 
companies, and financial firms. The limited partners require an annual rate of return of between 
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25 % and 35 % on the capital invested. The venture capital funds have a defined lifetime, with 
typical life spans of seven to ten years before they are terminated. Some funds have an optional 
extension period, which is typically three years at a maximum. When the funds are terminated, 
all remaining capital and stocks are distributed to the investors (Cumming and Johan, 2008; De 
Clercq et al., 2006; Sahlman, 1990; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Zider, 1998). 
The amount of capital raised in each fund varies between firms, but is often at least US$ 100 
million. Many VCFs also raise multiple funds over the life-time of the firm, often managing 
several funds simultaneously. The general partners manage the funds by investing in equity-
based securities in several entrepreneurial ventures. The amount invested in each portfolio 
company typically varies from US$ 2 million to US$ 10 million (De Clercq et al., 2006; Zider, 
1998).  
The general partners are typically compensated in the following way: an annual managing fee of 
1-3 % of the capital of each fund, and a success fee of 20 % of the profits, or 20 % of the returns 
over a predetermined level (De Clercq et al., 2006; Sahlman, 1990; Zider, 1998). Many general 
partners also invest some of their personal wealth in the funds established, often equal to 1 % of 
the total capital raised (Williams et al., 2006).  
Typically, the general partners take an active role in monitoring the portfolio ventures, for 
instance through board positions and economic rights. The investments are developed over a 
time period of two to ten years before they are exited. Exits preferably take the form of an initial 
public offering (IPO) or a trade sale. The capital gains from the investments are immediately 
transferred to the limited partners upon exit (De Clercq et al., 2006; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; 
Sahlman, 1990; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Zider, 1998). 
An illustration of the relation between the limited partners, the general partners and the 
portfolio companies in a venture capital fund is given in figure 1 (Zider, 1998). 
 
Figure 1 - Relations between Actors in a Venture Capital Fund 
As mentioned, the VCs raise capital from private investors, with the intention of investing in 
entrepreneurial ventures. Entrepreneurs with ideas approach VCs to attract funding. If 
successful, the VC invests in the entrepreneurial venture, and receives stock in return. The 
ownership share of the company is determined by the stage and the maturity of the 
entrepreneurial venture, but the VCs typically claim from 20 % to 60 % of the company (Zider, 
1998). The VCs often invest several times in the same venture, a phenomenon known as staging 
of capital (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). Eventually, the investment is exited, and the capital 
is transferred back to the private investors (Zider, 1998). 
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VCs invest in companies in different stages. De Clercq et al. (2006) distinguish between four 
stages of venture financing: seed, start-up, expansion, and buyout. The seed stage is 
characterized by an undeveloped technology and concept, and the entrepreneur seeks financing 
for research and development and business concept validation. In the start-up stage, the venture 
has a management team in place, a pilot of the product is created, and the product is ready for 
marketing. Funds will often be used for establishing marketing and sales activities. In the 
expansion phase, marketing activities are initiated and the venture is ready to grow. The venture 
is now seeking additional capital to finance this growth. The buyout stage venture is an 
established company where the capital is used for a leveraged buyout and a delisting if the 
venture is publicly traded (De Clercq et al., 2006). Such late-stage investments are typically not 
the domain of VCs. Instead, VCs typically invest in companies in the start-up and expansion stage 
(De Clercq et al., 2006). Such companies are associated with both high potential return and high 
risk (Sahlman, 1990).  
The failure rate of companies in early stages is high, and estimates show that an entrepreneurial 
venture only has a 20 % chance of succeeding (Zider, 1998). In order to reduce the risk 
associated with their investments, VCs apply different mechanisms. They often co-invest with 
one or two other VCFs, a phenomenon known as syndication. One of the VCFs normally acts as 
the lead investor, being responsible for the due diligence, and with the main responsibility for 
the investment in the portfolio firm (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Lerner, 1994; Sahlman, 1990; 
Zider, 1998). Additionally, VCs employ contractual rights which give them a preferred position if 
the venture fails. Such rights may include convertible preferred shares and anti-dilution rights 
(Sahlman, 1990). Furthermore, most VCFs have a specific investment profile, and specialize in 
certain industries which they find especially promising (Zider, 1998). 
To compensate for the risk inherent in entrepreneurial ventures, the VC demands a return in the 
order of ten times invested capital over a period of five years, which is equal to an annual rate of 
return of 60 % (De Clercq et al., 2006; Zider, 1998). Since a venture capital fund portfolio 
consists of some home runs (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005) and some failures, the realized return 
will vary considerably between the portfolio companies (Zider, 1998). Often, 50 % of the 
portfolio companies will return only the invested amount when realized. Therefore, the home 
runs need to generate ten to twenty times the invested amount to secure the required annual 
portfolio return of 25 % to 35 % (Zider, 1998). 
2.1. The Venture Capital Investment Process 
As the VCF successfully has raised a fund, focus shifts to the investment process. The activities 
performed by VCs during the investment process, from deal origination through investment 
decision, value adding, and finally exiting, have been under scrutiny since the groundbreaking 
article of Tyebjee and Bruno (1984). Since then, other scholars have modeled the venture capital 
investment activity (e.g. De Clercq et al., 2006; Fried and Hisrich, 1994). A comparison of three 
different models is given in figure 2. These contributions are selected due to their academic 
influence and practical relevance.  
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Figure 2 - Models of the Venture Capital Investment Process 
In the following sections, these models will be presented using De Clercq et al.’s (2006) model as 
a framework. As seen from the figure above, this particular model distinguishes between three 
phases of activity for the general partners in a VCF when investing in a portfolio company: the 
pre-investment phase, the post-investment phase and the exit phase.  
The Pre-Investment Phase 
In the pre-investment phase, the VC wants to generate investment proposals from ventures that 
have the potential for large capital gains and evaluates these proposals with the purpose of 
picking winners. The VC looks for a unique business idea that offers a huge market potential, 
protection of intellectual property, and a realistic plan with respect to production, marketing 
and financial potential. Moreover, the idea must have the potential of being executed within the 
timeframe of the VC. Another important factor is the entrepreneur and management team. The 
team should be ambitious, motivated, honest, and experienced. Preferably, the management 
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team has both general business experience and industry-related expertise (De Clercq et al., 
2006). 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) distinguish between four steps in the pre-investment phase: deal 
origination, screening, evaluation, and structuring of the deal. Deal origination is the process in 
which the VC becomes aware of investment opportunities. Deals come from three sources: cold 
calls, where entrepreneurs contact the VC when no prior relation exists; referrals, where 
investors or other intermediaries the VC has a previous relation with recommend the 
entrepreneur; and technology scans, where the VC actively seeks companies operating in a 
specific industry or technology-related area.  
The largest amount by far of deal proposals originate without any active search by the VC. 
Several studies have shown that the most common behavior of VCs when seeking deals is to 
passively wait for potential deals to be presented to them (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sweeting, 
1981; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). VCFs also often refer ideas to each other. This is particularly 
evident when a lead investor in an entrepreneurial venture seeks co-investors to establish a 
syndicate (De Clercq et al., 2006; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). 
VCFs receive hundreds to thousands of investment proposals annually. Therefore, the VCs 
quickly assess the business opportunities in the screening step. Four criteria are used when 
screening business ideas: the investment size and the investment policy of the venture fund, the 
technology and market sector of the venture, the geographical location, and the financing stage. 
Many business opportunities get rejected in this phase (De Clercq et al., 2006; Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984). 
The VC conducts a more detailed evaluation of the proposals that get through the initial 
screening. The evaluation includes a subjective assessment of criteria such as management 
commitment and skills, market size and growth, market position, and expected rate of return. 
While all of these criteria are important, several studies have shown that especially the quality of 
the management team is under scrutiny (De Clercq et al., 2006; Guild and Bachher, 1996; 
MacMillan et al., 1985). MacMillan et al. (1985) summarized this sentiment as follows:  
There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or 
odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines 
whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all.  
Therefore, it is no surprise that this stage of the evaluation usually includes a meeting between 
the VC and the entrepreneur, where the entrepreneur presents his plans (De Clercq et al., 2006; 
Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984).  
If the result of the evaluation is positive, deal structuring follows. In this step, the entrepreneur 
and the VC negotiate the valuation of the business, the control granted to the VC and the 
covenants restricting the entrepreneur’s actions. In the end, only a small fraction of the 
investment proposals end up being funded by the VC (De Clercq et al., 2006; Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984). 
An even more refined classification of the pre-investment phase is offered by Fried and Hisrich 
(1994). These scholars distinguish between six steps in the pre-investment phase: origination, 
VCF specific screen, generic screen, first-phase evaluation, second-phase evaluation, and closing.  
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The origination step is similar to the deal origination step offered by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984). 
The VCF specific screen consists of criteria such as the size of the investment, the industry in 
which the venture operates, the venture’s location, and the financing stage. This is equivalent to 
the screening stage of Tyebjee and Bruno (1984). The generic screen includes a review of the 
venture’s business plan and other information about the investment which may be available to 
the VC. 
In the first-phase evaluation, additional information is gathered and compared to the 
information given in the business plan. The VC contacts existing investors and customers, 
potential customers, and former business associates to access the information needed. 
Additionally, the VC and the entrepreneur meet at one or more occasions, where the purpose is 
to learn more about the business, evaluate the entrepreneur’s knowledge of the industry, and 
get an overview of potential problems.  
In the second-phase evaluation stage, the VC continues evaluation activities, but allocates 
considerably more time to the proposal. The focus is switched from determining interest in the 
deal to determining the risk factors of the investment, and how they can be mitigated. Due to the 
considerable time committed, the VC usually has an understanding of the terms and structure of 
the deal before entering this stage. In the closing, the details of the deal are negotiated and 
contracts are signed.  
The Post-Investment Phase 
In general, VCs are active investors, spending considerable time on their investments (Steier, 
1998). Gorman and Sahlman (1989) found that most VCs spend more than half of their time 
actively involved with their portfolio companies. In the post-investment phase, the VC involves 
himself in two main activities: monitoring and value-adding (De Clercq et al., 2006). The purpose 
of these activities is to enact a positive influence on the value of the portfolio company.  
The VC is often more involved than other investors in monitoring their investments. This is due 
to several reasons. For instance, investments in entrepreneurial ventures are illiquid, and cannot 
be sold immediately. Further, the uncertainty associated with entrepreneurial ventures is 
pronounced, and therefore the VC must spend time determining the current status and future 
prospects. Additionally, the VC is paid by the limited partners to monitor the investment, and the 
success of the portfolio company is in the VC’s own interest. The VC is especially interested in 
whether or not the venture is able to reach predetermined milestones. In order to monitor the 
investments, the VC often acts as a director of the company, in addition to requiring the 
management team to submit regular updates of the company status (De Clercq et al., 2006). 
The VC also conducts activities that add value to his investments. For instance, he may provide 
operating expertise, financial and strategic management, network, and experience in recruiting 
personnel (Ehrlich et al., 1994). Based on a case study by Pratch (2005), De Clercq et al. (2006) 
suggest that a VC can add value in six different ways, by undertaking:  
 A strategic role: the VC can act as an advisor on important strategic, marketing, and 
organizational issues.  
 A financing role: the VC can contribute with developing internal financial procedures, 
raising additional external capital, and contribute in the exit of the investment. 
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 A networking role: the VC has a network of contacts that can contribute with recruitment 
advice, raising additional capital, and mapping potential customers and exit possibilities. 
 An interpersonal role: the VC can provide moral support when times are tough, and act 
as a discussion partner on sensitive issues.  
 A reputational role: a successful VC can lend credibility to the entrepreneurial venture, 
and thereby help secure additional financing, generate sales, and recruit new members 
to the management team. 
 A discipline role: the VC must evaluate the management, which may be disciplinary to 
the entrepreneur, and be beneficial for the venture as a whole. 
A central question that is sought answered by the research on value-added is: Do VCs add value? 
Efforts made to answer this question have led to inconclusive answers (Barney et al., 1996). 
Some studies support the hypothesis that VCs add value (MacMillan et al., 1989; Sapienza, 1992), 
while others point in the opposite direction, or find no support for such a hypothesis at all 
(Busenitz et al., 2004). 
What is for certain, however, is that VCs spend a considerable amount of their time actively 
involved with their portfolio companies; an activity that would make no sense should the VC 
himself doubt that he can add value to the entrepreneurial ventures. Therefore, while scholars 
thus far have been unable to give a definitive answer to the question of whether or not VCs add 
value to their portfolio companies, the conclusion can be drawn that the practitioners 
themselves believe that they can, and spend a considerable amount of their time on activities 
intended to do just that.  
The Exit Phase 
In the exit phase, the VCs divest their holdings in their portfolio companies (De Clercq et al., 
2006). In their general theory of venture capital exits, MacIntosh and Cumming (2003) provide a 
theoretical starting point for understanding exits: 
… a VC will exit from an investment when the projected marginal value added (PMVA) 
resulting from its stewardship efforts, at any given point in time, is less than the 
projected marginal costs (PMC) of these efforts.  
While this theory is based on a multitude of what the authors admit are unrealistic assumptions 
(for instance that the fund has an infinite lifespan, that the portfolio company at any given point 
in time can be exited at a price which best represents the true value of the firm, and that the VC 
freely can redeploy capital harvested from one investment into other investments), the basic 
rationale of comparing marginal costs with marginal value added holds considerable truth. 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) present five principle exit vehicles, and distinguish between full 
and partial exits. The five principle exit vehicles, listed in order of the typically assumed 
preference for the VC, are: IPO, acquisition, secondary sale, buyback, and write-off. A full exit 
occurs when the VC divests all of his holdings at the time of the sale, while a partial exit indicates 
that the VC keeps a share of his original holdings when the exit occurs.  
An IPO is the first sale of shares in a portfolio company to the public. Often the VC retains most of 
his shares after the offering date, and divests in the following period, due to lock-up agreements 
and legal regulations. Therefore, a full IPO exit is defined as the situation where the VC divests all 
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of his holdings within a year after the offering date. A partial IPO exit occurs when the VC holds 
some of his shares after this date. This distinction is by convention and by recording policies of 
North-American industry organizations (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). An IPO often gives a 
high valuation, and is assumed to be favored by management, who retain their positions. 
However, an IPO is associated with the previously mentioned lock-up agreements for the VC, 
meaning that he carries risk by retaining his shares. Illiquid public markets may also make it 
difficult to sell the shares (Wall and Smith, 1997). 
An acquisition is defined as a sale of the entire portfolio company to a third party. This exit 
vehicle is also commonly referred to as a trade sale, and we will use trade sale to denote this exit 
vehicle throughout this thesis. There are two different types of trade sale exits; the financial exit, 
where the value of the entity being sold is assigned based on its future profit generating power; 
and the strategic exit, where the buyer assigns value to the entity being bought based on what 
future profit can be generated by the buyer by exploiting the assets and capabilities of the target 
(McKaskill, 2009). A full trade sale exit means that the VC receives cash for the portfolio 
company, while a partial exit means that the VC receives shares in the acquiring company as part 
of the compensation (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). A trade sale involves lower fees than an 
IPO, and often offers a full exit. However, there may be few buyers in some countries, and the 
management team is often assumed to be negative to such an exit (Wall and Smith, 1997). 
A secondary sale is the sale of the VC’s shares to a strategic acquirer or another VCF. The 
difference between a trade sale and a secondary sale is that in the case of a secondary sale it is 
only the VC’s shares that are sold. A full secondary sale involves the sale of all of the VC’s shares. 
A partial secondary sale involves the sale of parts of the VC’s holdings (Cumming and MacIntosh, 
2003). 
A buyback occurs when the entrepreneur or the portfolio company buys the VC’s shares. A 
partial buyback exit is defined as a sale of a part of the VC’s holdings, while a full buyback exit 
occurs when the VC sells all of his shares in the portfolio company (Cumming and MacIntosh, 
2003). 
A write-off is conducted when the entrepreneurial firm has failed or when it is barely profitable. 
A full write-off means that the VC walks away from the investment. This is often followed by the 
bankruptcy of the portfolio firm. A partial write-off is a write-down of the value of the assets in 
the company. A venture that is partially written off can be viable and barely profitable, but lacks 
the necessary potential to justify that the VC should devote more time and effort to it. Such a 
venture is also denoted as a “living dead” company (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). 
3. Motivation for Study 
As seen, the VCs’ portfolio companies are typically cash-constrained growth ventures that do not 
pay dividends in the investment period. Instead, returns are gathered as capital gains when 
divesting the venture (Cumming et al., 2006). It is capital gains that determine the success of 
venture capital funds – and ultimately the success and survival of the VC and the VCF. A 
profitable exit from the investment therefore lies at the heart of venture capital (Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2003).  
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However, successful exits are hard to achieve. Already in the mid-nineties, a study conducted on 
behalf of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) found that over 70 % of the VCs 
struggled with problems when divesting their investments (Wall and Smith, 1997). When 
comparing the level of new investments with the number of exits, the study showed an exit 
overhang, indicating that VCs did not exit their portfolio companies within the desired time 
frame (Wall and Smith, 1997).  
These problems are unfortunately still evident today (Hege et al., 2009; Oehler et al., 2007). The 
last decade has shown a decrease in returns experienced by VCs, and in the U.S. the quarterly 
returns have fallen from over 80 % around year 2000, to single digit and even negative 
percentages in the recent years (Ghalbouni and Rouizes, 2010).  
The decreasing returns correspond with a steep fall in the number of exits completed since the 
turn of the millennia and a longer time from investment to exit (Ghalbouni and Rouizes, 2010). 
Figure 3 shows the development of the number of exits from 2002 to 2010 in the U.S., based on 
data from the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA, 2011). The figure shows that exits 
are highly dependent on market conditions, as seen by the lower number of exits in the 
aftermath after the dotcom bubble in 2001 and the financial crisis of 2007-2008.   
 
Figure 3 - The Number of Exits of U.S. Venture Capital-Backed Companies, 2002-2010 
The importance of exits for venture capital has led some scholars to explore the theme 
academically. The current research on venture capital exits is to a large degree focused on IPOs 
(Félix et al., 2008; Isaksson, 2000). This focus on IPOs can be explained by two factors. First, 
IPOs are often classified as the most prestigious exit vehicle due to the publicity obtained and 
the soaring returns created by some offerings (Chaplinsky and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2010; Dimov 
and Shepherd, 2005; Megginson, 2004). Second, the availability of data for IPOs is much better 
than for other exit vehicles.  
As the number of IPOs was much higher in the eighties and nineties than in the last decade, both 
in absolute number and compared to other exit vehicles, the focus on IPOs in the academic 
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research seemed logical. Today, however, the focus on IPOs is not in line with the empirical 
world of exits. In fact, statistics show that the trade sale is by far the most common exit vehicle. 
Figure 4, also deduced from the NVCA (2011), shows the number of completed trade sales and 
IPOs in the U.S. in the period from 2002 to 2010.  
 
Figure 4 - The Number of Trade Sale and IPO exits in the U.S., 2002-2010 
Two patterns appear from this figure. First, trade sales are a much larger exit vehicle than IPOs 
measured by the number of transactions completed. Second, both exit vehicles are subject to 
market conditions, but the consequences of an economic downturn is relatively more evident for 
IPOs. In 2008 and 2009, after the last financial crisis, the IPO exit window was basically closed, 
with just 18 IPOs in these two years combined. For trade sales, the exit window was still open, as 
shown by the 621 transactions that were consummated in the same period. Statistics from the 
EVCA and the Danish state investment fund Vækstfonden show the same pattern in Europe and 
the Nordics (EVCA, 2010; Vækstfonden, 2009). 
As mentioned, IPOs are believed to give better returns than other exit vehicles, leading some 
scholars to characterize IPOs as the home run exit vehicle (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). But, as 
seen by figure 5 below, this has not been the case in the U.S. for the last decade. This figure 
shows the average deal value and offering amount (in USD millions) for trade sales and IPOs 
respectively in the U.S. between 2002 and 2010, based on numbers from the NVCA (2011). For 
the last six years, the average trade sale value has been larger than the average IPO offering. It 
has to be taken into account, however, that the average value of the trade sale transactions are 
based on the deals where the exit value has been disclosed. In a significant number of trade sale 
transactions, the deal value is not disclosed, suggesting that these numbers must be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 5 - The Average Deal Value of Trade Sale and IPO Exits in the U.S., 2002-2010 
Taken together, these statistics show an interesting pattern. Despite the importance of exits to 
VCs, they struggle with exiting successfully. Moreover, trade sales are more common relative to 
IPOs, and also found to be more profitable. Trade sales are therefore instrumental for the 
venture capital business model in order to deliver the required rate of return. However, as 
popular and significant as ever, the importance of trade sales is not reflected in the academic 
research on venture capital exits. It is the possibility for opening this black box that is the main 
motivation behind the focus of this master’s thesis.  
4. Methodology 
This section covers some reflections on the overall research process of this thesis. For a more 
academic discussion regarding research design and methods, we direct the attention of the 
reader to the method chapter included in each paper.  
The Point of Departure 
The basis for this master’s thesis was laid during the fall of 2010, when the authors were 
working on their project thesis: “The Venture Capital Exit Process”. The project thesis included a 
thorough literature review. This review first looked closer at general venture capital research, in 
order to give the authors a strong grounding in the field of venture capital. Thereafter, articles 
relevant for the venture capital exit process were reviewed. In total, 42 articles were selected for 
this second part of the review.  
Based on this review, it became apparent that the issue of venture capital exits had not received 
sufficient attention from scholars. While there were some studies drawing attention to various 
factors with regards to exits, few looked closer at the issue from a holistic point of view. Paper 
one included in this master’s thesis summarizes the findings of the review, and was written 
during the spring of 2011. The main contribution of this paper is the development of an 
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overarching model of the venture capital exit process, denoted “The Road to Venture Capital 
Exit”. 
As discussed in the previous section, however, the most striking finding was that there was 
basically no research-based knowledge on the topic of venture capital trade sale exits. With the 
discussed importance of trade sale exits for the venture capital business model in mind, this 
issue intrigued us. Close to nothing was done on the topic from an academic point of view, yet it 
was ripe with potential problems, and of an instrumental practical importance. Simultaneously, 
practitioners we discussed the subject with indicated great interest in the results of a research 
project focused on this area.  
With very little done on the subject so far, it was quickly decided to make this an exploratory, 
multiple-case study. We aimed at enhancing the understanding of the phenomenon of venture 
capital trade sale exits, and thereby provide insights into a complex process. In order to do that, 
we did not want to enter the research process with pre-conceived assumptions of what the 
interesting questions to ask were. Instead, the data collected was determining for what was 
finally examined in the three papers built on the case study, thus making this an inductive study.  
Sampling 
Detailed information about trade sale exit processes is regarded as sensitive both on a business 
and personal level. The access to informants was therefore a potential problem. Based on 
strategic sampling of completed trade sale exits in various industries and geographies, several 
interesting cases were identified. We initiated contact with potential informants either directly 
or via individuals in our personal networks. As we immersed ourselves in the venture capital-
entrepreneur community, we were also introduced to several cases by actors lending a helping 
hand.  
Based on these efforts we included in total 19 trade sale exit processes in our sample. Seven of 
these cases were trade sale exits performed by U.S. VCs, while the remaining twelve were 
performed by Norwegian VCs. The cases included span over ten different industries. An 
overview of the cases included in the study is given in the table below. 
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Table 1 - Overview of Cases 
Case Industry Acquired Informants 
Avalanche Cable 2006 VC 
Blackhawk Sensors 1998 CEO 
Bruin Electronics 2006 VC, CEO 
Canuck Networking hardware 2005 VC 
Coyote Electronics 2007 2 VCs, CEO 
Flame Networking hardware 1996 VC 
Flyer Software 2007 2 VCs 
Hurricane Energy 2007 VC 
Islander Oil service 2007 CEO 
Lightning Software 2010 VC 
Oiler Wireless 2006 CEO 
Panther Energy 2007 VC 
Penguin Software 2009 CEO 
Ranger Oil service 2008 VC 
Sabre Networking hardware 1999 VC 
Senator Electronics 2011 VC 
Shark Telecom 2010 VC 
Star Telecom 2006 VC 
Thrasher Healthcare 2011 VC 
 
Interviews 
During the spring of 2011 we conducted in total 21 interviews. 15 of the interviews were with 
VCs, five of the interviews were with entrepreneurs, and a final interview included both the 
entrepreneur and the VC. In total, these interviews lasted 15 hours and five minutes. All 
interview sessions were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. These transcriptions totaled 
197 single-spaced pages, and nearly 145 000 words.  
Interview guides were built in order to ensure sufficient consistency between interviews. 
Separate guides were created for the VC and the entrepreneur interviews, in order to ensure 
that we covered specific areas relevant for each type of informant. These interview guides can be 
found in the appendix. Initial drafts of the guides were written by the authors based on 
knowledge gathered from the literature review. Thereafter, academics and practitioners with 
significant experience within the field were asked to comment on them and offer suggestions for 
improvements. Thus, by the time the interview guides were put to actual use, they had already 
been updated and refined several times. Nevertheless, we made minor adjustments to the guides 
as we recognized areas in need of improvement during the interview process. 
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The interviews were semi-structured. We as interviewers used the interview guide to make sure 
that we touched upon relevant areas, but to a large degree the respondents were allowed to 
speak freely. We strived to have two researchers present at all interviews. However, due to wide 
geographical distances with interviews taking place in major cities in Norway as well as in the 
U.S., this was not always possible to achieve. 
The interviews with Norwegian respondents were conducted in Norwegian. Quotes included in 
the papers are translated into English by the authors. Every precaution was taken to ensure that 
nothing was lost in translation. In addition, respondents were given a citation check, which led 
to some minor adjustments in the quotes. 
Data Analysis 
The empirical data we had collected after the interviews were completed was incredibly rich, 
and, for us as researchers, extremely exciting. Based on the transcriptions and secondary data 
collected from among others press clippings, web sites and presentations, mini-cases were built 
for each of the trade sale exit processes included in the study. Thereafter, within-case and cross-
case analysis of the data was performed. This was a highly iterative process, with the authors 
frequently stepping back and forth between the data and analysis.  
From this inductive approach several areas emerged as especially interesting. Three areas were 
found to be important enough that papers were written; the link between pre-planned exit 
strategies and value-adding activities (paper two), the venture capitalist-entrepreneur 
relationship during trade sale exits (paper three), and the choice of financial advisors (paper 
four).  
As paper two solely looked at the investor role, the cases where the entrepreneur was the 
informant were not included. Similarly, the Shark case was dropped, due to relevant factors not 
being covered in the data collected. The Shark case was also dropped from paper three for the 
same reason. Paper four included all cases.  
Limitations 
The selection of cases was based on a strategic sampling of completed trade sale exits. As such, 
our sample is not statistically representative, indicating that our findings are not generalizable. 
However, we strove to increase the generalizability of our findings by including cases from 
various industries and from different countries.  
Since we were sampling completed trade sale exits, all of the processes included by definition 
belong to the past. Thus, retrospective bias is a potential problem. This is especially relevant for 
the oldest cases included. However, the interviews started with the respondents being asked to 
give a recount of the events leading to investment and further to the exit decision was made. 
Such open-ended questioning should improve the accuracy of our data.  
Only two of our cases involve the venture capitalist-entrepreneur dyad, with both sides acting as 
informants. While we entered the study with the goal of attaining many such informant dyads, it 
proved difficult to gain access. Interviewing only one side of the dyad may obviously affect the 
data collected with informant bias and partial information. The data was triangulated with 
secondary sources in order to minimize this problem.  
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Due to the sensitivity of the data collected, the informants may have withheld information 
deemed too sensitive to share. In order to motivate the informants to share freely, all cases are 
given code names in order to ensure anonymity. In addition, all informants were given the 
chance to remove information from the papers that they deemed confidential. None of the 
informants utilized this option.  
Overall, we are aware of the limitations of the data collected in this study, and we have taken 
steps in order to ensure that we treat the findings with the necessary caution. However, the 
informants and cases included fit the aim of this research study well. We believe that the data 
provided was as accurate and solid as could reasonably be expected with the time and resources 
of this study in mind. 
5. Summary of Appended Papers 
This section gives a brief overview of the aim and findings of the four papers that are appended 
at the end of this thesis.  
5.1. Paper 1: The Venture Capital Exit Process 
Aim of the Paper 
The purpose of this paper is to take the first steps towards creating an overarching model of the 
venture capital exit process by examining the following research questions: 
 Which variables influence the venture capital exit process?  
 During which phase of the venture capital investment activity process do these variables 
have their highest influence?  
 How do these variables influence the exit process? 
Summary of Findings 
Through a thorough literature review covering a broad range of disciplines, an overarching 
model denoted “The Road to Venture Capital Exit” has been developed, covering the entire 
investment cycle from pre-investment to the exit phase. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the 
first overarching model of the venture capital exit process that has been developed, as existing 
literature tend to focus on subsets of the exit process. Six categories of variables were identified; 
Economic, Governance, Network, Strategic, VCF-specific and Venture-specific. The model takes 
into account the fact that some of these variables are exogenous, while others are open to 
manipulation by the VC. The model also acknowledges that some of these variables are of a 
dynamic nature.  
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5.2. Paper 2: Pre-Planned Exit Strategies and Value-Adding in Venture 
Capital Trade Sale Exits 
Aim of the Paper 
The aim of this paper is to examine: 
 The different mindsets towards pre-planned exit strategies among VCs. 
 If there is a link between having a pre-planned exit strategy and the focus of the VC’s 
value-adding activities. 
Summary of Findings 
The findings indicate the existence of two polar groups of investors; the Tailor and the Architect. 
The Tailor is a close tracker with a clear focus on exits from day one. He uses exit possibilities as 
well as traditional business possibilities as criteria to evaluate his investments. He also adds 
value with exit specifically in mind, focusing his value-adding activities on the areas that will 
maximize the probability for success of the pre-planned exit strategy. The Architect does not use 
exit possibilities as an evaluation criterion. He does not add value with exit specifically in mind, 
but will have a more general focus in his value-adding, and believes that the best exit strategy is 
to build a strong company. 
5.3. Paper 3: The Venture Capitalist-Entrepreneur Relationship during 
Trade Sale Exits 
Aim of the Paper 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the VC-E relationship during trade sale exit 
processes. Specifically, the following two research questions are investigated: 
 What characterizes the VC-E relationship during trade sale exit processes? 
 Which, if any, factors influence the cooperative level of the VC-E relationship during a 
trade sale exit process? 
Summary of Findings 
We find that the VC-E relationship during trade sale exit processes is characterized more by 
consensus and cooperation than by conflict and defection. In none of the cases covered was the 
exit decision put to a formal vote in the board, nor did the VC in any of the cases utilize special 
legal rights to force the entrepreneur to accept the exit decision. While some sort of agreement 
could be expected due to our sample, the low level of conflict seems to nuance the often stated 
assumption that entrepreneurs will oppose trade sale exits. Further, we find that several factors 
influence the degree of cooperation in the VC-E relationship during the trade sale exit process. 
These factors include the pre-investment alignment with regards to the exit, the strategic 
hurdles and personal motives faced by the entrepreneur, the reputation and network 
connectedness of the VC, and the probability for entrepreneurial recycling.  
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5.4. Paper 4: The Choice of Financial Advisors in Venture Capital Trade 
Sale Exits 
Aim of the Paper 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the choice of financial advisors in venture capital trade 
sale exits. More specifically, the following two research questions are investigated: 
 Why do venture capital-backed companies engage financial advisors in trade sales? 
 What factors influence the choice of a specific financial advisor? 
Summary of Findings 
We find that venture capital-backed companies in trade sale exits emphasize many of the same 
factors as suggested by the general literature on financial advisors. However, the data suggests 
some extensions. With respect to the first research question, we find that VCs believe that 
advisors are especially useful in a bargaining situation, where they for instance can take the role 
of bad cops, and by letting VCs and entrepreneurs focus on their main tasks. Regarding the 
second question, industry experience and prior relations are the most frequently mentioned 
determinants. Further, the size of the advisory firm is put forward as an important factor, 
suggesting that VCs are conscious of receiving top attention from their advisors. Finally, we 
integrate these findings in a framework that explains the role of financial advisors in venture 
capital trade sale exits.  
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Trade sales by far dominate as the most common, profitable exit vehicle for VCs. Successful trade 
sale exits are therefore of high importance for VCs and entrepreneurs alike. However, this 
importance is not reflected in the literature, with close to no studies looking closer at venture 
capital trade sale exits. Therefore, this master’s thesis sought to explore the phenomenon. 
Paper one gives a thorough review of relevant literature. Based on this review, an overarching 
model of the venture capital exit process denoted “The Road to Venture Capital Exit” was 
developed.  
Empirical data was gathered via a multiple-case study, involving 19 completed venture capital 
trade sale exits. Twelve of the exits were performed by Norwegian VCs, while the remaining 
seven were performed by American VCs. The case companies included span over ten different 
industries, and were acquired between 1996 and 2011.  
From this rich, empirical data an inductive approach led to three different papers, all focusing on 
different aspects of the venture capital trade sale exit process. Paper two explores the existence 
of two different investor archetypes, and the link between pre-planned exit strategies and value-
adding activities. Paper three sheds light on the VC-E relationship during the trade sale exit 
process. Finally, paper four explores the choice of financial intermediaries in the execution of the 
trade sale process.  
Thus, this thesis has taken significant steps towards opening the black box of venture capital 
trade sale exits. Our genuine hope is that these contributions will inspire other scholars to 
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continue investigating the phenomenon. Research-based knowledge can help practitioners 
improve their performance, with virtuous effects for VCs, entrepreneurs and society at large.  
6.1. Implications for Practitioners  
We have been deeply emerged in the venture capital community over the past six months. This 
has given us the opportunity to see the trade sale exit process from both the entrepreneur and 
the investor side, as well as to compare different practices among different VCFs. Through the 
process, we have seen single cases where what seems to have been best practice in several 
aspects of the trade sale exit process has been identified. As we have evaluated a large number of 
cases, we are left with several areas where we feel that we can provide helpful advice to 
practitioners. We are humbly aware that none of us have any experience from the venture 
capital industry. Nevertheless, we feel that we might be able to provide some advice from an 
outsider’s perspective. This section will therefore present our recommendations for 
practitioners. 
Make sure all parties are aligned – at all times. Although this might seem like an obvious 
statement, we have seen cases where there is more of an implicit alignment towards the end 
goal; the exit. Some VCs assume that the founders are willing to give up control of the company 
in an eventual trade sale, without having a discussion pre-investment. This is also partly an 
advice to the entrepreneurs; if they want their company to stay in the family for generations, 
venture capital is perhaps not the right financing choice. If the different parties have an open 
discussion about their plans and aspirations pre-investment, future conflicts can easily be 
avoided. 
But alignment is not crucial only in the pre-investment phase, it is also important to make sure 
the parties are aligned throughout the entire investment cycle. Although VCs have the possibility 
to force a sale through drag-along rights, it is rarely done in trade sale exits. One of the main 
reasons is that an acquirer is not only buying a company, he is also buying the human capital 
inherent in that company. A management team who does not agree with an acquisition process 
might destroy significant deal value through their reluctant attitude towards the potential buyer. 
This might in turn have significant consequences for the post-acquisition performance. Since we 
have seen that the management is more likely to have a positive inclination towards a trade sale 
when they are facing significant strategic hurdles, we recommend the VC to try to time a trade 
sale exit with these hurdles. This will probably benefit the VCs reputation in the long run, which 
brings us to the next recommendation. 
Life is a multi-round game. This is especially true in the venture capital community, since VCs 
often are specialized within industry and by geography. VCs are dependent on getting a steady 
deal flow, and if they get a reputation for not listening to entrepreneurs, that deal flow will 
diminish. Again, alignment through the entire process is the key. Also, since venture capital 
investments are syndicated in most cases, a VCF with a bad reputation will have a hard time 
getting other VCFs to join a syndicate, since they will avoid affiliation with the industry’s bad 
guys. Finally, we often see that the same companies make several acquisitions within the same 
space, and that often means that the VC will have to deal with them on a repeated basis. A 
reputation for selling bad companies will hence naturally decrease the scope of potential buyers.  
An action that can be taken to reduce potential reputational damage is to hire intermediaries to 
assist in the acquisition process. By having a third party involved to play the part of bad cop, the 
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other actors get someone neutral to blame for their grievances. But being the bad cop is not the 
only area where intermediaries can add value, as shown in our next advice. 
Know what your intermediary can do for you. As mentioned earlier, most VCFs are 
specialized within a few industries. This means that they have an intimate knowledge of the 
space they operate in, and that they most likely will be aware of the potential acquirers of their 
portfolio company. This is sometimes used as an argument against using advisors. We believe 
that an intermediary can add value in identifying potential buyers in some cases, but this is not 
where their main contribution is. The focus of the intermediary should rather be on the practical 
issues of an acquisition process, be it an auction or a negotiated sale. The VCs are time 
constrained, and are not expected to spend time on activities as creating information 
memorandums or facilitating an auction process. The same goes for management; they are in 
most cases better off focusing on day-to-day operations than deeply involving themselves in the 
nitty-gritty details of a sales process. The intermediary should be used to unburden both the VC 
and the management, so they can be able to focus on their main tasks. 
If the pre-planned exit strategy is trade sale, act accordingly. We have seen a few cases 
where there has been a clear goal of a trade sale exit from day one, but where the VCs still had a 
general focus in their value-adding. Our advice is to always remember the end goal, and take 
measures to increase the probability of a successful exit. And since this business is all about 
finding the right buyer, the right buyer needs to be aware that the portfolio company will be up 
for sale in the future. We believe that a good way to do this is through the use of strategic 
partnerships. By involving potential buyers, be it as sales partners, members of an advisory 
board, or other partnerships, it is easier to convey the value of a portfolio company and to create 
buzz around it. This is an arena where the VCs network acquired through the multi-round game 
of venture capital investing can be extremely valuable, and this potential value should be 
exploited. The earlier potential buyers are aware of the portfolio company, the easier it will be to 
actually get it acquired down the line.  
Entrepreneurs: Know the consequences. Although most entrepreneurs are well educated in 
the ways of venture capital and know that an exit is unavoidable, we feel that this point cannot 
be accentuated enough. Entrepreneurs have to be aware that an exit will come, and take 
measures to ensure that the exit will be a pleasant event for all parties. Again, it all comes down 
to alignment. We would also argue that those entrepreneurs that picture themselves as serial 
entrepreneurs should remember our advice that life is a multi-round game. Although they might 
have to swallow a bitter pill in one specific exit, avoiding a high conflict level might be beneficial 
when they come looking for investment in the next round. 
6.2. Implications for Further Research 
This section highlights some general implications for further research of the master’s thesis as a 
whole. For paper-specific implications, we direct the attention of the reader to the conclusions 
and implications chapter of each paper.  
The literature review given in paper one first and foremost identified that the issue of venture 
capital exit processes is an area still ripe for exploration. While the IPO exit vehicle has received 
some attention, trade sales are still a black box. While we have taken the first steps towards 
opening that box in this thesis, many areas still remain. For instance, why is it that trade sales 
are associated with less prestige than an IPO? Successful trade sales require significant skill on 
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behalf of both investor and management team, and may be even more profitable than an IPO 
exit. At the same time, trade sales are more likely to be a full exit, while IPO exits might require 
the VC to hold on to shares for a significant amount of time. How does this influence the VC’s goal 
of IPO versus trade sale?  
It is not only the trade sale exit vehicle that lacks coverage in the academic literature, however. 
Secondary sales, where the VC sells his holdings, typically to another financial investor, are 
gaining ground in Europe. In fact, according to the EVCA (2010), in 2009 secondary sales made 
up a significant share of venture capital exits in Europe, second only to that of trade sales (write-
offs excluded). As the literature review demonstrates, this exit vehicle has received close to no 
attention in academia. With its growing importance, however, scholars should look closer at 
secondary sales. Among others, it would be highly interesting to investigate which type of 
portfolio companies are likely to be exited via secondary sales, how the management team reacts 
to this type of exit, and whether or not secondary sales are successful exits by venture capital 
standards.   
The empirical data gathered in this study was based on a strategic sampling of completed trade 
sale exit processes performed in Norway and the U.S. Based on this data, in combination with a 
relevant theoretical backdrop for each paper’s focus area, we have put forward several 
important propositions. Further research should investigate whether or not our propositions 
will survive empirical testing over a statistically representative sample. Thus, the next logical 
steps are to operationalize the propositions put forward into testable hypotheses, and subject 
them to the rigor of quantitative research strategies.  
Further, the empirical data collected for this research project was based on trade sale processes 
that were successfully completed. While this was the correct path to take in this study, it would 
be very interesting to look closer at trade sale processes that failed in order to try to pinpoint 
which factors led to the failure of the exit. Such knowledge could prove instrumental in 
improving the overall return generated by the venture capital industry.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Interview Guide VC 
Background information about interviewee 
 Name, position, experience, relevance for case 
The investment  
 Background information about the company 
 Context (market outlook) 
 Terms (equity share, amount, syndication) 
 Preplanned exit strategy? Exit strategy included in BP from entrepreneur?  
 Execution of this strategy? 
 Syndication 
o Was the deal syndicated? 
o When did the syndication take place? 
o Why syndication? 
o Value added from syndicated investors? 
 Founder CEO/Hired Gun? 
What kind of activities towards exit was conducted after the investment? (Auditors, IP, 
due dill. preparations, networking, positioning, 5P’s, changes in management team) 
Entrepreneur on board with regards to the need to exit? 
Did the exit strategy change over the life of the investment? 
Exit decision  
 When was this decision taken? 
 On what terms? 
 Why? Part of the plan? 
 Relationship VC/Entrepreneur 
o Involvement from entrepreneur in exit decision/process? 
o Different preferences (exit vehicle, timing, acquirer) 
 Reputation 
o Importance of “home run” (IPO)? 
o Return (greed)? 
 Timing 
o Market conditions 
o Termination of fund 
o Establishment of next fund 
Exit process  
 Marketing of company 
o Use of IP 
o Product brochures 
o Specific or broad marketing? 
 Geography, industry 
o Execution of marketing (management presentations, site visits, VC involvement) 
o Reputation of VC 
 Choice of intermediary 
o Why/Why not? 
o Criteria for choice 
 Industry experience 
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 Previous experience with intermediary (VC or portfolio company)? 
 References/network 
 Syndication 
 Price 
 Geographical coverage 
 Size of transaction versus size of intermediary 
o Broad or narrow search? 
o Fee structure 
 Incentives for intermediaries? 
 Choice of acquirer 
o How did you identify potential buyers? 
 Syndication 
 VC network 
 Intermediary 
 Entrepreneur’s network 
o How many potential buyers did you initiate negotiations with? 
o Strategic fit 
o Terms 
 Valuation 
 Structure of deal (Full or partial exit?) 
o Entrepreneur/VC involvement in choice 
 Negotiations 
o Lead negotiator (experience with negotiations) 
o Use of intermediaries 
o Facilitation of process 
 Handling of information asymmetry (Dataroom?) 
 How much information is shared with prospective buyers 
 Some kind of information that you did not share 
 Continued/retained ownership 
 Valuation 
 Differences between entrepreneur and VC in valuation? 
 Differences between company and acquirer(s) in valuation? 
 Enforcement (use of contract) 
o Why/why not necessary? 
o Action towards exit in contracts? 
o Convertible/preferred securities? 
o Veto/control rights? 
 Focus on day-to-day operations 
Post-sale  
 Involvement after sale (ownership, board position, advisor) 
 Evaluate the exit 
o What went right? 
 Compared to general exit strategy/philosophy for VC-company 
o What went wrong? 
 Compared to general exit strategy/philosophy for VC-company 
o What did you learn? Something that you would have done differently next time? 
o Evaluate the intermediaries 
 Important for outcome? 
 What did they do right? 
 What did they do wrong? 
 Worth their fee? 
 Would you choose one next time? 
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Appendix 2 – Interview Guide Entrepreneur 
Background information about interviewee  
 Name, position, experience, relevance for case 
 Founder/Hired Gun? 
The investment  
 Background information about the company 
 Context (market outlook) 
 Terms (equity share, amount, syndication) 
 Preplanned exit strategy? (BP/Negotiations) 
 Rich or king? 
 Syndication 
o Value added from syndicated investors? 
o What are your thoughts on having multiple VCs as investors? 
Did you have exit in mind from the start of the investment? (realization of VC need to sell) 
Did you conduct any activities with exit in mind when building your company? (Auditors, 
IP, due dill. preparations, networking, positioning, 5P’s, management team) 
Exit decision  
 When was this decision taken? 
 On what terms? 
 Why? Part of the plan? 
 Did you agree? (timing) 
 Relationship VC/Entrepreneur 
o Involvement from entrepreneur in exit decision/process? 
o Different preferences (exit vehicle, timing, acquirer) 
 Reputation 
o Importance of successful exit? Serial entrepreneur? 
Exit process  
 Marketing of company 
o Use of IP 
o Product brochures 
o Specific or broad marketing? 
 Geography, industry 
o Execution of marketing (management presentations, site visits, VC involvement) 
o Reputation of VC 
 Choice of intermediary 
o Why/Why not? 
 Criteria for choice 
 Industry experience 
 Previous experience with intermediary (VC or portfolio company)? 
 References/network 
 Syndication 
 Price 
 Geographical coverage 
 Size of transaction versus size of intermediary 
o Broad or narrow search? 
o Fee structure 
o Incentives for intermediaries 
o Your thoughts? 
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 Choice of acquirer 
o How many potential buyers did you initiate negotiations with? 
o How did you identify potential buyers? 
 Syndication 
 VC network 
 Intermediary 
 Entrepreneur’s network 
o Strategic fit 
o Terms 
 Valuation 
 Structure of deal (Full or partial exit?) 
o Entrepreneur/VC involvement in choice 
 Negotiations 
o Lead negotiator (experience with negotiations) 
o Use of intermediaries 
o Facilitation of process 
o Involvement of entrepreneur 
o Valuation 
 Differences between entrepreneur and VC in valuation? 
 Differences between company and acquirer(s) in valuation? 
 Enforcement (use of contract) 
o Why/why not necessary? 
 (Handling of information asymmetry) 
o How much information is shared with prospective buyers 
o Some kind of information that you did not share 
o Continued/retained ownership 
 Focus on day-to-day operations? 
Post-sale  
 Involvement after sale (ownership, board position, advisor, new company) 
 Evaluate the exit 
o What went right? 
o What went wrong? 
o What did you learn? Something that you would have done differently next time? 
o How important was the intermediary? 
 What did they do right? 
 What did they do wrong? 
 Worth their fee? 
 Would you choose one next time? 
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Abstract 
Both European and American venture capitalists are struggling with achieving satisfactory exits, 
leading to poor industry performance. In addition, both entrepreneurs and the society at large 
have a vested interest in the success of venture capital, due to its vital role as a financing actor 
for entrepreneurial growth ventures creating new wealth. A better understanding of the success 
criteria of the exit process is therefore sought after. Findings from this literature review lead to 
the establishment of an initial model of the venture capital exit process, denoted “The Road to 
Venture Capital Exit”. Important aspects revealed include that exits are influenced by variables 
determined in all phases of the venture capital investment process, and that the process is 
influenced by variables both outside the venture capitalist’s control and within his control 
sphere. 
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Introduction 
Venture capital is a professionally managed capital pool that is invested in equity securities in 
private ventures. Venture capital funds are closed‐end, limiting the investment holding period 
for the venture capitalist (VC). VCs typically invest in early‐stage, growth companies, indicating 
that portfolio companies rarely pay dividends during the investment period. Therefore, capital 
gains acquired from a profitable exit lies at the heart of venture capital(Cumming and MacIntosh, 
2003). 
Successful exits are, however, not easy to achieve. A major survey commissioned by the Exits 
Committee of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) concluded that “European VCs 
are better at investing than exiting” (Wall and Smith, 1997). As much as 70 % of the responding 
VCs indicated that they had experienced difficulties exiting from their investments for various 
reasons. A quick comparison of the level of new investments with the level of exits also showed a 
significant exit overhang – indicating that many portfolio companies that normally should have 
been exited, were still kept on book. While one would have hoped that these challenges had been 
resolved by now, these exit problems are still relevant today (Hege et al., 2009; Oehler et al., 
2007).  
But it is not only European VCs that experience trouble exiting. Recent research presented in the 
Harvard Business Review concludes that American VCs are experiencing similar problems 
(Ghalbouni and Rouizes, 2010). The article states that VCs are facing significant challenges in 
successfully exiting their investments, pointing to the fact that the number and value of IPO and 
trade sale exits have fallen steeply from the numbers achieved during the golden period around 
the turn of the millennia. An illustrative showcasing of the severity of the problems encountered 
is the fact that the number of IPOs in the U.S. has dwindled from 17 per week in the year 2000 to 
a total of 15 in 2008 and 2009 combined. Thus, even though a profitable exit lies at the heart of 
venture capital, VCs do not seem to have a full understanding of the success criteria of the 
process, asserting the need for more knowledge.  
Due to the importance of exits, the phenomenon has attracted some scholarly interest. There are 
many articles that cover various aspects of venture capital exits. However, these articles often 
cover only subsets of the venture capital exit process, typically focusing on the time to exit, the 
exit form, or the influence of control variables on exit (Félix et al., 2008). 
Further, the population of articles tends to be focused on IPOs (Félix et al., 2008; Isaksson, 
2000). In fact, this literature review uncovered only one article specifically focused on trade sale 
exit strategies, and this article dates back to 1994 (Relander et al., 1994). This focus on IPOs can 
be explained by two major underlying reasons. First of all, VCs are often presumed to prefer IPO 
exits due to the reputational premium and high returns generated (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). 
Secondly, data is more freely available for IPO exits than for trade sale exits, making IPO exits 
more suitable for empirical research. However, recent studies clearly show that the trade sale is 
the dominant exit vehicle of the two (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Isaksson, 2007). 
Thus, while these contributions undoubtedly have brought the research-based knowledge on the 
field of venture capital exits forward, there are still considerable gaps to be filled. Therefore, the 
purpose of this paper is to develop an overarching model of the exit process based on the 
following research questions: 
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 Which variables influence the venture capital exit process?  
 During which phase of the venture capital investment activity process do these variables 
have their highest influence? 
 How do these variables influence the exit process? 
The goal is to generate a better understanding of the variables influencing the venture capital 
exit process, making it possible for the VC and the entrepreneur to pave the way for more 
successful exits. To answer these questions, this paper gives a thorough literature review on 
venture capital exit processes. Additionally, relevant literature on value-adding activities, social 
capital and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) will be presented. The breadth of the literature 
search is motivated by the lack of research in the field of venture capital exits.  
The findings from this review lead to an overarching model of the venture capital exit process, 
with relevant variables identified. Important aspects revealed include that exits are influenced 
by variables determined in all phases of the venture capital investment process, and that the 
process is influenced by variables both outside and within the VC’s control sphere. To the 
authors’ knowledge, this is the first framework developed that takes a holistic approach to 
venture capital trade exits. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: section II presents the methodology used to 
review the literature, and offers a critique of this methodology. Section III presents the literature 
review, while section IV structures the theoretical findings and develops a conceptual model. 
Section V concludes, suggests future research, and presents implications of the findings. 
Methodology 
Search for Literature 
The literature review started out with a broad approach. In order to gain a better understanding 
of the venture capital industry, core articles covering venture capital processes were selected 
and analyzed. After gaining a better understanding of the venture capital world, a search for 
articles more specific to the field of VCs and exit processes was conducted. However, due to the 
limited research on the topic of venture capital exits, the search for literature needed to remain 
broad. Our goal was to achieve the best possible overview of the entire exit process, and as such 
we were interested in articles covering several aspects of the venture capital investment 
process.  
The search followed two different approaches. Google Scholar (GS) was utilized as the primary 
search engine, and as a starting point key words and key phrases identified in the core literature 
were used as search terms. In order to select relevant articles, a combination of two criteria was 
used to judge the quality of the search results. The first criterion was the number of citations 
given by GS, while the second criterion was the journal ranking, as measured by the Financial 
Times ranking from 2007 and the classification made by the French business school École 
Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales (ESSEC) from 2009/2010. In addition to 
these main criteria, the quality was also assessed by looking at the currency given by year of 
publication, and a subjective evaluation of the relevance of the content. There was also a clear 
goal of combining qualitative with quantitative studies in order to achieve methodological 
convergence (Jick, 1979). 
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In addition to the online search, a snowball sampling approach was used. After reading the 
articles identified using GS, it became clear that many of these had been citing the same studies. 
These frequently cited studies provided a better understanding of the elementary principles in 
the literature. By using this approach, important studies that would not have been found using 
solely online search could be added to the literature list. 
These two approaches were used simultaneously, resulting in a reinforcing cycle. The search 
terms could be updated and modified, and hence the online search could yield more results. This 
in turn lead to more relevant literature found from the snowball sampling. 
To get a broader knowledge in the area of exits and to avoid becoming too focused on topicality 
(Bruce, 2001), articles from the domain of M&A were included, since there is a close link 
between trade sales and M&As. In addition, this choice was motivated by the lack of studies 
covering venture capital trade sale exits.  
Grouping and Selection of Articles 
In order to group the wide array of articles properly, an approach in the spirit of grounded 
theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) was used. Each article was assigned key words, the key words 
were grouped into concepts, and these concepts were finally grouped into six categories. After 
searching for and reading a large number of articles, no articles identifying new concepts or 
areas of interest were found, and it was concluded that a satisfactory level of theoretical 
saturation was reached. The categories created were: Choice of Exit Vehicle, Time to Exit, Legality 
and Control, Adding Value, Social Capital, and Mergers and Acquisitions. The review of the 
literature is presented following the same topical structure.  
The literature selected (presented in Appendix 2-7) was analyzed in two steps. First, each 
category was analyzed on a stand-alone basis to understand the different aspects of exit 
facilitation. Secondly, the findings from each category were combined to create an initial model 
covering the main research questions. 
Criticism of Methodology 
Although the literature search started out with a focus on articles published in high ranking 
journals with a high citation number, these criteria were bypassed to a certain extent when 
populating the categories, and there are a few articles included in this review that are currently 
unpublished. This choice might have affected the quality of the overall population, since only a 
subjective evaluation from the authors was used as a selection criterion.  
There are two main reasons for why this alternative selection approach was used. Number one, 
as previously stated, the research on venture capital exits has been rather limited (Isaksson, 
2007). Number two, the venture capital industry has experienced tremendous change over the 
past decade, and a lot of the high ranking literature is published in connection with the golden 
age around the turn of the millennia. By including newer work, although unpublished, it has 
been possible to capture the evolvement in the research on venture capital in general and on 
venture capital exits in particular. This argument is also supported by Bruce (2001), who states 
that “… students working in relatively new research areas need to read even studies that are of 
peripheral interest …” The authors of the unpublished papers have been contacted in order to 
make sure that the version included in this paper is the most current.  
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After selecting the articles to be used in the section covering value-adding activities, it turned 
out that all of them came from the Journal of Business Venturing. This came as a result of the 
approach used to select articles, and was not a deliberate choice by the authors. However, it has 
to be noted that this might have lead to a journal bias, where the views of this specific publisher 
have been overrepresented in this specific section. 
The same authors are often featured several times in the literature list. This overrepresentation 
might have lead to a researcher bias, where these authors have been given too much attention. 
However, research covering venture capital exits is as previously mentioned fairly limited, and 
hence the number of researchers in the area is also limited. It has been a goal to only feature 
repeated authors if they are considered among the most respected in their field, and if the extra 
articles add new value to the literature review. 
Literature Review 
The following section will elaborate on the main findings from the literature review, and is 
followed by a summary of our main findings. A summary of the literature covered can be found 
in Appendix 2-7. 
Choice of Exit Vehicle 
Introduction 
The choice of exit vehicle is an instrumental variable in the VC exit process. When exiting their 
investments, VCs employ five principal exit vehicles: IPOs, trade sales, secondary sales, buybacks 
and write-offs. There is also a distinction between full and partial exits, where partial exits 
indicate that the VC holds on to an amount of his original holdings when the exit occurs, whereas 
in a full exit all of the VC’s holdings is divested at the time of the exit event (Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2003). 
These five exit vehicles vary widely in terms of the return potential they offer, the prestige 
involved in the exit, and the strain on both the entrepreneur and the VC (e.g. Brau et al., 2003; 
Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Gompers, 1996; Isaksson, 2000). When examining the venture 
capital exit process and trying to build an understanding of what the VC does and why, it is 
therefore imperative to review the existing research on what determines the choice of exit 
vehicle.  
Main Findings 
The first obvious revelation when covering the academic literature on the choice of exit vehicle 
is that all exit vehicles are not created equal. It is common to rank the exit vehicles in order of 
preference, where one also makes a distinction between what is the preferred vehicle for the VC 
versus what the entrepreneur might desire (Bascha and Walz, 2001). The most common ranking 
in order of preference for the VC is given as: IPO, trade sale, secondary sale, buyback and write-
off – with the IPO as the obvious home run exit (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Wall and Smith, 
1997). 
For some of the exit vehicles this ranking is rather straightforward; it is clear that for both the 
VC and the entrepreneur an IPO will be preferred to a write-off. In fact, most authors (and for 
that matter VCs!) seem to draw the conclusion that the exit vehicles secondary sale, buy-back 
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and write-off all represent a certain degree of failure, with little to no return for the VC (e.g. 
Cumming and Johan, 2008; De Clercq et al., 2006; Wang and Sim, 2001). However, Wall and 
Smith (1997) point to the fact that European VCs are missing out on profitable exits due to the 
excessive focus on IPO over trade sale, and since secondary sales are not considered as a serious 
exit vehicle. Thus, the traditional preference ranking of exit vehicles might be flawed.  
Nevertheless, as a result of the fact that the IPO and the trade sale typically are viewed as the 
desired exit paths, and since the possibility of exiting in either of these fashions does imply a 
successful venture, the choice between the two has been the focus of several articles (e.g. Brau et 
al., 2003; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Hellmann, 2006; Yang et al., 2008). While most authors 
state that the IPO is the preferred exit vehicle for both entrepreneur and VC (e.g. Gompers, 1996; 
Isaksson, 2000; Wall and Smith, 1997; Wang and Sim, 2001), others disagree, pointing to the fact 
that a trade sale might actually result in a higher valuation (and thus pay-off to the VC) due to 
the synergy potential that a potential acquirer could benefit from (Schilit, 1991; Wright et al., 
1990). 
Looking closer at these two top-ranked exit vehicles then, no undisputed order of preference 
between the two can be made. Instead, many factors specific for the venture being exited is 
posited to influence which exit vehicle is employed. According to Brau et al. (2003) four main 
categories of factors affect the decision between an IPO and a trade sale: industry characteristics, 
the role of market timing, the demands for funds by private firms, and deal specific factors. 
In their study, Brau et al. (2003) find that high industry concentration, being affiliated with a 
high-tech industry, a high current cost of debt, a relatively hot IPO market, a large venture (in 
terms of total asset value), and a high insider percentage ownership all are positively related to 
the probability of an IPO. In contrast, a high market-to-book and/or highly leveraged industry, 
being affiliated with the financial services sector, and where the deal involves greater liquidity 
for the selling insiders are all factors positively related to the probability of being acquired.  
Further, Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) state that ventures with a higher growth potential are 
more likely to go public. This is perhaps not surprising, as ventures with a low growth potential 
typically do not fit the return requirements of the public market. Schwienbacher (2008), on the 
other hand, points to the importance of the innovation degree of the product or service offered. 
A higher degree of innovation makes it harder for potential acquirers to create fit between their 
own organization and the target, and thus lowers the value for the acquirer. The result is that 
firms with a higher degree of innovation are more likely to go public via an IPO.  
As denoted earlier, one can distinguish between full and partial exits. Partial exits might seem 
counterintuitive, as they reduce the potential payoff to the VC without reducing the costs of the 
VC as an active investor. Nevertheless, they are quite common. According to Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2003), who looked into the determinants affecting whether a full or a partial exit will 
be executed, the main determinant is the amount of information asymmetry between the VC and 
the purchaser(s) of the VC’s shares. 
In the event that there is private information about the venture and its potential for success that 
is difficult or impossible to make fully available to the interested parties, the VC might hold on to 
a certain stake in order to signal the quality of the venture. The logic is that the VC is willing to 
retain a stake only if the venture truly is a good investment, and as a result a signal of quality is 
sent to the market (Lin and Smith, 1997). 
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The choice of exit vehicle is also influenced by the geographic location of the venture capital firm 
(VCF) in question. Several studies have concluded that there exist significant differences in exit 
behavior dependent on which country the VCF is operating in – a result that is often attributed 
to the institutional and legal factors of the specific market (Isaksson, 2000; Schwienbacher, 
2005; Wang and Sim, 2001). 
As seen by the preceding paragraphs, the choice of exit vehicle is influenced by a multitude of 
variables. These variables include factors specific for the venture itself and the greater 
macroeconomic picture it operates within. However: 
Venture capitalists may have more experience in choosing the optimal method for going 
public and may be subject to fewer personal preferences for liquidity or control than are 
the sellers of non-VC-backed firms since they invest in and divest from many firms 
(Poulsen and Stegemoller, 2008). 
At the same time “VCs play an active role in directing investees towards the exit since this 
provides a means to cash-out their gains to earn a return on their investments (Wang and Sim, 
2001).” Further, many VCFs have a stated preferred exit vehicle (Isaksson, 2007). Therefore, the 
influence of the VC himself when choosing the exit vehicle for the investment cannot be 
disregarded.  
This point is expanded upon by Wall and Smith (1997), who distinguish between two types of 
VCs with respect to exit behavior: the passive investor, who takes a minority stake in the 
company, has a long-term view of the investment, and has not planned a specific exit route; and 
the proactive investor, who plans exit from the investment date, is motivated by cash, and gives 
the management incentives.  
Similarly, Relander et al. (1994) point to two different patterns of exit behavior for the VC, 
known as the path sketcher and the opportunist. A path sketcher VC has a proactive attitude 
towards exit problems from the very start, planning potential exit opportunities even before the 
investment is made, and working actively on developing potential exits during the entire post-
investment phase. The opportunist, on the other hand, has such a belief in his own management 
skills and the potential of the investment target that a profitable exit opportunity will develop 
when the time is right. 
In conclusion, the exit vehicle employed when divesting portfolio ventures seems to be heavily 
influenced by a multitude of factors both within and outside of the VC’s control sphere.  
Time to Exit 
Introduction 
According to financial and economic theory, the time to exit is one of the parameters 
determining the attractiveness of an investment (Douglas, 1992). A shorter time to exit will 
increase the present value and return of the investment and hence increase its attractiveness 
(Sahlman and Scherlis, 1988). VCs also typically set a harvest date for their investments (De 
Clercq et al., 2006; Zider, 1998), and they therefore need to be able to influence the time aspect 
of exiting. 
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A basic assumption is that a shorter time to exit leads to a larger return on investment. This, 
however, is not always the case. The VC will have to compare the opportunity cost of continued 
involvement with the potential increased returns from adding more value to the investment 
(Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). 
Even though timing evidently is an important factor in the exit process as a whole, “… rarely has 
the speed with which a company reaches its IPO been investigated” (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 
2001). This is true not only for the IPO exits, however. IPOs are overrepresented in the literature 
dealing with exit timing, and little attention has been paid to other exit vehicles (Giot and 
Schwienbacher, 2007).  
Nevertheless, the time to exit is a highly important variable in the venture capital exit process. 
Therefore, this part of the literature review focuses on articles covering exit timing, with the goal 
of identifying factors that affect a portfolio company’s time to exit.  
Main Findings 
The first important finding is that the type of exit vehicle affects time to exit. IPOs are by some 
scholars regarded as the fastest exit route, adding an explanation as to why it is the preferred 
exit route of many VCs (Espenlaub et al., 2009). Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) support this by 
using a competing risks model, where it is shown that VC-backed firms in the U.S. experience an 
increased likelihood of exiting through an IPO until a plateau is reached, followed by declining 
IPO exit possibilities. Trade sales have a more monotonic hazard rate, making it a more universal 
exit route.  
A company is rarely exited in full just because an IPO has taken place. VCs often keep a part of 
their shares, hence creating a partial exit (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). This means that the 
time to exit not only includes the time up to the IPO; the time it takes to actually divest also has 
to be taken into consideration. But if VCs only are concerned with returns, why do they not sell 
all their shares immediately? Several researchers have looked at this apparent paradox. The 
most obvious answer is, of course, legal factors. The VC is often obliged to hold on to a certain 
percentage of his shares, due to lock-up and contractual agreements.  
However, another interesting factor many point to is VC reputation. VCs with established 
reputations do not want to sell shares if they perceive them to be overpriced (Lin and Smith, 
1997), since this might ruin their reputation. This is also supported by Neus and Walz (2005), 
who see the venture capital investment process as a repeated game. If secondary investors 
buying shares in an IPO experience overpricing, their confidence in the VCs might be shaken 
when the next IPO comes around. Therefore, VCs might want to hold their shares until the true 
value of the company is revealed by the market, especially if there is a large potential for 
overpricing. 
While more experienced VCs are concerned with not losing their reputation, younger VCs are 
trying to build one. For limited partners it might be hard to judge a VC’s competence (Gompers, 
1996), and an IPO might signal an ability to pick good investments, making it extremely 
important for inexperienced VCs to show off a home run. This behavior is coined grandstanding 
by Gompers (1996), and also include the fact that investments that are taken to the market too 
early will be underpriced. Support for this observation is given by Neus and Walz (2005), who 
assert that young VCs may have an incentive to underprice in order to gain a reputation. 
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Esbenlaub et al. (2009) also observe that young VCs hold their investments for a shorter period 
of time than their more experienced counterparts, indicating support for the grandstanding 
hypothesis. 
But reputation is not the only factor influencing time to exit. The activity in the market plays an 
important role (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Rossetto, 2008; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001), 
and a hot market significantly shortens the time to exit. There are two explanations for this. 
Number one, a hot market is more liquid and it will be easier to find potential buyers of a 
company, be it through an IPO or a trade sale. Number two, there are often more potential good 
deals around in a hot market, giving the VCs an incentive to exit their current investments in 
order to free up human capital for new investments. Rossetto (2008) makes an interesting 
observation, namely that companies with venture capital backing is less likely to be underpriced 
during normal periods, but that the opposite is true for hot issue periods. This might suggest 
that VCs have a better ability to price their companies correctly than other actors in the market, 
but deliberately choose to underprice during hot markets in order to get access to new capital. 
Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) show that the degree of value-adding from the VCs positively 
influences the time to exit. This can be seen in the light of Esbenlaub et al. (2009), who claim that 
syndication decreases the time to exit. These two observations can be combined, since it is 
highly likely that a syndicate of VCs will have a larger knowledge reservoir (Widding, 2005) and 
therefore will be able to add more value to the venture. The observation regarding syndication 
should also be viewed in the light of social capital, an area which we will return to shortly; 
syndication will provide a larger network, increasing the possibility of finding potential buyers, 
and hence speed up the exit process. 
Geography is another factor influencing time to exit. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001) find that 
companies located in the West and Midwest of the U.S. have shorter times to exit than in the 
Northeast. A possible explanation for this is what they call a strong ecosystem, which both 
provides a nurturing environment and an increase in the birth rate of new organizations. 
Support for the impact of geographical location is given by Esbenlaub et al. (2009), who find that 
companies in the U.S. are exited faster than in the UK and the rest of the world.  
The concept of staged financing, described in detail in the following section, is closely connected 
to the evaluation of achieved milestones. Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) show that the 
achievement of milestones accelerates exit for all exit routes. Milestones give the VCs an 
opportunity to evaluate the quality of their investments. If they are developing the right way, 
more money and resources can be invested, hence accelerating the exit. If the venture is not 
developing as planned, judged by milestones, they may choose to divest through a liquidation in 
order to limit losses and free up any capital that can be salvaged from the failure. 
A final interesting observation is made by Lin and Smith (1997): venture capital-backed 
companies are taken public at an earlier stage than other companies in general, hence making 
the VC himself a factor influencing time to exit. This is explained by the fact that VCs have limited 
resources in the form of advisory talent available to them. In order to free up these resources for 
other investments, they choose to push for an exit. This offers an alternative to the 
grandstanding hypothesis, although not mutually exclusive. 
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The time to exit of a given portfolio venture thus appears to be influenced by a multitude of 
variables; some given by the external environment and some more inclined to active 
manipulation by the VC.  
Legality and Control 
Introduction 
The risk associated with investing in early-stage ventures is pronounced (Sahlman, 1990). The 
failure rate among such companies is high, and on average as few as two out of ten ventures 
succeed (Zider, 1998). VCs themselves seem to be confident that the main reason for these 
failures is shortcomings in the senior management of the portfolio companies (Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989). 
It is not surprising then, that VCs use different mechanisms to reduce the risk, and to increase 
the control over the portfolio companies’ destinies (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Zider, 1998). 
In fact, different types of control rights are correlated with, and facilitate, exit outcomes 
(Cumming, 2008). Additionally, the institutional and legal factors in a geographical region can 
influence the risk associated with investing in private ventures (Cumming et al., 2006). 
Main Findings 
Some parts of the literature emphasize the Legality in a country as a determinant of exit 
possibilities (Cumming et al., 2006; Isaksson, 2000; Schwienbacher, 2005; Wang and Sim, 2001). 
Legality is an index derived by different law and finance factors, such as the judicial system, the 
rule of law, corruption, and shareholder rights, as described by La Porta et al. (1997; 1998; 
2000). Empirical evidence gives support for the influence Legality places on exit: high quality 
legal environments give rise to successful exit environments, and an increase in the Legality 
index increases the probability for exiting through an IPO (Cumming et al., 2006). 
A possible explanation could be that countries with better protection of shareholder rights have 
more developed equity markets (Cumming and Johan, 2008). In addition, Cumming and Johan 
(2008) find that Legality is associated with governance structures, such as syndication and 
board seats, which in turn are positively related to the probability of an IPO. 
The VC and the entrepreneur may have different preferences with respect to which exit vehicle 
to employ (Cumming, 2008; Cumming and Johan, 2008; Hellmann, 2006). The entrepreneur is 
often assumed to prefer an IPO, because it is more likely that he continues to control the 
company in such a case. The VC, on the other hand, may actually prefer a trade sale in some 
cases (Cumming, 2008; Cumming and Johan, 2008; Hellmann, 2006). In order to cope with this 
misalignment of interests, VCs use different kinds of governance mechanisms (Cumming, 2008; 
Cumming and Johan, 2008). 
These governance factors may include board positions, control rights, veto rights, and security 
design (Cumming and Johan, 2008; Sahlman, 1990). Control rights are for example co-sale 
arrangements, drag-along rights and anti-dilution protection (Cumming and Johan, 2008). 
Examples of veto rights are the right to prohibit asset sales, asset purchases, issuances of equity 
and changes in control (Cumming and Johan, 2008). 
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Research shows that such governance factors influence exit vehicles. When the exit strategy is 
pre-planned, a trade sale exit is associated with stronger control and veto rights (Cumming and 
Johan, 2008). Likewise, trade sale exits, pre-planned or not, are associated with stronger control 
rights (Cumming, 2008). This is in line with the arguments made related to the misalignment of 
interests between the VC and entrepreneur presented over. Moreover, IPO exits are associated 
with weaker control rights. This is also true for ventures that are liquidated (Cumming, 2008). 
Most VCs assume a position on the board when investing, and board positions seem to play an 
important role in determining exit (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Sahlman, 1990; Smith, 2005; 
Williams et al., 2006). More specifically, the board is often the institution in the company that is 
authorized to initiate exit decisions (Smith, 2005). 
Another widely used mechanism by VCs to reduce the risk associated with investing in early-
stage ventures is convertible preferred securities (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Sahlman, 1990; 
Smith, 2005). Hellman (2006) shows that convertible preferred securities may affect the exit, by 
allocating different cash flow rights for IPOs and trade sales. An optimal contract may in fact give 
the VC more cash flow rights in a trade sale (Hellmann, 2006). Pre-planned trade sale exits are 
more likely to be associated with convertible securities and have a lower likelihood of using 
common equity (Cumming and Johan, 2008).   
Should the venture performance be extremely disappointing, and it becomes necessary to 
liquidate the firm, VCs use liquidation rights to recover as much of their investment as possible 
(Sahlman, 1990; Smith, 2005). This means that VCs have the first claim of the venture’s assets 
and technology (Zider, 1998). 
A final method to obtain control over the portfolio companies is capital staging (Gompers, 1995; 
Sahlman, 1990). The concept is that the portfolio company is only granted enough money to 
reach the next milestone (Schwienbacher, 2005). If the portfolio company reaches the next 
stage, more money is likely to be invested. When considering infusing additional capital, the VC 
gathers information, and staging of capital therefore becomes a monitoring device (Gompers, 
1995). This practice is disciplinary and provides incentives to the entrepreneur. Misuse of 
capital becomes costly for the entrepreneur, because more capital will be invested at a lower 
valuation, reducing the entrepreneur’s stake. Further, staging of capital gives the VC the option 
to abandon the project completely if it is performing badly (Sahlman, 1990).  
The extent of rights used may vary by the entrepreneur, the VC and the nature of the firm. For 
instance, more experienced entrepreneurs receive venture financing with less control rights, 
and more experienced VCs are more likely to use convertible securities (Cumming, 2008; 
Cumming and Johan, 2008). This is straight-forward, because experienced entrepreneurs often 
have a track-record that reduces the risk for the VC. Also, VCs are more likely to use control 
rights in a venture that operates in a high-tech industry, and less likely to use such mechanisms 
in ventures in the earlier stages (Cumming, 2008). High-tech industries are often associated with 
higher risk, and the VC may therefore find it natural to increase the level of control in such 
ventures.  
In conclusion, it is evident that the institutional factors and governance mechanisms imposed by 
VCs influence both the exit possibilities and the exit vehicle.   
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Adding Value 
Introduction 
In general, VCs are active investors, spending considerable time on their portfolio companies 
(Steier, 1998). Gorman and Sahlman (1989) found that most VCs spend more than half of their 
time actively involved with their portfolio companies. In the post-investment phase, the VC 
involves himself in two main activities: monitoring and value-adding activities (De Clercq et al., 
2006). In order to monitor the investments, the VC often acts as a director of the company, in 
addition to requiring regular updates on the company status from the management team (De 
Clercq et al., 2006). Moreover, the VC may support his portfolio companies by conducting 
different kinds of value-adding activities. MacMillan et al. (1989) distinguish between four areas 
of involvement: development and operations, management selection, personnel management, 
and financial participation. 
The value that VCs add to the portfolio companies helps justify the expensive capital they 
provide to entrepreneurial ventures (De Clercq et al., 2006; Zider, 1998). Ehrlich et al. (1994) 
support this statement: “Who the entrepreneur gets his/her money from is just as important as 
the amount of capital obtained initially.” Gompers (1995) puts it this way: “Venture capitalists 
claim that the information they generate and the services they provide for portfolio companies 
are as important as the capital infused.” However, he adds that: “Many entrepreneurs believe 
that venture capitalists provide little more than money.”  
These statements lead us to a central question that is sought answered in the research on value-
adding: Do VCs add value? Efforts made to answer this question have led to inconclusive 
answers (Barney et al., 1996). Some studies support the hypothesis that VCs add value 
(MacMillan et al., 1989; Sapienza, 1992), while others point in the opposite direction, or find no 
support for such a hypothesis at all (Busenitz et al., 2004). 
What is for certain is that VCs spend a considerable amount of their time actively involved with 
their portfolio companies; an activity that would make no sense should the VC himself doubt 
that he can add value to the entrepreneurial ventures. Therefore, while scholars thus far have 
been unable to give a definitive answer to the question of whether or not VCs add value to their 
portfolio companies, the conclusion can be drawn that the practitioners themselves believe that 
they can, and hence spend a considerable amount of their time on activities intended to do just 
that.  
By taking the stance that VCs in fact can add value it is obvious that the degree to which they are 
successful in doing so affects the survival probability and success of the venture in question. 
Since successful exits are contingent on successful ventures, there might be a link between the 
value added and the exit process, warranting a review of the literature in this field.  
Main Findings 
According to several studies, the main value-adding activity for VCs is to help in financial and 
strategic matters (Ehrlich et al., 1994; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1989; 
Sapienza et al., 1996). This may involve help in raising additional capital, providing strategic 
advice, and serving on a sounding board for the portfolio companies. Additionally, VCs may help 
with developing business plans and recruitment (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Zider, 1998). 
42 
 
Typically, VCs are not involved in the day-to-day operation of the portfolio companies (Gorman 
and Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1989; Sapienza et al., 1996). 
Overall, VCs are satisfied with the service they provide to their portfolio companies, and they 
would not have changed their behavior significantly if they could (MacMillan et al., 1989). If they 
had the chance, however, they would have increased their involvement in activities requiring 
minimal time commitment, and decreased their involvement in activities requiring considerable 
time (MacMillan et al., 1989). On the other hand, entrepreneurs mainly seek help from investors 
to manage the financial aspects of the firm, as well as conducting recruitment (Ehrlich et al., 
1994). This shows that the supply of expertise from VCs is to a large degree in line with the 
demand for expertise from entrepreneurs.  
Another aspect that influences the value of advice from VCs is entrepreneurial ventures’ 
openness to advice. Barney et al. (1996) found that the success of nonfinancial assistance 
depends partly on how much value the management team puts on advice from VCs. This raises 
an interesting question: Do entrepreneurs in general see value in the advice and activities of the 
VC? And if the answer is no, could this be part of the reason why entrepreneurs mainly seek help 
to manage the financial aspects of the firm? Under the assumption that openness to advice 
affects the value added from the VC, the demand for advice could also be greater from the 
entrepreneurs that are open to it. Thus, a reinforcing virtuous cycle of value-adding could be 
generated by having an open and demanding entrepreneur.   
Other factors may also influence the degree of value added from the VC. For instance, VCs add 
more value to portfolio companies associated with pronounced uncertainty related to 
innovation and life cycle (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996). However, value can be added in 
every stage of the companies’ life cycles (Sapienza, 1992). It is also found that VCs with 
experience in the industry in which the portfolio firm operates, add more value than those who 
do not hold such experience (Sapienza et al., 1996). Firm performance may also influence the 
value ventures put on VCs’ advice. Sapienza (1992) found a positive correlation between firm 
performance and the entrepreneur’s evaluation of the value of VC involvement. There are at 
least two different explanations of this phenomenon. One is that venture performance influences 
the perception of the value that is added, and the other is that VCs actually do provide value, 
which is subsequently transferred into superior performance (Sapienza, 1992). However, 
Barney et al. (1996) found that the current performance of a portfolio company does not 
influence the assessment of the performance of VCs’ advice.  
Additionally, the human capital of VCs has been under scrutiny. Distinguishing general human 
capital, defined as an education within humanities and social sciences, and specific human 
capital, defined as an education within management and law, in addition to consulting 
experience, Dimov and Shepherd (2005) explored to which degree human capital influences 
investment performance. They found that general human capital was associated with a higher 
likelihood of an IPO, while specific human capital reduced the probability of a bankruptcy.  
As mentioned, several studies show that VCs allocate a majority of their time to value-adding 
activities (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Zider, 1998). Typically, the lead investor in a portfolio 
company devotes more time to the investment than non-lead investors. However, a portfolio 
company may have a VC’s attention only for an hour or two per week (Gorman and Sahlman, 
1989; Zider, 1998). This means that VCs are not deeply involved in the day-to-day operations of 
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their portfolio companies. However, the amount of face-to-face interaction between the VC and 
the CEO and the number of hours put into each venture are determining factors of value added 
(Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996).  
The VC devotes different amounts of time to each of the portfolio companies (Sapienza et al., 
1996). Typically, less time is allocated to the top performers in the portfolio, as well as the 
lemons (Zider, 1998). However, other studies show that it is in fact in the well-functioning 
companies the VC may add the most value (Sapienza et al., 1996). Companies in the early stages 
also receive more attention than older ventures (Sapienza et al., 1996). 
Even though the average VC spends much time on value-adding activities, there are considerable 
differences between different VCFs. VCs may conduct laissez-faire involvement, moderate 
involvement, and close tracker involvement, where the investor exhibits more involvement than 
the entrepreneur in some activities (MacMillan et al., 1989). No differences in portfolio company 
performance were found with respect to the different levels of involvement (MacMillan et al., 
1989). However, different types of involvement may require different types of activities in order 
to have a positive impact on venture performance. For laissez-faire involvement, developing a 
professional support group influenced performance positively, while monitoring operations had 
a positive influence when conducting moderate involvement. For the close tracker, negotiating 
employment terms with management added the most value (measured as venture performance) 
(MacMillan et al., 1989).  
In conclusion, under the stance that the VC actually can add value apart from financial 
assistance, this value is influenced by various factors. Obviously, the more value that is added to 
the venture as it develops, the higher is the probability of it surviving and growing to become a 
successful company. As a result, a successful exit for the VC is more probable; indicating that 
value-adding factors cannot be disregarded when seeking to define the variables that affect exits.   
Social Capital 
Introduction 
Human beings do not operate within a social vacuum. We are connected to others, and we have 
our own unique networks. The existence of such unique networks, in combination with personal 
characteristics of individuals, are among the factors making opportunity recognition possible 
(Kirzner, 1999). In addition, these networks are very important for both investor and 
entrepreneur in maximizing the rate of return achieved on their investments: 
Rate of return is keyed to the social structure of the competitive arena and is the focus 
here. Each player has a network of contacts in the arena. Certain players are connected to 
certain others, trust certain others, are obligated to support certain others, and are 
dependent on exchange with certain others. Something about the structure of the 
player’s network and the location of the player’s contacts in the social structure of the 
arena provide a competitive advantage in getting higher rates of return on investment 
(Burt, 2000).  
These connections to others constitute the social capital of the individual, and the social capital 
of the people in the organization aggregate to the social capital of the organization (Burt, 2000). 
As such, the social capital of the VCF is the sum of the social capital of its partners and 
employees.  
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In addition to social capital, organizations bring financial and human capital to the competitive 
arena. However, there are some important characteristics of social capital that distinguishes it 
from the other two. First of all, social capital is never owned by a single individual or 
organization – instead it is jointly owned and determined by the parties in the relationship. 
Should your legal advisor decide to retire and withdraw from his professional network, the 
connection dissolves and the social capital inherent in the relationship is lost. Secondly, where 
both the financial and human capital are concerned with the investment term of the market 
production equation, social capital affects the rate of return. It is through the social capital of the 
firm that “… the opportunities to transform financial and human capital into profit [arises]” 
(Burt, 2000).  
These statements are as true for a consulting firm selling its services as they are for VCs looking 
for good prospects to invest in and later exit from. In fact: 
Networks also feature prominently in the venture capital (VC) industry. VCs tend to 
syndicate their investments with other VCs, rather than investing alone. They are thus 
bound by their current and past investments into webs of relationships with other VCs. 
Once they have invested in a company, VCs draw on their networks of service providers – 
head hunters, patent lawyers, investment bankers, etc. – to help the company succeed 
(Hochberg et al., 2007).  
Therefore, it is highly relevant to investigate the research literature on the connection between 
exit processes and the social capital of the VC. Even though a minimal amount of studies have 
been performed within this setting, some interesting results have been produced, and these will 
form the backdrop for our discussion regarding the effect of social capital on exit processes.   
Main Findings 
As previously stated, the reputation of the VCF, in terms of the firm being known for not exiting 
at overstated valuations, is important for alleviating a large problem for VCs when exiting; 
namely that of information asymmetry between seller and buyer. As such, social capital has the 
potential to lower the information asymmetry, as the reputation of a VC is an inherent part of his 
social capital. 
However, social capital can have an even more direct influence on the problem of asymmetrical 
information. As shown by Gompers and Xuan (2009) in their study of acquisitions of private 
companies by public acquirers, VCs can function as bridge builders between the acquiring firm 
and the target. In situations where both the acquirer and the target have been financed by the 
same VCF, the likelihood that a transaction will be all-equity financed as well as the likelihood 
that a transaction will take place at all both increase significantly. Furthermore, the acquisition 
announcement returns are significantly higher for such transactions when benchmarked against 
transactions where the VCF has no financing history with the acquirer.  
The strong social relationships the VC has with both the acquirer and the target thus allows him 
to act as a bridge builder, credibly conveying information between the two firms through his 
personal relationships. The information asymmetry associated with the transaction is reduced 
for both parties, increasing the likelihood of a successful acquisition. Importantly, this effect of 
the social capital of the VC is especially valuable in situations where the asymmetric information 
problem is especially severe; that is where the firms are geographically dispersed (putting a 
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restraint on the ability to “kick the tires” of the target) and where the target is young (thus 
having little history of performance and market standing to show to) (Gompers and Xuan, 2009).  
Furthermore, Hochberg et al. (2007) comprehensively show that networks are the predominant 
choice of organizational form for VCFs. In fact, some VCFs even go as far as describing 
themselves as a venture keiretsu. These networks differ in their size and quality, with some VCs 
holding a more influential network position than others, “… implying differences in clout, 
investment opportunity sets, access to information, etc. across VCs” (Hochberg et al., 2007). As 
such, having a central position in the network does not only improve the access to deal flow. 
Well-networked VCs are found to perform better as they are able to provide higher quality 
value-adding services to the ventures they invest in, with the result that these portfolio 
companies are significantly more likely to survive to an eventual exit.  
However, the social capital of the VC does not only affect the potential for successfully exiting. As 
we have mentioned earlier, VCs are as a rule of thumb not able to sell their stake in a venture 
immediately following an IPO. Instead, they typically gradually divest their holdings over a 
period of months and even years. As a result, then, the ability of the firm to survive after going 
public may also be an important determinant of the success of the exit for the VCF. Fisher and 
Pollock (2004) show that a higher proportion of investors included in the deal network at the 
time of transforming the company from private to public that have embedded ties to the lead 
underwriter has a positive effect on the likelihood of survival for the IPO firm. This is due to the 
fact that embedded investors allocate higher credibility to the claims made by the underwriter, 
increasing their tolerance of short-term variance in performance following the IPO (Fischer and 
Pollock, 2004). Thus, they are willing to hold on to the stock for a longer period of time, 
providing stability in the stock price and allowing the company to focus on strategic and 
operational activities (Rao and Sivakumar, 1999).  
Therefore, Fisher and Pollock (2004) conclude that:  
Finally, when selecting an underwriter to lead their IPO, managers should carefully 
consider not just the reputational capital of underwriters, but also the social capital 
reflected in their networks of relationships with institutional investors and the likelihood 
they will use their social capital on the firm’s behalf to construct an embedded deal 
network.  
However, we know that the VC typically holds at least one seat on the board of directors, and has 
a significant influence over important management decisions (such as the decision to go public) 
through his ownership stake as well as through special provisions in the investment contract. In 
addition, VCs with exit experience have personal relationships with both underwriters and 
institutional investors. Therefore, it is logical that the VC also plays an important role when it 
comes to the choice of who should be the lead underwriter for the IPO firm – and that the social 
capital of the VC will be an important determinant of which firm is chosen. Furthermore, having 
a VC onboard with embedded relationships with both underwriters and institutional investors 
should also mean that a higher credibility is allocated to the information relayed about the IPO 
firm. Thus, the social capital of the VC can play an important role in providing stability for the 
IPO firm – increasing its likelihood of survival post-IPO. This view is supported by the fact that 
venture capital-backed firms are more likely to survive IPOs than non venture capital-backed 
companies (Jain and Kini, 2000). 
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There is little doubt that the social capital of the VC has a significant effect on several aspects of 
the exit process. Hochberg et al. (2007) find that:  
… VCs that are better-networked at the time a fund is raised subsequently enjoy 
significantly better fund performance, as measured by the rate of successful portfolio 
exits over the next 10 years. 
The famous proverb “It is not what you know, but who you know” seems to have some clout also 
when it comes to the VC and his exit process. 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Introduction 
Most of the research done with regards to exit processes is focused on IPOs. With trade sales 
being the most common exit route for VCs, exhibiting a strong growth over the past 10 years 
(Chaplinsky and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2010; Wall and Smith, 1997), it is evident that attention 
needs to be paid to this exit route as well. In order to get a broader perspective on exits, this 
chapter will take a closer look at the exit process from an M&A perspective. 
Most M&A literature have been interested in the buyer’s perspective, with the goal of identifying 
factors that determine the acquirer’s degree of success (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
Previous research also tends to be focused on the acquisitions of public firms (Capron and Shen, 
2007). However, with the goal of this study in mind, this section will rather focus on factors that 
are of importance to the VC and entrepreneur, in order to create the most value when 
conducting an exit through a trade sale of a privately held company. 
Main Findings 
The first interesting finding from these articles concerns the timing of the decision to sell. 
Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) suggest that the motivation of the management of the selling 
company mainly comes down to two factors, namely strategic hurdles and strong personal 
motivations. If none of these factors are present, management will act in a discouraging way 
towards potential buyers, making a trade sale more difficult. Four factors driving the personal 
motivation of management were identified; fear of failure, stress, dilution risk, and financial 
gain. A strategic hurdle is defined as a non-incremental event in the company’s development, 
such as raising funds, ramping up sales, hiring a new CEO or filling a strategic gap (Graebner and 
Eisenhardt, 2004). Managers who experienced one or more of these factors were shown to have 
a high interest in being acquired (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). This view is partially 
supported by Petty et al. (1994), who found that the need for financing growth is a factor 
influencing the selling decision. 
Capron and Shen (2007) look at the trade sale mainly from the buyer’s point of view, but their 
findings have some interesting implications for sellers of private firms. Most striking is perhaps 
the observation that due to information asymmetry leading to a higher perceived risk, a private 
firm discount exists. The authors point to a lack of visibility and lack of managerial ability to 
convey the value of their assets, in addition to a lack of negotiation skills and low acquisition 
experience, and suggest acting carefully when negotiating psychological benefits at the expense 
of purchasing price. This is in line with the thoughts of Wall and Smith (1997), who suggest that 
a potential way to improve the exit process is to involve third-party intermediaries. 
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Interestingly, Stuart et al. (1999) argue that an acquirer can use the quality of third-party 
endorsements to assess the quality of young, newly public firms. This might also hold some truth 
before the firm has gone public, and hence offer some support to Wall and Smith (1997). 
However, caution needs to be taken when choosing these intermediaries. Kesner et al. (1994) 
argue that the use of investment bankers reduces the cost of searching by matching buyers and 
sellers, that they reduce information asymmetry, and also provide technical expertise improving 
the efficiency and effectiveness of negotiations. But, when looking at this process by using 
agency theory, there might be a misalignment of interests. The bankers often get paid a 
percentage of the total value of the deal, both when representing the target and the bidder. This 
means that the goals of the seller and the investment bankers seemingly are aligned, under the 
assumption that both want to receive the maximum price possible for the shares. However, the 
bidder wants to minimize the price paid for the target firm, indicating misaligned interests. 
This might seem as a problem not concerning the seller, since Kesner et al. (1994) argue that the 
incentives for the seller and the investment bank are aligned. However, according to Graebner 
and Eisenhardt (2004) the sellers are more concerned about selecting buyers that offer a 
synergistic combination potential and organizational rapport than they are with selecting the 
potential buyer offering the highest price. And most surprisingly, the investors and the board 
actually share this concern. The selling leaders were described in the following way: 
… the selling leaders saw acquisition as a way to prosper through partnership, not as 
organizational death. They were attracted to compatible buyers, suggesting that 
courtship perhaps creates a subtle trade-off between acquisition price and 
organizational death (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
Hence, there is clearly a conflict between Kesner et al. (1994) and Graebner and Eisenhardt 
(2004). Without taking sides, the fact is that a conflict of interest between the principal and 
agent might arise, and the VC and entrepreneur need to be aware of this. This also becomes 
evident when looking at Petty et al. (1994), who show that entrepreneurs mostly relied on their 
staff and advisors when determining a fair price for their company, and that they often were 
disappointed with the advice given by the experts.  
Petty et al. (1994) also take a closer look at the post-exit phase, with emphasis on the 
entrepreneur. It turns out that entrepreneurs exhibit a significant disappointment with the exit 
process and its final outcome. A feeling of disillusionment often arose, especially when the 
entrepreneur continued to work in the management of the new firm under supervision of the 
new owners. One might think that the increased liquidity that often comes with an acquisition 
motivates the entrepreneur, but Petty et al. (1994) show that the opposite often is the case; the 
entrepreneur saw the management of the new liquidity as a burden. Overall, this paints a picture 
of an entrepreneur who is inexperienced when it comes to exit processes. This is especially 
evident with regards to the implications the exit has for the future, both for the entrepreneur 
himself and for the company he is managing. 
Discussion 
The review of the literature covering aspects of the exit process has generated some interesting 
insights. First of all, the VC’s divestment of his portfolio companies is a complex process 
influenced by a host of different variables. As such, no simple model can adequately describe all 
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of the aspects influencing the exit process. Secondly, there seems to be a clear gap in the 
research-based knowledge about the exit process. While we have covered a large amount of 
articles shedding light on the venture capital exit process, no overarching model of the process 
itself has been uncovered. 
Instead, articles typically cover one specialized theme – such as which factors might influence 
the choice of exiting via a trade sale rather than an IPO. Perhaps this lack of an overview of the 
entire process is due to the complexity of the exit process combined with the sensitivity of the 
data involved. However, a better picture of what actually influences the exit process, along with 
an understanding of how this influence affects the exit, could potentially decrease the current 
exit failure rates. Such a contribution could therefore be immensely valuable to the venture 
capital community. Therefore, based on our findings from the literature review, our first steps 
towards generating such an overarching model are presented below.  
The model, named “The Road to Venture Capital Exit”, divides the VC investment activity process 
into three distinct steps; pre-investment, post-investment, and exit phase, following De Clercq et 
al.’s (2006) convention. The relevant variables from each of the categories developed during the 
literature review are indicated for each step. It is also indicated whether the variable is viewed 
as being exo- or endogenous. However, as indicated in the following discussion, it is not always 
easy to draw a clear distinction between exo- and endogenous variables. In our model, the 
exogenously given variables are presented on the right. The endogenous variables are presented 
along with ambiguous variables on the left. 
Due to the vast number of variables identified, they have been categorized into six distinct 
categories based on their individual characteristics. These categories are: Economic, Governance, 
Network, Strategic, VCF-specific and Venture-specific. Which variables that have been classified as 
belonging to which category is indicated in the model below. The authors hope that this 
classification will make later, empirical research more practical, as it illustrates some abstracted 
categories that enact high influence on the venture capital exit process. Such abstracted 
categories may lend themselves more easily to empirical inquiries than the individual variables 
identified. Appendix 1 gives a more thorough presentation of each variable.  
49 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Road to Venture Capital Exit 
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The first thing we had to consider when trying to generate this model was whether or not it was 
enough to solely look at the final phase of the venture capital investment activity process. In 
other words, is it possible to understand all of the determinants of the exit process by only 
looking at the exit phase of the process? This phase has been called the exit phase for a reason, 
and there is little doubt that many highly important decisions are made during this critical time. 
Furthermore, in the interest of creating a parsimonious model, it would be beneficial to be able 
to focus on only the last step in the investment activity process. However, the review has 
uncovered variables that have a high influence on the exit process, but that nevertheless are 
determined long before the venture enters the exit phase. Some of these are locked in already at 
the pre-investment phase, while others have their highest influence during the post-investment 
phase.  
For instance, whether or not the VC utilizes convertible securities is decided as he structures the 
deal before investing. However, the use of convertible securities affects exits by allocating 
different cash flow rights to the VC dependent on whether the exit vehicle is an IPO or a trade 
sale (Hellmann, 2006). Similarly, the VC decides how much time he wishes to spend on face-to-
face interaction with the entrepreneur during the post-investment face. However, the more time 
he spends on such interaction, the higher the degree of value-adding (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza 
et al., 1996), and the higher the degree of value-adding, the lower the time to exit (Giot and 
Schwienbacher, 2007).  
Obviously then, variables that are locked in the pre-investment and post-investment phase of the 
venture capital investment activity process do influence exits. The critical takeaway is therefore 
that one must take a step back and consider issues from the entire investment activity process 
when trying to model the exit process; focusing only on the exit phase means overlooking many 
of the determinants that are the underlying reasons for the choice set available to the VC at this 
late stage.  
A second point of consideration is which variables that are open to manipulation. While 
knowledge about all of the various variables influencing exit processes obviously is important, 
the variables of the most interest for practitioners are undoubtedly those where they actively 
can make a difference. The question is therefore whether such a distinction can be made, and if 
so, which variables are open to manipulation and which are given by the external environment?  
There can be little doubt that some variables are completely outside the VCs control sphere. A 
hot equity market, for instance, does push down the time to exit (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; 
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001) and increases the likelihood of exiting via an IPO (Brau et al., 
2003). As such, hot equity markets do have a significant effect on the venture capital exit 
process. However, it is obvious that this is a variable outside of the VC’s control sphere. Markets 
vary from hot to cold on the account of many variables, but even the most confident VC could not 
claim that his decisions have a significant influence on this variation. Similarly, a high industry 
concentration in the industry of the portfolio company is positively related to the probability of 
exiting via an IPO (Brau et al., 2003). Again, the relevant industry concentration is clearly a 
variable that is given at the time of the VCs investment. Obviously then, some of the variables 
influencing exits are out of the VCs control.  
At the other end of the scale there are some variables that obviously do lie within the VCs control 
sphere. VCs can, for example, substantially decrease the information asymmetry associated with 
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a trade sale by actively seeking to act as a bridge builder between the seller and the buyer 
(Gompers and Xuan, 2009). High information asymmetry is associated with a private firm 
discount in trade sales (Capron and Shen, 2007), and as such directly affects the value of the exit. 
Similarly, VCs can actively seek to syndicate their investments, and syndication decreases the 
time to exit (Espenlaub et al., 2009). As such, there is little doubt that the VC can actively 
influence some of the variables that affect exits. 
However, many of the variables uncovered during our literature review do not lay themselves 
open to such an easy classification. Consider, for example, the experience of the entrepreneur 
variable. A more experienced entrepreneur is associated with less control rights for the VC 
(Cumming, 2008; Cumming and Johan, 2008), and weak control rights are associated with IPO 
exits (Cumming, 2008). As such, the experience of the entrepreneur does have an effect on exits. 
The question is, then, can the VC actively influence the experience of the entrepreneur?  
Obviously, the experience of the entrepreneur at the time the deal is presented to the VC is given. 
No active influence can be exerted by the VC to change what the entrepreneur has experienced 
prior to meeting him. However, it is a known fact that VCs often take an active role in choosing 
the management of their portfolio companies. Therefore, the VC can play an active role in 
determining who should be the CEO of a given portfolio company, and as an extension, highly 
experienced individuals can be given the role of entrepreneur by the VC. Thus, it is ambiguous 
whether or not the VC actively can influence the experience of the entrepreneur.  
Similarly, the size of a portfolio company (in terms of the total asset value) influences the choice 
of exit vehicle, with larger ventures being associated with a higher probability of going IPO (Brau 
et al., 2003). This variable is partly determined by factors outside the VCs control; it is clear that 
a venture developing an online service will have a lower total asset value than a company 
developing and producing a novel floating offshore wind turbine. At the same time, the VC often 
plays an active role in developing the strategy of the venture, with the business model as one 
important variable. A business model relying heavily on outsourcing obviously will lead to a 
lower total asset value of the venture than one that is based on keeping activities in-house. 
Again, whether or not the VC can actively influence the size of the portfolio company, and to 
which degree, is ambiguous.  
As a result, we therefore end up with three classes of variables; those that are completely 
outside the VCs control sphere, those that are open to manipulation by the VC, and those that are 
ambiguous with respect to which degree the VC can actively influence them.  
This distinction between variables is important, as it allows the actors in the process to focus on 
the variables where influence can be enacted to change the outcome of the process, while still 
allowing for the inclusion of all of the relevant variables in the analysis. However, it is important 
to note that the classification of the variables is based on the subjective evaluation of the 
authors, and as such is in need of empirical verification.  
A final point of consideration is whether or not the model is dynamic. As it is presented, the 
model appears rather static. The level of insider ownership is, for example, given as a variable 
that is determined in the pre-investment phase. However, while insider ownership without a 
doubt is influenced by the original terms of the investment, it is easy to imagine ways for this 
variable to be changed as the venture develops. The board may for instance award stock options 
or equity to the management team during the post-investment phase based on the achievement 
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of specific milestones. Similarly, syndication is given as a variable that is determined in both the 
pre-investment and the post-investment phase. This is logical as syndication of the deal can 
occur both at the time of initial investment and at later stages. 
Furthermore, variables that are given to have a high influence in a certain stage might actually 
be partly responsible for entering this stage in the first place. One clear example would be 
whether or not there is a hot market, which is shown to have a clear effect on both exit vehicle 
and timing (e.g. Brau et al., 2003; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Gompers, 1996; Rossetto, 
2008). In our model, this variable is shown to influence the exit phase of the investment activity 
process. This is based on the fact that it is the temperature of the market as the venture is exited 
that enacts influence. A hot market two years (or for that matter two weeks) before exiting will 
lend little help if the current market is cold. However, it is not hard to imagine that a current hot 
market is one of the reasons why the VC has moved into the exit phase. As such, the variable 
might affect the post-investment phase by actively ending it. 
It is therefore expected that the proposed model indeed will be a dynamic one, where it should 
be possible to identify variables that assume new values as the venture develops, as well as 
where the value of certain variables actually might influence the stage of the exit process itself. 
Which variables are dynamic, and which are static, as well as the degree to which the original 
value can be changed, however, is not certain. Empirical research will be needed to shed light on 
these questions. 
With these important clarifications as the backdrop, the first steps towards generating an 
overarching model of the exit process have been taken. As has been pointed out, many factors 
remain uncertain. Furthermore, we cannot draw the conclusion that all relevant variables have 
been uncovered. For that, our data is insufficient. We do believe, however, that these first steps 
are an important beginning that can create the foundation on which to build an overarching 
model of the venture capital exit process. Thus, we hope that the proposed model helps in 
paving the way for an increased research-based knowledge of this highly complex and important 
process. By having such an overview of variables influencing the eventual exit of the VC, along 
with an understanding of when each variable is open for manipulation and enacting its strongest 
influence, both VCs and entrepreneurs are better equipped for managing the exit process and 
achieving the extremely important successful exit. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The purpose of this paper was to develop an overarching model based on the following research 
questions: Which variables influence the venture capital exit process? During which phase of the 
venture capital investment activity process do these variables have their highest influence? And 
how do these variables influence the exit process? 
To answer these questions, we have conducted a thorough literature review. The literature 
covered in the review is grouped into six categories: Choice of Exit Vehicle, Time to Exit, Legality 
and Control, Adding Value, Social Capital and Mergers and Acquisitions.  
The review has identified several variables that influence exits. These variables have been 
grouped into six new categories: Economic, Governance, Network, Strategic, VCF-specific and 
Venture-specific, and according to which phase of the venture capital investment cycle they 
belong: the pre-investment, the post-investment or the exit phase. 
53 
 
This grouping has led to a theoretical model, known as “The Road to Venture Capital Exit”. The 
model suggests that variables that influence exit may be apparent both in the pre-investment, 
the post-investment and the exit phase. Further, the model acknowledges that there are certain 
variables that are exogenous, and certain variables that the VC can influence. Finally, the 
proposed model acknowledges that some of the variables may be of a dynamic nature.  
Implications for Practitioners 
One of the motivations behind this study was the pronounced difficulties VCs have with exiting 
their investments (Ghalbouni and Rouizes, 2010; Wall and Smith, 1997). Hopefully, the different 
variables identified in this paper can help the VC evaluate his potential investments better. 
However, a mere descriptive framework as ours can only act as a checklist, and a more 
prescriptive model is needed in order to provide more exact advice. One takeaway for the VC 
could be that exit is not the process that starts when the decision to sell is made; exit is a 
longitudinal process which starts already in the pre-investment phase, and almost every 
decision made throughout the investment cycle has the potential to influence the final outcome 
of the exit. 
For the entrepreneur it might seem confusing that the focus of the VC is on exiting, even before 
the investment has been made. However, due to the nature of venture capital funding, it should 
not come as a surprise that VCs seek to maximize their returns. In fact, a successful exit only 
means that the VC and entrepreneur have performed well, and will in most cases be a driver for 
further growth of the company. Perhaps the findings in this report can make the entrepreneur 
even more aware of how the VC thinks and acts, and help him both adapt to and support the 
strategic choices of the VC. As a matter of fact, a successful exit will in most cases mean that the 
entrepreneur himself has a lucrative choice – either to walk away with his share, or continue to 
work in a company that has gained momentum from the exit. 
Implications for Further Research 
This study has identified a clear gap in the research-based knowledge of the venture capital exit 
process; which variables affect exits, how they influence the process and when this influence is 
the greatest is not covered sufficiently in the current literature. The authors have taken the first 
steps towards generating an overarching model of the exit process, but many questions remain.  
The variables found have been classified as endogenous and/or exogenous based on a subjective 
evaluation by the authors. Further research is warranted on which variables the VC actually is 
able to influence, and to which degree he is able to shape the variable to his liking. Similarly, we 
make no statement about which variables have the highest influence. There can be little doubt, 
however, that some variables will be more important than others, warranting a study of which 
variables are the most important determinants of the exit process.  
Another interesting point is the fact that the geographic location of the portfolio company is 
found to have a significant influence on the exit process. A fundamental question is therefore 
whether an overarching model that is valid for several different countries can be built at all? 
Thus, a study is warranted on the applicability of the proposed model in different geographical 
settings.   
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Furthermore, the literature reviewed is overly focused on the IPO exit vehicle. Taking into 
account the domination of the trade sale exit vehicle observed, current research has not covered 
sufficiently this important exit vehicle. In fact, our literature review identified only one article 
specifically focused on venture capital trade sales. Thus, there exists a significant gap in the 
research-based knowledge on this topic. This black box offers a multitude of interesting 
opportunities for scholars to pursue.  
To answer these questions and many more one has to turn to the empirical world, studying how 
the proposed model actually fits with the reality described by the VCs themselves. In addition, it 
would be interesting to look at the process from the view of the entrepreneur to understand his 
take on the venture capital exit process.  
Scholars also need to consider the trade-offs involved with regards to methodology; where a 
broad study based on structured surveys and quantitative data may offer greater possibilities 
for generalizable conclusions, a narrower, qualitative study will no doubt offer greater insights. 
The complexity of the venture capital exit process and the vast number of variables identified 
that influence this process puts forward considerable challenges when considering the former 
research strategy. However, the sensitivity of the data involved may indicate that the latter 
strategy of gathering in-depth, qualitative data will encounter its own problems. In conclusion, 
scholars will have to make their own evaluation of the trade-offs involved based on their 
particular research question. 
References 
BARNEY, J. B., BUSENITZ, L. W., FIET, J. O. & MOESEL, D. D. 1996. New venture teams' assessment 
of learning assistance from venture capital firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 11, 257-
272. 
BASCHA, A. & WALZ, U. 2001. Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital 
finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 285-306. 
BRAU, J. C., FRANCIS, B. & KOHERS, N. 2003. The choice of IPO versus takeover: Empirical 
evidence. Journal of Business, 76, 583-612. 
BRUCE, C. 2001. Interpreting the scope of their literature reviews: significant differences in 
research students’ concerns. New Library World, 102, 158-166. 
BURT, R. S. 2000. The Network Entrepreneur. In: SWEDBERG, R. (ed.) Entrepreneurship: The 
Social Science View. New York: Oxford University Press. 
BUSENITZ, L. W., FIET, J. O. & MOESEL, D. D. 2004. Reconsidering the venture capitalists' "value 
added" proposition: An interorganizational learning perspective. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 19, 787-807. 
CAPRON, L. & SHEN, J. C. 2007. Acquisitions of private vs. public firms: Private information, 
target selection, and acquirer returns. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 891-911. 
CHAPLINSKY, S. & GUPTA-MUKHERJEE, S. 2010. The Form of Exit in Venture Capital: 
Implications for Reputation Building. Mimeo. Darden Graduate School of Business, 
University of Virginia. School of Business Administration, Loyola University. 
CUMMING, D. 2008. Contracts and exits in venture capital finance. Review of Financial Studies, 
21, 1947-1982. 
CUMMING, D., FLEMING, G. & SCHWIENBACHER, A. 2006. Legality and venture capital exits. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 12, 214-245. 
CUMMING, D. & JOHAN, S. A. B. 2008. Preplanned exit strategies in venture capital. European 
Economic Review, 52, 1209-1241. 
CUMMING, D. & MACINTOSH, J. G. 2003. A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture 
capital exits. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27, 511-548. 
55 
 
DE CLERCQ, D., FRIED, V. H., LEHTONEN, O. & SAPIENZA, H. J. 2006. An entrepreneur's guide to 
the venture capital galaxy. Academy of Management Perspectives, 20, 90-112. 
DIMOV, D. P. & SHEPHERD, D. A. 2005. Human capital theory and venture capital firms: 
exploring "home runs" and "strike outs". Journal of Business Venturing, 20, 1-21. 
DOUGLAS, E. J. 1992. Managerial Economics, London, Prentice Hall. 
EHRLICH, S. B., DE NOBLE, A. F., MOORE, T. & WEAVER, R. R. 1994. After the cash arrives: A 
comparative study of venture capital and private investor involvement in 
entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 9, 67-82. 
ESPENLAUB, S., KHURSHED, A. & MOHAMED, A. 2009. The Exit behavior of Venture Capital 
firms. Mimeo. Manchester Business School. 
FÉLIX, E. G. S., PIRES, C. P. & GULAMHUSSEN, M. A. 2008. The Exit Decision in the European 
Venture Capital Market. Mimeo. 
FISCHER, H. M. & POLLOCK, T. G. 2004. Effects of social capital and power on surviving 
transformational change: The case of initial public offerings. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47, 463-481. 
GHALBOUNI, J. & ROUIZES, D. 2010. The VC Shakeout. Harvard Business Review, 88, 21-23. 
GIOT, P. & SCHWIENBACHER, A. 2007. IPOs, trade sales and liquidations: Modelling venture 
capital exits using survival analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31, 679-702. 
GOMPERS, P. A. 1995. Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital. 
Journal of Finance, 50, 1461-1489. 
GOMPERS, P. A. 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 42, 133-156. 
GOMPERS, P. A. & XUAN, Y. 2009. Bridge Building in Venture Capital-Backed Acquisitions. AFA 
2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper. Harvard Business School. 
GORMAN, M. & SAHLMAN, W. A. 1989. What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business 
Venturing, 4, 231-248. 
GRAEBNER, M. E. & EISENHARDT, K. M. 2004. The seller's side of the story: Acquisition as 
courtship and governance as syndicate in entrepreneurial firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 49, 366-403. 
HEGE, U., PALOMINO, F. & SCHWIENBACHER, A. 2009. Venture Capital Performance: The 
Disparity Between Europe and the United States. Finance, 30, 7-50. 
HELLMANN, T. 2006. IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 649-679. 
HOCHBERG, Y. V., LJUNGQVIST, A. & LU, Y. 2007. Whom you know matters: Venture capital 
networks and investment performance. Journal of Finance, 62, 251-301. 
ISAKSSON, A. 2000. Venture Capital Exit Behaviour in Sweden. Mimeo. Umeå School of Business 
and Economics. 
ISAKSSON, A. 2007. Exit strategy and the intensity of exit-directed activities among venture 
capital-backed entrepreneurs in Sweden. In: GREGORIOU, G. N., KOOLI, M. & KRAEUSSL, 
R. (eds.) Venture Capital in Europe. Oxford: Elsevier. 
JAIN, B. A. & KINI, O. 1995. Venture capitalist participation and the post-issue operating 
performance of IPO firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 16, 593-606. 
JAIN, B. A. & KINI, O. 2000. Does the presence of venture capitalists improve the survival profile 
of IPO firms? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 27, 1139-1176. 
JICK, T. D. 1979. Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods - Triangulation in Action. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 602-611. 
KAPLAN, S. N. & STRÖMBERG, P. 2003. Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 281-315. 
KESNER, I. F., SHAPIRO, D. L. & SHARMA, A. 1994. Brokering Mergers - an Agency Theory 
Perspective on the Role of Representatives. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 703-
721. 
KIRZNER, I. M. 1999. Creativity and/or Alertness: A Reconsideration of the Schumpeterian 
Entrepreneur. Review of Austrian Economics, 11, 5-17. 
56 
 
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., VISHNY, R. 1997. Legal determinants of 
eternal finance. Journal of Finance 52, 1131–1150. 
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., VISHNY, R. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of 
Political Economy, 106, 1113– 1155. 
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., VISHNY, R. 2000. Agency problems and 
dividend policies around the world. Journal of Finance, 55, 1 – 34. 
LIN, T. H. & SMITH, R. L. 1997. Insider reputation and selling decisions: The unwinding of 
venture capital investments during equity IPOs. Journal of Corporate Finance, 4, 241-263. 
MACMILLAN, I. C., KULOW, D. M. & KHOYLIAN, R. 1989. Venture capitalists' involvement in their 
investments: Extent and performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 4, 27-47. 
NEUS, W. & WALZ, U. 2005. Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of an initial public 
offering. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14, 253-277. 
OEHLER, A., PUKTHUANTHONG, K., RUMMER, M. & WALKER, T. 2007. Venture capital in Europe: 
Closing the gap to the U.S. In: GREGORIOU, G. N., KOOLI, M. & KRAEUSSL, R. (eds.) 
Venture Capital in Europe. Oxford: Elsevier. 
PETTY, J. W., SHULMAN, J. & BYGRAVE, W. E. 1994. Mergers and acquisitions: A means of 
harvesting the venture. Managerial Finance, 20, 43-52. 
POULSEN, A. & STEGEMOLLER, M. 2008. Moving from private to public ownership: selling out to 
public firms vs. initial public offerings. Mimeo. University of Georgia. 
RAO, H. & SIVAKUMAR, K. 1999. Institutional sources of boundary-spanning structures: The 
establishment of investor relations departments in the Fortune 500 industrials. 
Organization Science, 10, 27-42. 
RELANDER, K., SYRJÄNEN, A. P. & MIETTINEN, S. 1994. Analysis of the trade sale as a venture 
capital exit route. In: BYGRAVE, W. D., HAY, M.G., PEETERS, J.B. (ed.) Realizing investment 
value. London: Pittman Publishing. 
ROSSETTO, S. 2008. The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs. Annals of Finance, 4, 
29-53. 
SAHLMAN, W. A. 1990. The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 27, 473-521. 
SAHLMAN, W. A. & SCHERLIS, D. R. 1988. A Method For Valuing High-Risk, Long-Term 
Investments: "The Venture Capital Method". Harvard Business School Note 288-006. 
SAPIENZA, H. J. 1992. When Do Venture Capitalists Add Value. Journal of Business Venturing, 7, 9-
27. 
SAPIENZA, H. J., MANIGART, S. & VERMEIR, W. 1996. Venture capitalist governance and value 
added in four countries. Journal of Business Venturing, 11, 439-469. 
SCHILIT, W. K. 1991. Dream Makers and Deal Breakers inside the Venture Capital Industry, 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall. 
SCHWIENBACHER, A. 2005. An empirical analysis of venture capital exits in Europe and the 
United States. Mimeo. University of Amsterdam. 
SCHWIENBACHER, A. 2008. Innovation and Venture Capital Exits. Economic Journal, 118, 1888-
1916. 
SHEPHERD, D. A. & ZACHARAKIS, A. 2001. Speed to Initial Public Offering of VC-Backed 
Companies. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 25, 59-69. 
SMITH, D. G. 2005. The exit structure of venture capital. Ucla Law Review, 53, 315-356. 
STEIER, L. 1998. Confounding Market and Hierarchy in Venture Capital Governance: The 
Canadian Immigrant Investor Program. Journal of Management Studies, 35, 511-535. 
STRAUSS, A. & CORBIN, J. 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research : Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publishing. 
STUART, T. E., HOANG, H. & HYBELS, R. C. 1999. Interorganizational endorsements and the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 315-349. 
SÆTRE, A. 2003. Entrepreneurial perspectives on informal venture capital. Venture Capital, 5, 
71-94. 
WALL, J. & SMITH, J. 1997. Better Exits. Journal of Private Equity, 1, 31-43. 
57 
 
WANG, C. K. & SIM, V. 2001. Exit strategies of venture capital-backed companies in Singapore. 
Venture Capital, 3, 337-358. 
WIDDING, L. Ø. 2005. Building entrepreneurial knowledge reservoirs. Journal of Small Business 
and Enterprise Development, 12, 595-612. 
WILLIAMS, D. R., DUNCAN, W. J. & GINTER, P. M. 2006. Structuring Deals and Governance after 
the IPO: Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists in High-Tech Start-ups. Business 
Horizons, 49, 303-311. 
WRIGHT, M., CHIPLIN, B., THOMPSON, S. & ROBBIE, K. 1990. Realizations of venture capital 
investments: the case of management buy-outs in the UK. Service Industries Journal, 10, 
499-520. 
YANG, Q., PAN, A. & LI, J. 2008. Research on the Real Option Decision Model about Venture 
Capital Exit. 2008 Workshop on Power Electronics and Intelligent Transportation System. 
ZIDER, B. 1998. How venture capital works. Harvard Business Review, 76, 131-139. 
 
 
58 
 
Appendix 1 – Variables Influencing the Exit Process 
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Appendix 2 – Literature on Exit Vehicles 
Author(s) 
Year 
Title 
Journal Purpose and Findings Methodology 
Bascha & Walz 
2001 
 
“Convertible 
securities and 
optimal exit 
decisions in venture 
capital finance” 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
The authors study the interaction between 
exit decisions and contract design in venture 
capital finance. Built on the premise that the 
VC and entrepreneur often have diverging 
opinions of different exit solutions, it is 
shown that convertible securities can help 
that the ex-ante agreed optimal exit policy is 
implemented.   
Model development and 
analysis. 
Brau, Francis & 
Kohers 
2003 
 
“The Choice of IPO 
versus Takeover: 
Empirical Evidence” 
The Journal of 
Business 
Examining factors that influence the choice 
between an IPO and a takeover by a public 
acquirer. Results show that the industry 
concentration, high-tech industry affiliation, 
current cost of debt, relative “hotness” of the 
IPO market, firm size and insider ownership 
percentage are all positively related to the 
probability of an IPO. In contrast, private 
companies in high market-to-book industries, 
financial service sectors, highly leveraged 
industries, and deals involving greater 
liquidity for selling insiders show a strong 
likelihood for takeovers. The results also 
indicate that a liquidity discount exists in 
takeovers relative to IPOs. 
Empirical study of 4,683 
firms that conducted a firm 
commitment IPO from 
1984 to 1998 and 4,927 
completed deals involving 
100 % acquisition of U.S. 
private targets by U.S. 
public acquirers.  
Cumming & 
MacIntosh 
2003 
 
“A Cross-Country 
Comparison of Full 
and Partial Venture 
Capital Exits” 
Journal of 
Banking and 
Finance 
The authors aim to explore when VCs make a 
partial exit instead of a full one. They 
consider the determinants of full and partial 
exit for all five exit vehicles. The central 
hypothesis of the paper; that the greater the 
degree of information asymmetry between 
the selling VC and the buyer, the greater is 
the likelihood of partial exit to signal quality, 
is supported. The data also indicates 
differences between the U.S. and Canadian 
venture capital industries, and emphasizes 
the impact of legal and institutional factors 
on exits across countries.  
Empirical analysis of 112 
VC exits in the U.S. and 134 
VC exits in Canada during 
1992-1995.  
Isaksson 
2000 
 
“Venture Capital Exit 
Behavior in Sweden” 
Unpublished 
Conference 
Paper 
The author aims to explain the exit 
mechanisms used in Sweden to improve the 
understanding of venture capital exit 
problems. IPO exits are found to be the most 
preferred exit vehicle, while trade sales have 
been the most common. None of the 
government owned VCFs are found to be 
aiming for IPO exits. The majority of the firms 
in the survey show active exit behavior and 
thus indicates that exit behavior is an 
important part of the venture capital process. 
Structured questionnaire 
sent to all VCFs identified 
in Sweden. Response rate 
of 60 % (23 firms).  
Poulsen & 
Stegemoller 
2008 
 
“Moving from Private 
to Public Ownership: 
Selling out to Public 
Firms versus Initial 
Public Offerings” 
Financial 
Management 
The authors want to identify factors 
determining whether a venture goes public 
via IPO or by being acquired by a public 
acquirer. By considering firm-specific 
characteristics, such as growth, capital 
constraints, and asymmetric information, 
they find that firms go public via an IPO when 
they have greater growth opportunities and 
face more capital constraints.  
Empirical study of 1,074 
IPO and 735 sellout firms 
in the U.S., covering the 
period from 1995 to 2004.  
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Schwienbacher 
2005 
 
“An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture 
Capital Exits in 
Europe and the 
United States” 
Unpublished 
Working Paper 
The author aims to provide new, stylized 
facts about the venture capital industry in 
Europe and the U.S., with a focus on exits. He 
finds that there are many similarities, but 
some important differences include: duration 
of exit stage, the use of convertible securities, 
replacement of former management and deal 
syndication. Schwienbacher also finds that 
European VCs monitor less than their U.S. 
counterparts, and that some aspects of close 
monitoring seem to significantly affect the 
venture’s likelihood of going public. 
Structured questionnaires 
sent out to about 600 VCs 
in Europe and 600 VCs in 
the U.S. Response rates of 
18 % for Europe and 11 % 
for the U.S. Data analyzed 
by using a regression 
analysis. 
Schwienbacher 
2008 
 
“Innovation and 
Venture Capital 
Exits” 
The Economic 
Journal 
Investigates how innovation choices may 
affect exits. Finds that more innovative and 
profitable ventures are more likely to go 
public than ventures with more imitative or 
derivative projects. Thus, if the entrepreneur 
receives private benefits from remaining 
independent after the exit of the VC, he has 
incentives to favor business and R&D 
strategies that make an IPO more likely – 
leading to riskier strategies aiming at 
excessive innovation.  
Model development and 
analysis.  
Wang & Sim 
2001 
 
“Exit strategies of 
venture capital-
backed companies in 
Singapore” 
Venture Capital 
The authors aim to explore the rationale of 
VCs in choosing a particular mode of exit for 
their investments. They find that firms in 
family owned, high-technology industries 
tend to exit via IPO. Wang & Sim also find 
contrasting evidence to the grandstanding 
hypothesis. The level of equity valuation is 
found to be independent of the likelihood 
that VC-backed companies will exit via IPO. 
Frequency of financing rounds is also found 
to be independent of the IPO exit. 
Empirical analysis of VCFs 
that have exited from 
1990-1998 in Singapore. 
Structured questionnaire 
covering 100 divestments. 
Case study with one firm to 
expand on data set.  
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Author(s) 
Year 
Title 
Journal Purpose and Findings Methodology 
Esbenlaub, 
Khurshed & 
Mohammed 
2009 
 
“The Exit behavior of 
Venture Capital 
firms” 
Unpublished 
Working Paper 
Examining the exit behavior of UK VCFs from 
their portfolio companies based in the UK, the 
U.S., and the rest of the world. UK VCs prefer 
IPOs, followed by M&As and other routes. 
This preference is driven by the fact that IPO 
provides the fastest exit route. Experienced 
VCs hold their portfolio companies much 
longer than young VCs. Syndication reduces 
the time to exit. Portfolio companies based in 
the U.S. are exited quicker than in Europe and 
the rest of the world. 
Empirical survival analysis 
using a frailty model, with a 
dataset of 5,059 
investments in portfolio 
companies for 290 UK 
VCFs. 
Giot & 
Schwienbacher 
2007 
 
“IPOs, trade sales and 
liquidations: 
Modeling venture 
capital exits using 
survival analysis” 
Journal of Banking 
and Finance 
The purpose is to examine the dynamics of 
exit options for U.S. venture capital funds. The 
study shows that hazard rates for IPOs are 
first sharply increasing, but then decreasing 
after a plateau is reached. For trade sales, the 
hazard function reaches its maximum later, 
and decreases more slowly. Achievement of 
milestones in past financing rounds and the 
degree of value-adding from VCs accelerates 
exit. Trade sales are significantly more likely 
for firms based in Silicon Valley and along 
Route 128, than in the rest of the U.S. Exits 
tend to be sped up during favorable IPO 
markets. 
A modeling of exit times for 
IPO, trade sale and 
liquidation using a 
competing risks model on a 
sample of 20,000 
investment rounds for 
6,000 VC-backed firms. 
Gompers 
1996 
 
“Grandstanding in 
the venture capital 
industry” 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
Development and testing of the hypothesis 
that young VC firms take their investments 
public earlier than more established firms, a 
term labeled grandstanding. The motivation 
for this behavior is the building of reputation 
by signaling ability to go public, and to raise 
capital for new funds. The analysis shows that 
companies backed by young VC firms are in 
fact more underpriced at their IPO. In 
addition, young VC firms have been on the 
board of directors a shorter period of time at 
the IPO, they hold smaller equity stakes, and 
time the IPO with the raising of money for 
new funds. 
Empirical regression 
analysis on a sample of 433 
U.S. IPOs occurring 
between 1978 and 1987. 
Lin & Smith 
1998 
 
“Insider reputation 
and selling decisions: 
the unwinding of 
venture capital 
investments during 
equity IPOs” 
Journal of Corporate 
Finance 
Four hypotheses are built, tested and 
confirmed. 1) Companies with VC investors 
are brought to the market at an earlier stage 
of development than other companies. 2) 
Ownership positions of venture capital 
investors are reduced substantially after an 
IPO. Monitoring responsibilities will decline 
correspondingly. 3) The likelihood of selling 
during the IPO depends positively on VC 
reputation and underwriter certification and 
negatively on the potential for overvaluation. 
4) VCs with established reputations seek to 
maintain their reputations by selling shares 
in IPOs only if they perceive them not to be 
overpriced.  
Hypothesis testing using a 
sample of 2,634 common 
equity IPOs from 1979 to 
1990, where 497 were VC-
backed. 
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Neus & Walz 
2005 
 
“Exit timing of 
venture capitalists in 
the course of an 
initial public 
offering” 
Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 
A study of the divestment decisions of VCs in 
the course of an IPO, examining why they do 
not sell immediately after the IPO. A model is 
built that shows that the decisions are based 
on a reputation-based mechanism in a 
repeated game-setting. It is also shown that 
young VCs may have the incentive to use 
underpricing in order to credibly committing 
themselves to establishing reputation. 
Development of a model 
and of testable hypotheses 
connected to the model.  
Rosetto 
2008 
 
“The price of rapid 
exit in venture 
capital-backed IPOs” 
Annals of Finance 
Proposes an explanation of two empirical 
puzzles surrounding IPOs: 1) IPO 
underpricing increases during “hot issue” 
periods. 2) venture capital-backed IPOs are 
less underpriced than non venture capital-
backed IPOs during normal periods of 
activity, but the reverse is true during “hot 
issue” periods. Developing an empirical 
model, suggesting that when IPOs are driven 
by the initial investor’s desire to exit in order 
to finance a new venture, the values of both 
the existing and new venture drive the 
decision of price and fraction to be sold in the 
existing IPO. The availability of attractive new 
investments increases equilibrium 
underpricing.   
Model development. 
Shepherd & 
Zacharakis 
2001 
 
“Speed to Initial 
Public Offering of VC-
Backed Companies” 
Entrepreneurship 
Theory and 
Practice 
The article develops hypotheses regarding 
factors that affect a company’s speed to IPO. 
The study shows that geographical location in 
the U.S. affects the speed to IPO and that 
companies located in the West and Midwest 
are exited faster than companies located in 
the Northeast. Industry group does not have a 
significant effect, except that non-high-tech 
companies are faster than computer 
companies. The relative activity of the IPO 
market over time increases the speed to IPO, 
and portfolio companies that have gone 
public more recently have a greater speed.  
Testing five hypotheses by 
performing an ANOVA 
analysis on 906 U.S. 
portfolio companies that 
went public in the period 
1984 to June 1999. The 
sample is drawn from a 
database assembled by the 
National Venture Capital 
Association. 
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Appendix 4 – Literature on Legality and Control 
Author(s) 
Year 
Title 
Journal Purpose and Findings Methodology 
Cumming 
2008 
 
“Contracts and Exits in 
Venture Capital 
Finance” 
The Review of 
Financial 
Studies 
The author aims to study the relation between 
venture capital contracts and exits. Strong VC 
control rights are found to increase the 
likelihood of an acquisition. The use of 
common equity increases the probability of an 
IPO, and write-offs are less likely when specific 
veto and control rights are used. In conclusion, 
VC control rights are correlated with, and 
facilitate, exit outcomes. 
Survey to all venture capital 
funds which are members of 
the EVCA. Follow-up 
interviews with the 35 funds 
that responded, covering 
223 investments in the 
period 1995-2002. 
Cumming, Fleming, 
& Schwienbacher 
2006 
 
“Legality and venture 
capital exits” 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
The authors want to investigate the effect of 
Legality on the exiting of venture capital 
investments. They find that Legality is of high 
importance for exiting private investments, 
and that a higher Legality index increases the 
likelihood of an IPO. High quality legal 
environments facilitate successful exit 
environments and active venture capital 
markets, which in turn are correlated with 
active stock markets.  
Empirical study of a hand-
collected dataset of 468 
venture-backed investments 
from 12 Asia-Pacific 
countries comprising 53 
venture capital funds. 
Cumming & Johan  
2008 
 
“Preplanned exit 
strategies in venture 
capital” 
European 
Economic 
Review 
An examination of the relation between pre-
planned exit vehicles and contracts and 
contractual rights. The researchers find that 
exits are pre-planned in 31 % of the cases. 
Preplanned acquisitions are associated with 
stronger veto and control rights in favor of the 
investor and greater use of convertible 
securities.  
Empirical analysis of 223 
firms backed by 35 
European VCFs in the period 
1995-2002. Information 
gathered by survey and 
interviews. 
Gompers 
1995 
 
“Optimal Investment, 
Monitoring, and the 
Staging of Venture 
Capital” 
The Journal of 
Finance 
The author studies the structure of staged 
venture capital investments when agency and 
monitoring costs exist. Greater R&D intensity 
and higher market-to-book ratios lead to more 
frequent monitoring. VCs maintain the option 
to discontinue funding projects with little 
probability of going public. 
Random sample of 794 VC-
financed companies, 
financed between January 
1961 and July 1992. Data 
collected from the Venture 
Economics’ Venture 
Intelligence Database. 
Hellman 
2006 
 
“IPOs, acquisitions, 
and the use of 
convertible securities 
in venture capital” 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how 
exit vehicle decisions are made, and to explain 
features of venture capital contracts.  
Convertible preferred equity gives different 
cash flow rights for acquisitions and IPOs. 
Contingent control rights are important for 
achieving efficient exit decisions.  
Model development and 
analysis. 
Kaplan & Strömberg 
2003 
 
”Financial Contracting 
Theory Meets the Real 
World: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture 
Capital Contracts” 
Review of 
Economic 
Studies 
Compares the financial contracts between VCs 
and entrepreneurs with financial contracting 
theory. The results show that real-world 
contracts are more complex than existing 
theories predict. VCs are allowed to separately 
allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting 
rights, liquidation rights and other control 
rights. 
Empirical analysis of 123 
investments in 119 ventures 
by 14 venture capital firms.  
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Sahlman 
1990 
 
“The structure and 
governance of venture 
capital organizations” 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
This paper aims to describe and analyze the 
structure of venture capital organizations and 
the relationships between investors, VCs and 
entrepreneurial ventures. It is shown that 
staging of capital, compensation based on 
value creation and mechanisms to distribute 
capital and profits are used to cope with the 
agency problems that exist. 
Model development and 
analysis. 
Smith 
2005 
 
“The Exit Structure of 
Venture Capital” 
 
UCLA Law 
Review 
The author aims to analyze the exit provisions 
regulated by venture capital contracts. The 
contracts serve to lock VCs into the investment 
during the initial stage, but in the later stages 
the VCs acquire increasing control over exit.  
Empirical analysis of 367 
venture-backed companies.  
Williams, Duncan & 
Ginter 
2006 
 
“Structuring deals and 
governance after the 
IPO: Entrepreneurs 
and venture 
capitalists in high tech 
startups” 
Business 
Horizons 
This paper seeks to increase the 
understanding of the effects of venture capital 
investment on selected firm governance and 
financing structures. The data shows that the 
involvement of VCs reduces the role of the 
founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision 
making. Further, VCs prefer to invest together 
with other VCs, and the partners share the risk 
and reward.  
A sample of 190 publicly 
traded biotechnology and 
healthcare firms that filed 
an IPO registration 
statement in the period 
January 1996 to December 
199 was studied.  
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Appendix 5 – Literature on Value-Adding Activities 
Author(s) 
Year 
Title 
Journal Purpose and Findings Methodology 
Barney, Busenitz, 
Fiet & Moesel 
1996 
 
“New Venture Team’s 
Assessment of 
Learning Assistance 
from Venture Capital 
Firms” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
The authors aim to examine the conditions 
that impact a venture’s evaluation of 
nonfinancial advice. The central finding is that 
ventures differ in their evaluation of VC 
assistance. The optimal involvement of 
learning is contingent upon the openness to 
learning.  
Mailed surveys to 837 new 
ventures that had received 
at least one round of 
financing. This yielded a 
final sample of 205 firms. 
Busenitz, Fiet & 
Moesel 
2004 
 
“Reconsidering the 
venture capitalists’ 
”value added” 
proposition: An 
interorganizational 
learning perspective” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
An examination of the interorganizational 
relationships between VCs and NVTs and their 
contribution to long-term improvement in the 
performance of a venture. No statistically 
significant support for strategic information 
was found. A negative association for 
dismissals was found. Positive support for 
procedurally just interventions was found. 
Surveys sent to ventures 
that received venture capital 
between 1987 and 1989. 
Follow-up surveys were 
conducted in early 2000.  
Dimov & Shepherd 
2005 
 
“Human capital theory 
and venture capital 
firms: exploring 
“home runs” and 
“strike outs”” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
An investigation of the relationship between 
the education and experience of VCs and their 
performance. General human capital had a 
positive association with the proportion of 
portfolio companies going public, specific 
human capital had not. Specific human capital 
was negatively associated with the proportion 
of portfolio companies that went bankrupt.  
112 U.S. venture capital 
funds that had invested in 
over 20 portfolio companies 
and at least one in the 
wireless communication 
industry were randomly 
selected and analyzed.  
Ehrlich, De Noble, 
Moore & Weaver 
1994 
 
”After the Cash 
Arrives: A 
Comparative Study of 
Venture Capital and 
Private Investor 
Involvement in 
Entrepreneurial 
Firms” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
Determines how initial relationships are 
established and maintained between 
entrepreneurs and their primary investors. A 
VC places more stringent control on the 
venture, demands more frequent reporting, 
and is better to gain access to additional 
rounds of equity than private investors. Who 
the entrepreneur receives the funding from is 
as important as the amount raised.  
Surveyed entrepreneurs in 
Southern California, U.S. 47 
entrepreneurs were 
included in the study. 
Gorman & Sahlman 
1989 
 
“What Do Venture 
Capitalists Do?” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
The aim is to shed light on the relationship 
between VCs and their portfolio companies. 
VCs spend about half their time monitoring 
nine portfolio investments, and sit on the 
board of five of these. The most important 
activity is to raise additional capital, help with 
strategic analysis and management 
recruitment. Weak senior management was 
considered to be the dominant cause of 
venture failure.  
Questionnaire sent to 100 
VCs in late 1984, with 49 
respondents.  
Macmillan, Kulow & 
Khoylian 
1989 
 
”Venture Capitalists’ 
Involvement in Their 
Investments: Extent 
and Performance” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
The purpose of this paper is to identify any 
connection between VC involvement and 
venture performance. VCs were mostly 
involved in the financial aspects of the venture. 
Four distinct areas of involvement: 
development and operations, management 
selection, personnel management and financial 
participation. Three types of involvement: 
laissez faire, moderate, and close tracker. 
Questionnaire to 350 VCs. 
62 answered, and a 
regression analysis was 
performed. 
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Sapienza 
1992 
 
“When Do Venture 
Capitalists Add 
Value?” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
Examines when VCs add value. The greater the 
innovation pursued by the venture, the more 
frequent the contact between the lead investor 
and the CEO, the more open the 
communication, and the less conflict, the 
greater was the value of the involvement. The 
value of the VC’s involvement was strongly 
positively correlated with venture 
performance.  
Questionnaire to the 
entrepreneurs of 51 venture 
capital-backed ventures in 
the U.S. and the lead VC in 
each of these portfolio 
companies. Response rate of 
85 % for the entrepreneurs 
and 80 % from the venture 
capitalists.  
Sapienza, Manigart 
& Vermeir 
1996 
 
“Venture Capitalist 
Governance and Value 
Added in Four 
Countries” 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
Examine the drivers of VC governance and 
value added in the U.S., the UK, France and the 
Netherlands. VCs view their strategic 
involvement as their most important role, 
which is providing financial and business 
advice. Other important contributions were to 
act as a mentor and to give access to their 
network.  
The U.S. study included 
interviews with VCs and 
CEOs of portfolio companies, 
as well as follow-up 
questionnaires. The 
personal interviews, 
conducted in 1987-88, had a 
response rate of 85 % and 
80 %, respectively. Surveys 
were also mailed to VCs in 
the U.K., France and the 
Netherlands.  
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Appendix 6 – Literature on Social Capital 
Author(s) 
Year 
Title 
Journal Purpose and Findings Methodology 
Chaplinsky & Gupta-
Mukherjee 
2010 
 
“The Form of Exit in 
Venture Capital: 
Implications for 
Reputation Building”  
Unpublished 
Working Paper 
The authors aim to shed light on the role of the 
chosen exit vehicle in resolving information 
asymmetry problems related to VCs’ skill and 
reputation-building. The authors find that 
returns to M&A and IPO exits are 
systematically different, but the form of exit 
itself is not a perfect indicator of quality. IPOs 
are more valuable to the VC in terms of 
reputation building. Top quartile M&A returns 
are harder to achieve than top quartile IPO 
returns, but they carry a lower reputational 
value.  
Empirical study using a 
sample of returns from 
1,222 M&A and IPO exits 
from U.S. based venture 
capital-backed companies 
over 1985 to 2008. 
Fisher & Pollock 
2004 
 
“Effects of Social 
Capital and Power on 
Surviving 
Transformational 
Change: The Case of 
Initial Public 
Offerings” 
The Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
The authors aim to explore how social capital 
and the power of VCs and founder CEOs affect 
the likelihood of firm survival post-IPO. They 
find that average management team tenure 
and the IPO deal’s network embeddedness 
decreases the likelihood of firm failure during 
the first five years post IPO. In addition, CEO 
ownership and VC ownership concentration 
also decreases the likelihood of failure.  
Empirical study using data 
from 218 U.S. initial public 
offerings conducted in 1992.  
Gompers & Xuan 
2009 
 
“Bridge Building in 
Venture Capital-
Backed Acquisitions” 
AFA 2009 San 
Francisco 
Meeting Paper 
The authors aim to explore the role that VCs 
play in intermediating relationships between 
various market participants by looking at the 
potential for bridge building. The results show 
that VCs can form a bridge between acquiring 
and target firms, thus reducing the asymmetric 
information associated with the transaction 
for both parties.  
Empirical study of 1,261 
acquisitions of U.S. venture 
capital-backed private 
companies performed 
between 1992 and 2006.   
Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist & Lu 
2007 
 
“Whom You Know 
Matters: Venture 
Capital Networks and 
Investment 
Performance” 
Journal of 
Finance 
The authors examine the performance 
consequences of networks for VCs in the 
context of relationships established when VCs 
syndicate portfolio investments. The results 
show that better-networked VCFs experience 
significantly better fund performance, as 
measured by the proportion of investments 
that are successfully exited.  
Empirical study of all 
investments by U.S. VC funds 
between 1980 and 1999 
using graph theory.  
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Appendix 7 – Literature on M&A 
Author(s) 
Year 
Title 
Journal Purpose and Findings Methodology 
Cartwright & 
Schoenberg 
2006 
 
”Thirty Years of 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Research: Recent 
Advances and Future 
Opportunities” 
British Journal of 
Management 
A brief summary of past M&A research, with 
focus on recent advances and suggestions for 
future research. Also looking at a paradox 
surrounding M&A; even though it has been a 
field of research for 30 years, the performance 
of M&As has not improved. 
Literature review. 
Capron & Shen 
2007 
 
“Acquisitions of 
Private Vs. Public 
Firms: Private 
Information, Target 
Selection, and 
Acquirer Returns 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Testing a set of hypotheses regarding: the 
drivers behind the acquirer’s choice between 
private and public targets; the stock market 
reaction to acquisitions of private vs. public 
firms; and if the acquirers gain when their 
selection of a public or private firm fits the 
theory. The main findings are: acquirers favor 
private targets in familiar industries, but turn 
to public targets when entering a new 
business; acquirers of private targets perform 
better than acquirers of public targets on 
merger announcement; and that acquirers in 
general make the right choice when choosing 
between acquiring a private or public firm. 
A combination of an 
international post-
acquisition survey with 273 
responses, and an event 
study looking at the 101 
stock-listed acquirers from 
the survey, where public 
information was available. 
Graebner & 
Eisenhardt  
2004 
 
”The Seller’s Side of 
the Story: Acquisition 
as Courtship and 
Governance as 
Syndicate in 
Entrepreneurial 
Firms” 
Administrative 
Science Quartely 
The paper looks at the acquisition process 
from the seller’s side, and seeks to identify 
under which conditions firms want to sell, and 
which factors determine the choice of 
acquirer. Managers seek to sell when they 
meet strategic hurdles, and are driven by 
personal motivations as past failures and 
investments by friends. It is also shown that 
the management looks for buyers that offer a 
potential for synergy and organizational 
rapport, and that price is not always given top 
priority. The authors state that acquisition 
hence is similar to courtship, rather than to a 
mere takeover. Another contribution from the 
authors is the view of corporate governance as 
syndicate, where VCs and entrepreneurs make 
a joint decision with regards to buyer. 
A multiple-case, inductive 
study of 12 U.S. technology-
based ventures. The 
entrepreneurial firms are 
selected from three 
industries; networking 
hardware, infrastructure 
software, and online 
commerce. 
Kesner, Shapiro & 
Sharma 
1994 
 
“Brokering Mergers: 
An Agency Theory 
Perspective on the 
Role of 
Representatives” 
The Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
The study uses an agency theory perspective 
to look at the relationship between investment 
bankers and the parts in merger deals. The 
hypothesis is that a conflict of interest 
between the bankers and the firms they 
represent exists, since bankers typically are 
compensated with a percentage of the total 
deal, regardless if they represent buyers or 
sellers. The analysis supports the hypothesis; 
investment bankers and targets have aligning 
goals, but there is a conflict of interest 
between the bankers and the buyers. 
A quantitative analysis 
conducted on 77 mergers 
done between publicly 
traded companies, made in 
the U.S. from 1983 through 
1990. 
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Petty, Shulman & 
Bygrave 
1994 
 
“Mergers and 
Acquisitions: A Means 
of Harvesting the 
Venture” 
Managerial 
Finance 
The article shows that the factors influencing 
the selling decision are estate planning, the 
opportunity to diversify, and the need for 
financing growth. There is a large degree of 
disappointment among selling entrepreneurs 
after the merger process, and the management 
often seem to have unrealistic expectations 
when entering the exit process. Finally, it is 
also suggested that entrepreneurs lack 
experience when it comes to negotiations and 
to the post-sale period. 
A sample of acquisition 
transactions of private firms 
conducted between 1984 
and 1990 is used to prepare 
an interview guide, used to 
conduct personal interviews 
with the entrepreneurs 
being acquired.  
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Abstract
This study examines the link between pre-planned exit strategies in venture capital and the 
value-adding activities conducted by venture capitalists. Through an inductive, multiple-case 
study examining 14 Norwegian and U.S. trade sale exits, we find that two polar groups of 
investors exist, namely the Tailor and the Architect. The Tailor has a pre-planned exit strategy, 
and this affects both his investment decision and the value-adding activities he conducts post-
investment, as these activities are performed with exit specifically in mind. The Architect has a 
more agnostic approach to pre-planned exit strategies, and he adds value in a more general 
manner, believing that the best exit strategy is to build a great company. 
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Introduction 
The venture capital industry is struggling. Since the golden age of software investing from 1997 
to 2000, quarterly IRRs for U.S. venture capital firms (VCFs) have declined from a staggering 
83 % high to single digit percentages, even falling into negative waters for some quarters 
(Ghalbouni and Rouizes, 2010). A part of this problem is the combination of a lower number of 
deals and an increased time to exit. The number of IPOs, historically regarded as the most 
attractive exit route for venture capitalists (VCs) (Megginson, 2004), has seen a sharp decrease 
over the past years, and trade sale exits have become by far the most common exit vehicle. As a 
matter of fact, statistics from the National Venture Capital Association show that in the period 
2004-2010, 2498 exits in the U.S. were trade sales, compared to 384 IPOs (NVCA, 2011). 
Nevertheless, most research is still focused on IPO exits (Félix et al., 2008). This is in large part 
due to more easy access to data, and the common belief that IPO is the most prestigious exit 
route (Chaplinsky and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2010; Megginson, 2004). A few voices in the 
mid-1990s suggested that this disproportionate focus on IPO exits was skewed, and that more 
effort should be put into trade sale exits, both from an academic and practical point of view 
(Relander et al., 1994; Wall and Smith, 1997). However, with the aforementioned boom in IPOs 
in the late 1990s, it is perhaps not surprising that the academic community kept focusing on this 
area. 
Given the venture capital business model, VCs are dependent on exits to generate returns. It is 
therefore somewhat surprising that there seems to be a lack of research in the area, especially 
when it comes to trade sale exits. With today’s market conditions, trade sale exits are as 
relevant as ever, and it is with that backdrop this article departs. We will seek to open parts of 
the black box that is currently hiding the dynamics of a trade sale exit. 
The field of pre-planned exit strategies and their link to investment decisions is an area where 
little previous academic work has been done. Some scholars have proposed that there are two 
main approaches to investing; the proactive and the reactive approach (Relander et al., 1994; 
Wall and Smith, 1997). Investors in the first group use a combination of traditional evaluation 
criteria and exit possibilities when evaluating potential deals, and will have a pre-planned exit 
strategy when entering an investment. The latter group is more focused on business 
possibilities, and will seek to identify exit possibilities as they arise through the life of the 
investment. 
Based on a review of value-adding literature, we propose that these two groups of investors will 
have a different approach to value-adding. If it is true that the first group is concerned with exits 
from day one, we expect that this will be reflected in their value-adding post-investment, and 
that they will perform value-adding activities with exit specifically in mind. That is, internal 
activities that are conducted to tailor the company for a potential buyer, and external activities 
that serve the purpose of making the company known among actors that might have an interest 
in acquiring the portfolio company. We anticipate that the second group of investors will add 
value in a more general manner, and that the focus is on building a great company, rather than 
optimizing it to fit with the needs of potential buyers. Regardless of what approach the VC is 
fonder of, it will have a significant influence on how the company is configured, as well as have 
implications for how prepared the VC is for exit when entering the exit phase. With this 
background, we set out to explore:  
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 The different mindsets towards pre-planned exit strategies among VCs 
 If there is a link between having a pre-planned exit strategy and the focus of the VC’s 
value-adding activities 
To shed light on this research agenda, we have conducted an inductive multiple-case study, 
where 14 Norwegian and U.S. VCs were interviewed, focusing on case-specific trade sale exits 
that they had been involved in. The findings from our empirical study to a large degree 
confirmed our expectations. Two polar groups of investors emerged, and they have been labeled 
the Tailor and the Architect. The Tailor is a close tracker who is extremely focused on exits, and 
this is reflected both in his evaluation of deals and in the value-adding activities he conducts. 
The Architect is more of an opportunist with a strong belief in that building a great company is 
the best exit strategy. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II builds an initial framework that can be 
used to put our empirical findings into context. Section III explains the methods used to conduct 
the study and gives a short introduction to the cases. Section IV describes our main findings. 
Finally, the findings are compared to our initial framework in section V, followed by the 
implications of this study in section VI. 
Theoretical Framework 
This section will seek to build an initial theoretical framework that can help understand how 
VCs evaluate their investment proposals in the light of future exit opportunities and value-
adding. By combining insights from deal screening literature and the value-adding domain, it 
will be shown why we suggest that VCs can be divided into two main classifications, namely the 
Tailor and the Architect, and it will be elaborated on the traits characterizing these two 
archetypes of investors. 
Deal Evaluation 
In the pre-investment phase (De Clercq et al., 2006), the VC is looking for business ideas offering 
a large market potential, protection of intellectual property, and realistic production, marketing 
and financial plans that can be executed within the VC’s desired time frame. The entrepreneur 
and management team is another important factor taken into account, and an ambitious, 
motivated, honest, and experienced team with both general business experience and industry 
related expertise is preferred (De Clercq et al., 2006). 
A more detailed account of the decision making process is given by Fried and Hisrich (1994). 
This model divides the pre-investment phase into six distinct steps; origination, VCF specific 
screen, generic screen, first-phase evaluation, second-phase evaluation, and closing. The VCF 
specific and the generic screen includes evaluation criteria as the size of the investment, the 
industry and geographical location of the venture, financing stage, review of the business plan, 
and other information available to the VC. During the first-phase evaluation, existing investors 
and customers, potential customers, and former business associates are contacted to gather 
information, and the VC and entrepreneurial team meet at one or more occasions. In the second-
phase evaluation stage, focus is switched from determining interest in the deal to evaluating the 
potential risk factors of the deal. 
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MacMillan et al. (1985) take a closer look at which criteria the VCs are concerned with during 
the different evaluation stages. They find that the personality and experience of the 
management team dominate financial criteria, and that product and market criteria are 
regarded as less important than the former two. This emphasis on human capital is also 
supported by several other scholars (De Clercq et al., 2006; Guild and Bachher, 1996; Tyebjee 
and Bruno, 1984). However, Baum and Silverman (2004) suggest that VCs actually give too 
much attention to human capital when evaluating deals. Human capital as a decision criteria is 
somewhat downplayed by Hall and Hofer (1993), who in their study found that even though the 
VC made observations on the entrepreneur with regards to age, experience, and other factors, 
these observations did not play a major role in the decision to accept or reject the proposals. 
The exception was when the entrepreneurial talent was at the extreme ends, meaning very 
incompetent or competent. 
The research on VC decision making has also been criticized (Sandberg et al., 1988). Zacharakis 
and Meyer (1998) propose that past research might have been somewhat misleading, and their 
findings suggest that: 
VCs are not good at introspecting about their own decision process. Even within the 
confines of a controlled experiment, which greatly reduces the amount of information 
considered, VCs lacked strong understanding of how they made decisions (Zacharakis 
and Meyer, 1998). 
Regardless of what criteria the VCs actually use when evaluating deals, pre-planned exit 
strategies are rarely mentioned as a factor taken into account. By all means, given the venture 
capital business model, exits are important and can be said to be implicitly considered. But still, 
pre-planned exit strategies and future exit opportunities seem to be missing from the equation. 
The next section will therefore take a closer look at what role pre-planned exit strategies play 
during the screening and evaluation stages. 
Pre-Planned Exit Strategies 
Following the definition of Cumming and MacIntosh (2003), five different exit vehicles exist:  
IPO, acquisition/trade sale, secondary sale, buyback, and write-off. It is highly unlikely that a VC 
will have a pre-planned exit strategy based on the latter three, as these often are associated with 
lower returns (Cumming et al., 2006; Wall and Smith, 1997). Therefore, trade sale exits and IPO 
exits will in reality be the only two plausible pre-planned exit strategies. 
Cumming and Johan (2008) performed a study which found that exits were pre-planned in 31 % 
of the cases, defining a pre-planned exit strategy as: 
… a reasonable expectation that the investor will want to dispose of the entrepreneurial 
investment either by IPO or acquisition (i.e., trade sale), and this expectation is formed 
prior to contracting with the entrepreneur. This expectation need not be revealed to the 
entrepreneur, and even if it is revealed, it need not be fully revealed. 
Relander et al. (1994) demand more than a reasonable expectation, and suggest that a proactive 
investor (labeled the path sketcher) performs a thorough analysis of both business and exit 
possibilities before investing, that these analyses influence the investment decision, and that 
exit possibilities will influence the deal structure. However, the path sketcher described by 
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Relander et al. (1994) does not necessarily plan the exit before investing, but is aware that most 
successful exits are trade sales. Wall and Smith (1997) includes another dimension, namely the 
management. They suggest that in order to be fully proactive, the management needs to be 
informed of the desired exit strategy, and incentivized properly in order to align interests. This 
investor also takes requirements of exits into operating plans. Finally, he is able to identify 
potential buyers together with the entrepreneur by looking at corporations that could benefit 
from improvements made by the venture (Relander et al., 1994). 
The reactive investor has a different approach. He trusts the management skills and the concept 
of the investment target and might map out some exit opportunities, but these opportunities 
have little influence on the investment decision (Relander et al., 1994). The portfolio companies 
of this investor are always for sale depending on price, but he believes that a lot of clients would 
not come to him if he planned the exits in advance. This investor reviews his portfolio regularly, 
keeping an eye open for potential buyers and identifies opportunities as they arise (Wall and 
Smith, 1997). 
For the purpose of this article we will use a combination of the definitions above: 
An investor with a pre-planned exit strategy has a clear expectation about which exit 
form is most suitable, formed prior to contracting through a thorough analysis of both 
business and exit possibilities, and will inform management of his plans prior to 
investing. 
It is hard to draw a determined conclusion with regards to what degree VCs are concerned with 
explicit exit strategies pre-investment. Although all VCs as mentioned are (and should be) 
implicitly concerned with exits, it seems like there are two different approaches to deal 
screening; the proactive and the reactive approach, and the rest of this article will use these two 
different approaches as a vantage point. 
Value-Adding 
With our two different investors fresh in mind, we move on to the value-adding domain. Baum 
and Silverman (2004) argue that the VC selects his particular investments based on a combined 
logic of “scouting” for strong technology, and “coaching” (Hellmann, 2000) via the injection of 
management skill, commonly known as value-adding. This suggests that when considering 
investment decisions, it is natural to also consider value-adding to get a better picture of VC 
decision making. The next section will therefore take a closer look at the link between pre-
planned exit strategies and value-adding. 
Although the value-adding hypothesis is disputed among scholars (Busenitz et al., 2004), the 
practitioners themselves are confident in their ability to enhance portfolio company 
performance through providing advice (Perry, 1989; Rock, 1991). A partner in a major U.S. VCF 
estimated that he aggregated returns of 70 percent when he took an active role, while passive 
investments only yielded 8 percent (Pratch, 2005). Other studies have also shown that venture 
capital-backed startups outperform comparable startups that are not venture capital-backed 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
The primary responsibilities of VCs in the post-investment phase are monitoring and to conduct 
value-adding activities (Busenitz et al., 2004; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Sapienza, 1992), and 
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they spend more than half of their time on these two activities (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). 
Several studies suggest that the main value-adding activities for the VC are to assist the portfolio 
company in financial and strategic matters such as raising additional capital, providing strategic 
advice, recruiting management, and serving on the board of directors (Ehrlich et al., 1994; 
Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1989; Sapienza et al., 1996). Other contributions 
include acting as a mentor and to give access to their network (Sapienza et al., 1996).  
Fried and Hisrich (1995) point to the importance of the value-adding activities that are 
dependent on the VCs network, such as helping to raise money, finding employees, finding 
acquisition or corporate partners, and giving access to strategic information. This emphasis on 
network is supported by Hochberg et al. (2007), who find that better-networked VCFs 
experience better fund performance, measured by the proportion of successful exits. Having a 
strong network enables the VC to provide higher quality value-adding services, and hence 
increases the probability of a successful exit. 
Other network-related areas where the VC can add value are through the facilitation of strategic 
alliances (Lindsey, 2008), and through acting as a bridge builder between acquirer and target, 
reducing information asymmetry by conveying information between the two firms through his 
personal relationships (Gompers and Xuan, 2009). Stuart et al. (1999) propose that: 
… faced with great uncertainty about the quality of young companies, third parties rely 
on the prominence of the affiliates of those companies to make judgments about their 
quality and that young companies "endorsed" by prominent exchange partners will 
perform better than otherwise comparable ventures that lack prominent associates. 
In conclusion, the different roles a VC can assume in his value-adding activities are summarized 
by De Clercq et al. (2006): 
 Strategic Role: Provide advice on strategic and marketing issues, as well as 
organizational development (Sapienza, 1989). 
 Financing Role: Arrange financing from other investors such as VCs, banks, and others 
(Lerner, 1994), and assist in developing internal financial management procedures. 
 Networking Role: Let the entrepreneur benefit from the VCs network when looking for 
financing, external managers, service providers, acquisition candidates or customers. 
 Interpersonal Role: Serve as a mentor, friend and confidant, and give moral support. 
 Reputational Role: Lend a reputational benefit that can be help when recruiting top 
management, getting initial sales and attracting more investment. 
 Discipline Role: Add value through evaluation, and if necessary, replacing 
underperforming management (Fried et al., 1998). 
Now that the different areas where a VC can add value have been examined, the next section will 
seek to integrate the findings into an initial framework that can be used to examine our 
empirical findings. 
Initial Framework 
Previous research has not looked closer at the connection between pre-planned exit strategies 
and value-adding. We suggest that a link between these areas exist, and that there are two 
different mindsets among VCs.  
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When looking at the different ways in which a VC can add value to his portfolio company, it 
might seem difficult to link these to a proactive or reactive mindset with regards to value-
adding. After all, regardless of mindset, the goal of the VC is still a profitable exit within a 
desired timeframe. However, the form of exit might have an influence on what activities the VC 
actually chooses to conduct. As an example, if the target exit route is an IPO, there are certain 
criteria that need to be met with regards to company structure, documentation, and revenue, 
and this might be determining for the scope of the value-adding activities. 
Further, we propose that an investor with trade sale as the pre-planned exit strategy will be 
more focused on network related value-adding activities, such as facilitating strategic 
partnerships and keeping potential buyers updated on the progress of the company, than an 
investor with an agnostic approach. By conducting such activities, the VC can increase the 
possibility of a successful trade sale. Given his focus on tailoring the value-adding activities to 
suit potential buyers, this investor has been named the Tailor. 
An investor with a more agnostic approach to exit strategies, where we define an agnostic 
approach as both the VCs with a dual strategy (aim for IPO, with trade sale as back-up) and the 
VCs without a pre-planned exit strategy, might focus more on building a strong company that 
potentially could stand alone and be publicly listed. This does not mean that network-related 
activities are not important to him, but he still prefers to identify opportunities as they arise. 
Therefore, his value-adding activities might not be as focused on future exits as the case is for 
the investor with a pre-planned exit strategy, but rather have a more internal focus, such as 
strategy, operations, and structural reorganizations. Since we propose that the focus of this 
investor is on building a great company, we have labeled him the Architect. 
The initial characteristics of our two investor archetypes are summarized in table 1 below. 
Table 1 - Initial Framework 
 The Tailor The Architect 
P
re
-I
n
v
e
st
m
e
n
t 
Analysis of business and exit 
possibilities influence the 
investment decision. 
Exit opportunities have little to 
none influence on the 
investment decision. 
Has a pre-planned exit strategy. 
Does not have a pre-planned 
exit strategy. 
P
o
st
-I
n
v
e
st
m
e
n
t Identifies potential buyers together 
with management by looking at the 
space they operate in. 
Identifies opportunities as they 
arise. 
Adds value with exit in mind, 
focusing on network related 
activities. 
Adds value with the company 
in mind, and has a more 
general focus. 
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Methodology 
The research design utilized in this study is a multiple-case, inductive study involving 14 
venture-backed trade sale exit processes. Multiple cases allow for replication logic, where each 
case can be looked upon as an experiment. Inferences drawn from one experiment serves to 
confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others (Yin, 1994). Multiple-case studies 
therefore allow for more generalizable and better grounded results than those of single-case 
studies. 
Research setting   
We chose venture capital trade sale exit processes as our research setting due to the lack of 
research on how value-adding is connected to pre-planned exit strategies. Further, trade sale 
exit processes are an intrinsic part of the venture capital business model. With trade sales by far 
being the most common exit vehicle, their success to a large part dictates the success of the 
venture capital industry as a whole. However, this practical significance of the process is not 
reflected in the current venture capital research, where trade sale exit processes are still 
somewhat of a black box. Taking the first steps towards opening that box was a major 
motivation for the chosen research setting.  
The fact that little research has been done on venture capital trade sale exit processes motivated 
us to make this an inductive study. The VC’s involvement in trade sale exits is a complex 
process, and poorly understood. Quantitative research strategies would not be able to offer the 
same insights into the process as rich, qualitative data would. Further, trade sale exits are laden 
with sensitive issues. An interview performed under the promise of confidentiality was viewed 
as the best method for gaining access to rich data.  
Sampling 
The cases included were based on a strategic sampling of completed trade sale exits. In total, we 
sampled 14 different cases. Several of the cases were identified as interesting by the researchers 
prior to initiating contact with the informants. As we immersed ourselves in the venture capital 
community, we were also introduced to several cases included in the sample by actors lending a 
helping hand. Given the fact that we were seeking to understand the VC involvement during the 
entire process, we sampled only cases in which the trade sale had been completed. As an added 
bonus, this reliance on retrospective data increased the efficiency of data collection, allowing for 
the inclusion of more cases in the study.  
We sampled firms from various industries. Further, trade sales completed by both Norwegian 
and U.S. VCs were included in the sample. By including various industries and different 
geographical regions in our sample, the generalizability of our results should improve. Five of 
the 14 cases included in the sample are trade sales exits performed by U.S. VCs, while the 
remaining nine were performed by Norwegian VCs. The table below presents a brief overview 
of the 14 cases included in the sample. 
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Table 2 – Overview of Cases 
Case Industry Acquired Informants 
Avalanche Cable 2006 VC 
Bruin Electronics 2006 VC 
Canuck Networking hardware 2005 VC 
Coyote Electronics 2007 2 VCs 
Flame Networking hardware 1996 VC 
Flyer Software 2007 2 VCs 
Hurricane Energy 2007 VC 
Lightning Software 2010 VC 
Panther Energy 2007 VC 
Ranger Oil service 2008 VC 
Sabre Networking hardware 1999 VC 
Senator Electronics 2011 VC 
Star Telecom 2006 VC 
Thrasher Healthcare 2011 VC 
The trade sales included in this study were completed between 1996 and 2011. This time period 
experienced very different market circumstances, from the hot market of the late 1990’s to the 
financial crisis in the late 2000’s and the depression that followed. As such, the rationale for, and 
the opportunities to complete, trade sale exits for VCs have varied considerably over the time 
period covered. While it was relatively easy to launch an IPO in the U.S. in the late 1990’s, it was 
next to impossible in 2008. This variance allowed for controlling for the influence of market 
circumstances. The cost, of course, was the possibility of informants no longer remembering 
events accurately. 
Data Sources 
The study is based on several data sources: (1) qualitative data from semi-structured interviews 
with VCs, (2) e-mails to follow up interviews and ensure that we understood the accounts given 
correctly, and (3) archival data, including press clippings, company web sites and discussion 
forums.  
We started with pilot interviews with informants who had considerable practical experience 
with trade sale exit processes, as well as academics with significant experience from the field of 
venture capital research. These interviews helped us form the interview guide. In addition, it 
made sure that we as interviewers were well prepared before entering into the next phase of 
the study.  
We conducted 14 interviews with our key informants. The interviews varied in length from 30 
to 70 minutes, and followed the aforementioned interview guide. The interviews followed a 
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“courtroom” procedure, with the interviewers emphasizing the need to focus on facts and 
events rather than on interpretations (Eisenhardt, 1989). We always began the interviews by 
asking the respondents to recount the story of why they invested, followed by a short recap of 
what developments took place within the portfolio company until the actual exit process was 
initiated. Seeing that we were seeking retrospective reports, such open-ended questioning 
should lead to higher accuracy in our data (Lipton, 1977; Miller et al., 1997). 
All of the 14 interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim, totaling 133 pages of 
single-spaced transcriptions. As mentioned, we followed up the interviews with e-mails asking 
clarifying questions on an as-needed basis. Interviews with Norwegian informants were 
conducted in Norwegian, and translated into English by the authors. We strived to ensure that 
nothing was lost in translation. 
When possible, we took steps to minimize informant biases, and always held the data provided 
in the interviews up against the archival data collected from secondary sources, in order to 
ensure that we were not suffering from being fed biased information. Our informants were all 
highly knowledgeable and influential with regards to the exit process. Such informants are the 
most reliable (Seidler, 1974; Kumar et al., 1993; Huber and Power, 1985). Further, we 
emphasized during the interviews that we were interested in case-specific facts and events. 
Thus, the information provided is less likely to be subject to cognitive biases and impression 
management (Huber and Power, 1985; Golden, 1992; Miller et al., 1997).  Finally, the trade sale 
exit process is highly sensitive, both on a personal level and business wise. We therefore 
promised confidentiality to our informants in order to further motivate for the provision of 
accurate data (Huber and Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997). 
Data Analysis 
Based on the triangulation of data from our different sources, rich and reliable mini-cases of 
each of the trade sale exits could be built (Jick, 1979). Thereafter, within-case and cross-case 
analyses were performed. The analysis started by looking closer at each case on a stand-alone 
basis. In the spirit of the inductive process, this analysis allowed for the emergence of constructs 
and relationships, and was not guided by specific hypotheses. 
Following the stand-alone analysis of all cases, cross-case analysis was performed. Replication 
logic allowed for the confirming and disconfirming of tentative constructs and propositions. 
This process was highly iterative, with the researchers stepping back and forth between data 
and analysis many times. Further, a significant amount of time was set aside for discussion both 
within the team and with external researchers in order to ensure the validity of the emergent 
constructs.  
Finally, as the findings from the study were ready for presentation, a sanity check was 
performed. All informants were contacted and asked to correct any final misunderstandings, as 
well as to perform a citation check. In addition, they were given the chance to comment on the 
propositions put forward and the logic behind our argumentation, in order to ensure a close 
connection between our results and the world as it is perceived by the practitioners.  
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Limitations 
This study is based on a strategic sampling of completed trade sale exit processes. As such, the 
results are not statistically representative. The cases included took place over a long period of 
time. While this helped control for market conditions, it does mean that the informants from the 
oldest cases may have remembered events inaccurately. Although we took steps to minimize 
informant biases, we cannot be sure that the information provided is how other stakeholders in 
the process experienced it.  Bias and partial information may have affected our data. Interview 
data was triangulated with data from other sources in order to minimize the effect of this 
potential problem. 
Findings 
The following section will elaborate on the main findings from our study in light of our research 
questions. First, the different VCs’ attitude towards pre-planned exit strategies will be clarified. 
Next, we will give more details on their approach to value-adding. 
Pre-Planned Exit Strategy 
As suggested earlier, an investor with a pre-planned exit strategy evaluates possible exit 
strategies and exit forms at time of investment, and these are just as important to him as the 
other, more traditional, evaluation criteria. He also has a clear idea about the exit form before 
investing, and makes sure the management is aligned. Our interviewees were asked to identify 
the pre-planned exit strategy, if they had one, and the results can be found in table 3.  Two main 
groups emerged; the investors with a pre-planned exit strategy, and the ones with a more 
agnostic approach. 
One of the most extreme instances of having a pre-planned exit strategy could be found in the 
Thrasher case. Here, exit opportunities were clearly used as an evaluation criterion when 
deciding to invest: 
… when we were investing in the company, we actually had reached out to several 
potential acquirers, and had bounced this company off of them, as well as the idea and 
the market. We got to know what the acquirer was thinking about … we knew they were 
interested in the company and the market before we invested. And within a year the 
acquirer came back to us and wanted to discuss potentially acquiring the company 
(Thrasher VC). 
Other VCs were more confident that buyers will emerge if the company is successful, and 
identify opportunities as they go along, without having a pre-planned exit strategy. This is 
exemplified by the following quote: 
… we did not go out to sell the company, but we realized it would be a reasonable time to 
start considering that. And then we weren’t the only ones thinking it out at the same 
time. So the people who called us were thinking that also, and it seemed like a good 
choice for everybody (Canuck VC).  
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Table 3 - Pre-Planned Exit Strategies 
 Case Statements 
IP
O
 
Avalanche 
It was probably more from [our] side to say that we should take it to an 
IPO. 
T
ra
d
e
 S
a
le
 
Bruin 
We had discussed that trade sale was the only relevant exit prior to 
investment … [The founders] had a burning passion for getting their 
technology into as many [products] as possible. And they saw that being 
acquired was a great way for them to achieve that. 
Coyote 
I do not believe in listing a one product company. Very few of our 
investments go to an IPO, and we rarely believe they will. 
Flyer 
There was a well established picture with both other investors and the 
management of what was going to happen before we invested. We were 
going to help build the company for a while, and then [the company] was 
going to be sold to an industrial buyer 
Hurricane 
We always discuss exit possibilities with the management team and other 
owners prior to investment, and in this case it was pretty clear that it was 
going to be a trade sale exit. 
Ranger 
The company had a single product, so trade sale was the only natural way 
to exit a case like this. So that was the exit strategy from the very 
beginning. 
Senator 
We explicitly discussed the expectations for valuation, time horizon and so 
on prior to investment. … it’s important to make sure that we’re all as 
aligned as possible. 
Star 
We had a dialogue with the company for a year before we invested. … we 
insisted on the fact that we were interested in investing, but that we would 
only do it if we followed our strategy of working towards a trade sale to a 
strategic partner. … We did not discuss an IPO. 
Thrasher 
IPO was definitely not a target. And you know; we always assume that an 
IPO is not the likely exit in any investment we do.  
A
g
n
o
st
ic
 
Canuck 
Exit strategy was not discussed prior to investment … if you build a 
company of substantial value, then you get to figure it out later. And the 
core mission is to build something of extraordinary value. 
Flame 
I thought it would be acquired, because it struck me as more of a products 
company, a products sort of thing … but I don't think I ever explicitly asked 
[the founder]: "If somebody shows up in your office with 100 million, do 
you want to sell?" 
Lightning 
I have a fundamental belief in that building a solid, well-performing 
company makes you attractive … Of course; we also made sure that 
potential buyers existed. … An IPO was also an attractive option for this 
company. 
Panther We talked about how it might be possible to make an IPO happen, and we 
were running parallel processes.  
Sabre 
We didn’t have any thoughts with regards to this being a trade sale or IPO 
case. 
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When deciding on the most suitable exit strategy, the VCs with a pre-planned exit strategy are 
extremely aware of what type of company they are investing in. Among the different rationales 
given for not considering an IPO, revenue base and product portfolio are the two reasons most 
often quoted as determinants for choosing a trade sale exit strategy. The statements from the 
VCs also show that there is a focus on keeping management in the loop, as suggested by Wall 
and Smith (1997). 
As can be seen from the selected quotes, having an agnostic view on pre-planned exit strategies 
does not imply not being concerned about exits at all, as previously suggested. There is however 
often a clear focus on building a great company, rather than focusing on the exit from day one. 
This is best exemplified by the statements from the Canuck and Lightning VCs. The other VCs 
did not necessarily share this attitude, but still did not have a clear picture of which exit form 
would be best suited for the portfolio company, or they did not have an exit discussion with the 
management prior to investing. 
We also see that an investor with a pre-planned strategy is concerned with exit from day one. 
Therefore, he identifies potential buyers early in the process. He knows the space, prefers 
management who knows the space, and makes sure the VC and the entrepreneur has the social 
capital needed to identify potential buyers. This means that he will not be surprised when 
someone comes knocking and wants to buy the company. 
Adding Value with Exit in Mind 
To divide value-adding activities into “with exit in mind” and “without exit in mind” might seem 
ambiguous, and these two categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. After all, all value-
adding activities are performed to increase the probability of success, and will hence increase 
the probability of a successful exit. However, activities as hiring a CEO with IPO experience or 
facilitating strategic partnerships with potential buyers are value-adding activities that serve a 
dual purpose; adding value and facilitating a future exit, hence adding value with exit in mind. 
Therefore, we have divided the VCs into two main groups; the ones who had a proactive 
approach and added value with exit in mind, and the ones with a more reactive approach, who 
added value in a more general matter. 
Investors with a Proactive Approach 
Nine of our interviewees stated that they had added value with exit specifically in mind. From 
these activities a number of different categories emerged, and the different activities that were 
conducted are summarized in table 4. 
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Table 4 - Exit Focused Value-Adding 
Case Value Added with Exit in Mind 
Avalanche 
Strategic Partnerships: The way to get a good company to get bought is to get your 
potential buyers to know about you. So how do you do that? You make 
partnerships. 
Hiring Key Personnel: [The hired CEO] had actually taken a company public back in 
the nineties … The goal was to take the company public. He had done that once, 
right. And that was very powerful. 
Advisory Board: … once we had gotten four or five of these guys on, we had other 
very experienced executives calling us, trying to get on that advisory board. 
PR and Marketing: We had a semi-annual event, like a dinner, at one of these trade 
shows. 
Bruin 
PR & Marketing: We often try to get our portfolio companies to focus on the more 
general aspects of marketing. In this case, we hired an external PR advisor, who 
did a very good job. 
Coyote 
Strategic Partnerships: We were searching for a partner early on, and we went out 
and talked to all the major players in the business. And that was an excellent 
opportunity to get the potential buyers to get to know us. 
Approach and Update Potential Buyers: A large part of our exit strategy was to 
make sure that the potential buyers were aware of our company, and to keep 
them updated on the progress. 
Strategy and Operations: The strategy we chose became important for the exit. 
Because if you enter [this market], it determines what type of buyers that 
might be interested in the company. 
Flyer 
Hiring Key Personnel: One of the conditions for making the investment was that a 
new CEO and Chairman were brought in. That was part of the term sheet. 
Strategy and Operations: One important thing to consider is the type of company a 
potential buyer wants.  
PR and Marketing: We attended a trade show where the top 20 players in this 
space participated, and we talked to every single one of them. 
Hurricane 
Hiring Key Personnel: We spent quite some time on hiring a CFO, as we see a strong 
CFO as an integral part of the management team … this person has to be able to 
support the CEO in negotiations, make prognoses for future financing, and 
control all documentation. 
Approach and Update Potential Buyers: We run continuous processes with the 
M&A departments of all the large players in our specific industry three to four 
times per year, to update them on the companies in our portfolio. 
PR and Marketing: Good marketing does not only sell the products, it actually sells 
the company itself. 
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Lightning 
Structural Reorganization: … we looked at making acquisitions to broaden the 
product portfolio, and we actually bought an American company. 
Strategy and Operations: … you get a higher valuation at the exit if you can show a 
business model with recurring revenues. So we were extremely focused on the 
business model. 
PR and Marketing: It was important for us to get on the big companies’ radar 
screen … we have always been on the offensive towards analysts … so every 
time someone talked about cloud computing and IT monitoring, [the company] 
was mentioned as an up and coming star. 
Panther 
Documentation and Procedures: We did a lot of work on financial reports. This was 
important to get the procedures in place, but also to make it easier to show the 
value of the company later on. 
Hiring Key Personnel: The CEO had to be convinced that he needed a new CFO, and 
we were actually struggling to persuade him.   
Structural Reorganization: We acquired a local company, with the main goal of 
getting a larger volume. 
Strategy and Operations: We put quite some time into helping the company decide 
what technologies and markets they should focus on. 
Star 
Strategic Partnerships: It is hard for a small start-up to sell to large customers … so 
we wanted to sell through credible partners … we built a few strategic 
partnerships, and we felt we had to make our strategic value visible to them … 
and one of these partners ended up buying the company. 
Thrasher 
Documentation and Procedures: … the manufacturing process was not done 
properly, the IT and the patents were not done properly, so there was a lot of 
stuff that we actually went in and fixed for them, or got them to focus on. 
Approach and Update Potential Buyers: … one of the things that we heard when we 
spoke to the potential acquirers was that well, we don't like this; you guys need 
to fix this. And so that's what we did when we went into this company. 
By comparing the value-adding activities identified in our case companies with the areas 
identified in the literature, it becomes clear that all the traditional areas of value-adding can be 
said to have been covered. The activities identified have been split into two main groups; 
internal and external focus. The internally focused activities are the ones that are done to 
change the internal configuration of the portfolio company, while the externally focused 
activities are more network-related. The next sections will focus on how the value-adding 
activities actually influenced the exit process for the different case companies. 
Internal Focus 
Documentation and Procedures: Both in the Panther and Thrasher case, the VCs had to change 
existing procedures. These actions served a dual purpose; not only did they improve day-to-day 
operations, but they also made it easier to build the proper documentation needed when 
potential buyers were enquiring later on. For Thrasher, these changes came as a direct result of 
contacting the potential buyers pre-investment, and the VCF had already made the plans before 
the investment was made. 
Hiring Key Personnel: Two of the case companies listed the hiring of a new CFO as an 
important part of their exit strategy, namely Hurricane and Panther. For both companies, this 
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was part of the goal of creating better financial documentation and procedures. The CFO himself 
might not be considered a valuable part of the company by a potential acquirer, but the results 
of his work will often play an important part of a future exit process. The Avalanche VC had a 
clear goal of IPO early on, and brought in a new CEO with IPO experience to improve the 
chances of making this happen. 
Structural Reorganization: Lightning and Panther made one acquisition each. These 
acquisitions were not identified as being part of a synergistic plan, but simply to make the 
company more attractive for a future exit. Both companies were considering the possibility of 
an IPO, and wanted to broaden their product portfolios as well as to increase their revenue base 
in order to make an IPO more likely. 
Strategy and Operations: In the Coyote and Flyer cases, the VCs were extremely aware of how 
their strategic and operational choices might affect the scope of potential buyers. A good 
example of this can be found in the following quote: 
One important thing to consider is the type of company a potential buyer wants. And 
when you make those strategic choices you might make yourself interesting to some 
buyers, but less attractive or even uninteresting to others (Flyer VC). 
The scope of buyers is not the only concern VCs have with strategy, as shown in the Lightning 
case. By altering the business model it was possible to create recurring revenue streams, and 
hence increase the valuation that could be deducted from traditional valuation methods as DCF 
and multiples. 
Common for all the internal factors identified is the focus on positioning the company for exit. 
Since this exit typically will happen in the short- to medium-term, this might be in conflict with 
the long-term goals of the company. For instance, it is easy to picture a situation where altering 
a business model or acquiring a competitor might be beneficial in the short run, but actually 
might hurt the company in the long run. 
External Focus 
Strategic Partnerships: Partnering is often an important part of the strategy of small start-ups, 
and can serve as a tool for getting access to customers and/or distribution, and other ways of 
increasing scalability. For four of the case companies, partnerships were also a deliberate way of 
getting potential acquirers to know their company, and in two of the cases, the portfolio 
company was actually bought by a strategic partner.  
Advisory Boards: In the Avalanche case, the company assembled an advisory board where all 
the major CTOs from the industry were participating. Although this was initiated by the 
management team, it was highly encouraged by the VCs. Updating these executives through 
board meetings greatly reduced the information asymmetry, and created buzz around the 
company that ultimately helped facilitate the exit. 
Approach and Update Potential Buyers: As with building strategic partnerships, activities that 
fall under this category help to make the portfolio company known among potential buyers. The 
cases show three different approaches: the Thrasher VCs approached potential buyers pre-
investment, and made sure they knew what their thoughts on a future acquisition of the case 
company were; the Coyote VCs ran a process where potential buyers were continuously 
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updated; the Hurricane VC proactively contacted the M&A departments of potential buyers on a 
quarterly basis.  
PR and Marketing: Again, the focus is on the activities that were identified by the VCs as 
directed towards exits. This included participation on trade shows, keeping industry analysts 
updated on the progress of the company, and general branding. As stated by the Hurricane VC: 
“Good marketing does not only sell the products, it actually sells the company itself”.  
A common factor for the actions with external focus is that they all serve the same purpose: To 
make sure that potential buyers know that the company exists and to create attention around 
the fact that the company will be up for sale in the future.  
Investors with a Reactive Approach 
Five of our interviewees did not identify any value-adding activities that were conducted with 
exit in mind, and we have therefore categorized them as having a reactive approach to value-
adding. Their attitudes to value-adding are exemplified in table 5. 
The level of involvement among the VCs was different; the Canuck VC was mainly taking on a 
financing role (De Clercq et al., 2006), and did not implement any major changes to his portfolio 
company. The Flame VC did not have time to make any major changes due to a short time to 
exit, but had set up a list of milestones to be completed, including hiring new VPs of marketing 
and engineering. Finally, the Sabre VC focused on financing and staffing issues, but did not do 
this specifically with exit in mind. The relatively low level of involvement shown by these 
investors is often labeled laissez-faire involvement (MacMillan et al., 1989).  
The Ranger VCs had to involve themselves in more aspects of building the company, since it was 
an early-phase start-up where the company basically had to be built from scratch. In the Senator 
case, a lot of time and effort was put into building an improved business model, with focus on 
go-to-market strategies and distribution strategies. However, this was not done with exit in 
mind, but to build a sustaining company. These two VCs were hence taking on more of a close 
tracker role (MacMillan et al., 1989). 
Table 5 – Value-Adding Mindset 
Case Value-Adding Mindset 
Canuck 
We didn't do anything to change the company, we were just encouraging it along. 
We were basically financing it in a way. 
Flame 
We didn't really do anything about exit on this one, because it just happened so fast, 
it was unexpected. 
Ranger 
The entire company was being built; it started out as an entrepreneur with some 
drawings. So everything was built from scratch, and we took the lead role when 
doing that. 
Sabre 
So you’re helping to control the burn-rate of the company, you’re adding to the 
management team, and through that, hopefully building more value. 
Senator 
We were redesigning and developing the go-to-market strategy and the 
distribution strategy of the company. But we did not do that in order to explicitly 
sell the company, but rather to help it grow 
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We identified a focus on the internal activities that could help build the company, as suggested 
by our initial framework. This does not mean that external activities were not important, but the 
overall impression is that these were downplayed to give more attention to internal activities. It 
looks as if these investors did not specifically prepare the company for exit, but rather focused 
on building a good company that could be able to stand alone in the long-term. 
Discussion 
Based on our findings, the different investors have been classified in line with the criteria 
developed earlier, as shown in table 6. A pattern seems to emerge where the Tailor and the 
Architect actually exist. Out of the nine cases where a pre-planned exit strategy existed, seven 
VCs added value with exit in mind, suggesting support for the notion that value-adding with exit 
in mind is linked to having a pre-planned exit strategy. We found four cases that did not fit with 
our two archetypes, and have therefore created a category labeled Middle-Ground Investors, to 
which we will return shortly. 
Table 6 - Summary of Cases 
 Case 
Pre-Planned 
Exit Strategy 
Value Added With Exit in 
Mind 
T
a
il
o
rs
 
Avalanche Yes Yes 
Bruin Yes Yes 
Coyote Yes Yes 
Flyer Yes Yes 
Hurricane Yes Yes 
Star Yes Yes 
Thrasher Yes Yes 
M
id
d
le
-
G
ro
u
n
d
 
In
v
e
st
o
rs
 
Ranger Yes No 
Senator Yes No 
Lightning No Yes 
Panther No Yes 
A
rc
h
it
e
ct
s Canuck No No 
Flame No No 
Sabre No No 
 
Seven VCs have been classified as Tailors, three as Architects, while the final four have been 
classified as Middle-Ground Investors. This last group consists of investors who did not fall into 
our predefined categories, and it is not surprising that this group emerged. After all, our Tailor 
and Architect are archetypes. In the real world, there will be more of a continuous scale, with 
investors distributed along the scale. We found two different types of Middle-Ground Investors; 
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the ones with a pre-planned exit strategy who did not add value with exit in mind, and the ones 
who did not have a pre-planned exit strategy, but did add value with exit in mind. The 
classification of investors is summarized in the matrix below. 
 
Figure 1 - Classification of Investors 
Overall, the findings from our study support the suggestions we made in our initial framework. 
A summary of the differences between the Tailor and the Architect can be found in figure 1 
below. 
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Figure 2 - Concluding Framework 
The Tailor is focused on exits from day one, or even before investing, and exit opportunities is a 
criteria when evaluating investments on the same level as business opportunities. His pre-
planned exit strategy not only influences the value-adding later on, but also the investment 
decision itself. We did, however, not find indications that the Tailor is focused on external 
activities exclusively, but found a more general pattern: The value-adding seems to be focused 
on internal areas where the company needs to be altered to fit with the pre-planned exit 
strategy, and the external activities that can help inform potential buyers about both the 
existence and quality of the portfolio company. There seems to be a notion that good companies 
do not sell themselves – the VC needs to actively take part in selling the company; not only in 
the exit phase, but also prior to it. Accordingly, we posit: 
P1: The Tailor will through a thorough analysis of both business and exit possibilities 
create a pre-planned exit strategy, and inform the management of his plans, prior to 
investing. 
P2: The Tailor will focus his value-adding on areas that will maximize the success rate of 
his pre-planned exit strategy. 
For the Architect, the focus appears to be more directed towards building a strong company. 
Traditional business criteria are used to assess potential investments, and although the VC 
knows that an exit will happen somewhere down the line, the exit opportunities are not 
considered part of the evaluation criteria. When the Architect moves on to the post-investment 
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phase, he adds value in a more general manner than the Tailor, and he is more confident that the 
buyers will come if the company is successful. Accordingly, we posit: 
P3: The Architect will have an agnostic approach to exit forms and to informing 
management of his plans prior to investing, and believes that the best exit strategy is to 
build a solid company. 
P4: The Architect will have a general focus in his value-adding, and will not focus on 
activities that are directly related to exit. 
We also found that the Tailor is more of a close tracker (MacMillan et al., 1989) than the 
Architect, especially when it comes to spending time on exit-related activities. The Tailor 
divides the time spent on exit-related activities evenly through the duration of his investment, 
whereas the Architect becomes focused on exit when the opportunity arrives. 
Conclusions and Implications 
This paper set out with the goal of opening parts of the black box encasing much of the 
dynamics of trade sale exits. The attention was given to investigating if there is a difference in 
the mindset of investors when it comes to pre-planned exit strategies, and further to examining 
how pre-planned exit strategies influence the VCs value-adding in the post-investment phase. 
Through a multiple-case study covering 14 trade sale exits, we found support for our initial 
suspicion; that having (or not having) a pre-planned exit strategy will influence how the VC adds 
value in the post-investment phase. 
Two archetypes of investors were identified, namely the Tailor and the Architect. The Tailor has 
a pre-planned exit strategy, which influences both his investment decision and his value-adding 
later on. His value-adding is focused on internal areas that can help tailor the company to meet 
the needs and requirements of potential buyers, while the external areas serve to make 
potential buyers aware of the company. The Architect does not have a pre-planned exit strategy, 
but believes that building a great company is the best exit strategy. In addition, we found a 
group of investors who did not fit into our two archetypes, and labeled these Middle-Ground 
Investors. 
Implications for Practitioners 
Based on the findings in this article, we will not give advice as to which approach VCs should 
take. However, the VC should be aware of what type of investor he is, and inform the 
management team of his intentions. If the VC is a Tailor, and the goal is to sell the portfolio 
company to acquirer X or Y in year Z, it is crucial to have management on board. Along the same 
lines, if the VC is an Architect and prefers to identify opportunities as they arise, the 
management team needs to be aware that an exit might happen unexpectedly. 
Entrepreneurs should call attention to what type of VC they want. Although cherry-picking VCs 
might seem like a luxury most entrepreneurs cannot afford, it is important to be aware of the 
intentions of the VC, and make sure that there is correspondence between the entrepreneur’s 
and the VC’s ambitions. The entrepreneur should also consider what effects the VC’s value-
adding will have on his company; especially if the VC chooses to be extremely hands-on. Again, it 
all comes down to making sure alignment exists before the investment is made. This is often 
97 
 
considered to be the responsibility of the VC, but we argue that the entrepreneur also can 
initiate these talks before accepting funding. 
Implications for Further Research 
Although this article has suggested that there are two fundamentally different approaches to 
investing and value-adding, we have not examined which of these two approaches that gives the 
best results, both in form of post-merger success for the acquirer and in terms of return for the 
VC. By tailoring a company to be more attractive for potential buyers, the acquirer might be able 
to get synergies from his acquisition faster than if he has to adapt the acquired company 
himself. But what if another buyer acquires the portfolio company? Building on the tailoring 
allegory, it would be like buying a bespoke suit that was intended for your neighbor; you might 
get lucky, but there is a chance you need to roll up the pant legs and invest in suspenders. And if 
the focus of the VC is on building a company that will generate the highest return on investment 
in a trade sale, it might hurt the profitability of this company in the long run. It is easy to picture 
a situation where a business model or a strategy is altered to get fast short-term growth, and 
create the illusion that the profits gained from this growth will continue in perpetuity. However, 
this might not always be the case. Finally, what if you build a company that no one wants to buy? 
In the real world, architects need to get their plans approved before their constructions are 
built. Our Architect, on the other hand, erects a construction and is confident that the buyers 
will come. 
So far, we have mainly focused on the role of pre-planned exit strategies and value-adding. The 
descriptions of the two archetypes need to be expanded to cover other relevant areas. For 
instance, we observed two different attitudes among the investors with regards to selling a 
company versus being bought. Some investors preferred unsolicited offers, and saw them as a 
golden opportunity to initiate an exit process. Other investors preferred to initiate the process 
themselves, and felt that unsolicited offers removed focus from day-to-day operations.  
More research will be needed to learn more about the VCs we have classified as Middle-Ground 
Investors. It might seem odd to start out with a pre-planned exit strategy, and not add value 
with exit in mind. However, it might be that if we were to cover more areas of the investment 
process, it would be easier to split this group as well. 
We have also left the entrepreneur/management team of the portfolio company out of the 
equation. It would be interesting to further examine the relationship between the entrepreneur 
and the VC. Is the management team aligned with the pre-planned exit strategy, and what are 
their views on selective value-adding? 
Trade sale exits are all about selling the company to the right buyer, regardless of how the VC 
chooses to attract these buyers. It could be that an Architect will need more assistance in this 
process, given that his focus has been on building a great company, rather than focusing on 
potential buyers from day one. An area that should be further examined is what role a financial 
advisor can play in identifying and attracting buyers, if the Tailor and the Architect have 
different views on the use of advisors, as well as what criteria they use to select these 
intermediaries. 
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Abstract 
A profitable exit lies at the heart of venture capital. Trade sales by far dominate as the most 
common exit vehicle. However, this dominance is not reflected in the literature. This paper 
therefore seeks to take the first steps toward opening the black box that is venture capital trade 
sale exits. By performing a multiple-case study of 18 trade sale exits performed by Norwegian 
and U.S. venture capitalists, we shed light on the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship 
during the exit process. Consensus-based decision making, rather than conflict, is found to 
characterize the relationship. Further, we show that several factors influence the cooperative 
level of the relationship. These factors include the pre-investment alignment with regards to the 
exit, the strategic hurdles and personal motives faced by the entrepreneur, the reputation and 
network connectedness of the venture capitalist, and the probability for entrepreneurial 
recycling.  
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Introduction 
And this part of actually selling companies, especially at attractive terms, is what is 
difficult to do in this industry (Senator VC). 
Entrepreneurial ventures are crucial for economic growth (Schoonhoven and Romanelli, 2001). 
In the current depressed market climate, innovative start-ups are perhaps more important than 
ever in generating wealth and employment. Venture capital firms (VCFs) provide much needed 
risk capital for such high-growth, entrepreneurial ventures, stimulating growth (Cumming, 
2008; Shane and Cable, 2002). The success of the venture capital industry is therefore an 
important factor in ensuring sufficient economic growth.  
The entrepreneurial companies in a venture capitalist’s (VC’s) portfolio are typically cash-
strained growth ventures that do not pay dividends. Instead, returns are gathered as capital 
gains when divesting the venture (Cumming et al., 2006). As such, a profitable exit event lies at 
the heart of venture capital (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). The venture capital industry is, 
however, struggling with achieving satisfactory results (Ghalbouni and Rouizes, 2010). 
There has been some scholarly interest in the field of venture capital exits, but most of the 
literature on venture capital instead focuses on the pre-investment and business development 
phase. Further, most studies done on venture capital exits focus on the IPO exit vehicle (Félix et 
al., 2008). This is understandable due to the ease of access to data for public listings versus 
acquisitions, and because of the prestige and exceptional returns generated by some IPO exits 
(Chaplinsky and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2010; Megginson, 2004). We argue, however, that this 
significant bias in the research towards IPO exits fails to acknowledge the extreme importance of 
the trade sale exit vehicle.  
Trade sales by far dominate as the most common exit vehicle. Recent statistics from the National 
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) demonstrate that over the years 2004 to 2010, U.S. VCs 
exited in total 384 portfolio companies via IPO and 2498 portfolio companies via trade sales 
(NVCA, 2011). That is; more than six trade sale exits were performed for every IPO exit. 
Numbers from the European counterpart of the NVCA, the EVCA, indicate a similar dominance in 
the European venture capital industry (EVCA, 2010). In the literature, however, venture capital 
trade sale exits are still somewhat of a black box.  
At the same time, entrepreneurs are often assumed to oppose trade sale exits, due to the loss of 
non-pecuniary benefits of control associated with an independent venture (Bascha and Walz, 
2001; Brickley et al., 1994; Cumming, 2008; Cumming and Johan, 2008b; Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Hellmann, 2006). VCs have been found to point to uncooperative management as one of the 
main reasons for failing to exit via trade sales (Wall and Smith, 1997). Simultaneously, VCs need 
the cooperation of the entrepreneur during the trade sale exit process in order to maximize the 
gains from the transaction (Martin et al., 2007). The VC’s ability to unilaterally initiate the exit 
process is generally overstated in the literature (Smith, 2005). Conflict in the VC-entrepreneur 
(VC-E) relationship during the trade sale process might therefore be one factor leading to the 
poor performance of the venture capital industry, destroying substantial value for investors and 
entrepreneurs alike.  
While the VC-E relationship has been the focus of considerable research (e.g. Arthurs and 
Busenitz, 2003; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2001; Fried and Hisrich, 1995; Shepherd and 
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Zacharakis, 2001; Ţurcan, 2008; Zacharakis et al., 2010), to the authors’ knowledge none of 
these studies have focused specifically on the relationship during this phase of unwinding. 
Therefore, this study sets out to take the first few steps towards opening the black box that is 
venture capital trade sale exits, by shedding light on the VC-E relationship during the process.  
Accordingly, the research questions of this study are: (1) What characterizes the VC-E 
relationship during trade sale exit processes? (2) Which, if any, factors influence the cooperative 
level of the VC-E relationship during a trade sale exit process?  
Based on theoretical insights derived from the concepts of agency theory, procedural justice, 
acquisition as courtship and social embeddedness, we analyze empirical data from a multiple-
case study of 18 venture capital trade sale exit processes performed by Norwegian and U.S. VCs. 
Our findings indicate that the VC-E relationship during trade sale exits is characterized more by 
consensus and cooperation than by conflict and defection. Further, we find that several factors 
influence the degree of cooperation observed. These factors include pre-investment alignment 
with regards to the exit, the strategic hurdles and personal motives faced by the entrepreneur, 
the reputation and network connectedness of the VC, and the probability for entrepreneurial 
recycling. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II develops the theoretical backdrop for 
our discussion. Section III describes the research methods used and gives a short introduction to 
the 18 cases covered. In section IV, the research questions are addressed in light of the empirical 
data gathered. Section V sums up the findings and posits propositions. Finally, we conclude and 
offer implications in section VI.   
Theoretical Development 
In this section, we seek to give a review of relevant literature analyzing the VC-E relationship in 
order to build a theoretical backdrop for our analysis. Agency theory, procedural justice theory 
and the concept of social embeddedness are theoretical vantage points in a multitude of studies, 
and are therefore covered in our review.  
Few studies have analyzed the acquisition process from the seller’s side. Typically, the focus has 
been that of the acquirer being the decision maker of importance. The acquire, on the other 
hand, is described as unimportant, unsuccessful, and reluctant (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
Recently, however, a different view has been put forward. The acquisition as courtship view 
proposes that management of target companies are pushed towards being acquired by difficult 
strategic hurdles and by strong personal motivations. Similarly, they are pulled towards 
acquisition by attractive buyers that offer synergistic potential and organizational rapport 
(Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). In the right circumstances management may in fact take a 
proactive stance towards being acquired.   
If the entrepreneur were to take an active role in seeking to be acquired, the posited opposition 
towards trade sale exits may not hold true. While this view is not developed far, it may hold new 
and interesting insights when analyzing the VC-E relationship during a trade sale exit process.    
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Agency Theory and the VC-E Relationship 
In the context of venture capital, the VC is generally portrayed as the principal, contracting the 
entrepreneur as his agent. A conflict of interest is stipulated between the VC, who receives no 
private benefits of control, and the entrepreneur, who receives non-pecuniary benefits from 
running an independent company (Gompers, 1995). Agency theory has identified several ways 
for the VC to mitigate this conflict; through the allocation of cash flow and control rights via 
structuring financial contracts, through extensive deal screening prior to investment, and via 
monitoring while the project is under way (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001).  
Empirical studies have confirmed the existence of such constructs. Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2003) showed that an instrumental part of venture capital financings is that they allow for 
separately allocating cash flow rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights. 
Similarly, several studies have documented the extensive pre-investment deal screening 
performed by VCs (e.g. De Clercq et al., 2006; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). 
Finally, VCs play an active role in monitoring the companies they have invested in by for 
example taking a seat on the board (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Sahlman, 1990; Smith, 2005; 
Williams et al., 2006) or by staging the capital to be invested, thus making further financing 
contingent on reaching previously specified milestones (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990; 
Schwienbacher, 2005).  
However, the application of the agency perspective to describe the VC-E relationship has been 
criticized for describing the relationship in only one direction (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). 
By focusing on the VC’s efforts to control the entrepreneur’s ability to act opportunistically, it 
ignores the entrepreneur’s concern that the VC may act opportunistically. VCs have in fact been 
shown to exercise opportunistic behavior in terms of shirking (Gifford, 1997), and also 
specifically with regards to exit decisions (Espenlaub et al., 2009; Gompers, 1996; Neus and 
Walz, 2005).  
Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) go further in their critique, claiming that the goals of the VC and the 
entrepreneur are aligned during the pre-investment process. When the goals of the principal and 
agent are aligned, there is no agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Thus, according to Arthurs 
and Busenitz (2003), agency theory varies in its usefulness when it comes to explaining the 
behaviors of the VC and the entrepreneur during their relationship. While the agency problem is 
highly relevant prior to investment, it may be less relevant after the fact, as goals are aligned 
during the pre-investment process. However, they do allow for certain inflection points at later 
times during the relationship where the agency problem might reappear.  
The trade sale exit process is likely to be such an inflection point. Entrepreneurs are emotionally 
attached to their ventures (Baron, 1998), but a trade sale exit is often linked with the departure 
of the entrepreneur(s) from the merged organization (Black and Gilson, 1998; Petty et al., 1999). 
Those who stay, have a probability of leaving the organization many times higher than the 
average top management turn-over rate (Hartzell et al., 2004). Being acquired means the loss of 
the non-pecuniary benefits previously held by the entrepreneur(s) when running a private, 
independent company. Therefore, it is perhaps no surprise that Petty et al. (1994) documented 
significant disappointment with the process and final outcome of acquisitions among several 
entrepreneurs.  
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As a result, it is often assumed that VCs will be more interested in a trade sale exit than 
entrepreneurs (Brickley et al., 1994; Cumming, 2008; Cumming and Johan, 2008b; Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Hellmann, 2006). Whereas the VC is assumed to simply focus on maximizing the financial 
return from the exit, the entrepreneur(s) have several other variables that are important to 
them (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004; Hartzell et al., 2004; Petty et al., 1994).  
Hence, goal incongruence during the exit process seems likely, bringing the agency problem back 
to high relevance. There has been supportive empirical evidence along these lines of reasoning, 
as Berg-Utby et al. (2007) found that the confidence in cooperative behavior in the VC-E dyad 
diminishes as the relationship approaches termination. VCs seek to protect themselves from the 
potential opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur by implementing strong veto and control 
rights, especially if they expect to exit via a trade sale (Cumming, 2008; Cumming and Johan, 
2008b; Hellmann, 2006). Such control rights include among others provisions such as co-sale 
arrangements, drag-along, anti-dilution protection, and the right to veto asset sales.  
At the same time VCs point to uncooperative management as one of the main reasons for failing 
to exit via trade sales (Wall and Smith, 1997). Entrepreneurs may therefore be perfectly capable 
of stopping a trade sale exit process they are not comfortable with, even without the provision of 
strong legal rights. The capability of the VC to control the exit decision unilaterally may be 
overstated in the literature (Smith, 2005).  
We therefore argue that agency theory describes real and relevant aspects of the VC-E 
relationship, and that it is a necessary construct in order to explain behaviors observed during 
the trade sale exit process. However, the literature on VC-E relationships implies that agency 
theory alone is not enough to understand all facets of the relationship. 
Cooperation in Addition to Control   
Several scholars have pointed to the concept of procedural justice as helpful in understanding 
aspects of the VC-E relationship (e.g. Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003; Berg-Utby et al., 2007; 
Busenitz et al., 2004; Cable and Shane, 1997; Fairchild, 2011; Fried and Hisrich, 1995; Shepherd 
and Zacharakis, 2001). The focus on self-interest and opportunistic behavior inherent in agency 
theory does not take into account the virtuous effects of cooperation (Ehrlich et al., 1994).  
Entrepreneurs often use terms like “supportive”, “open” and “friendly” to describe their 
relationship with their VC (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). The VC-E relationship is not characterized 
only by formal principal-agent relations, but also by close cooperation, where the VC hesitates to 
use any kind of power (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). In fact, cooperation between the managers of 
the VC-backed start-up and the investor has been found to be necessary for the success of the 
venture (Cable and Shane, 1997; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; 
Steier and Greenwood, 1995). In the words of MacIntosh and Cumming (2003): 
A venture capital investment is virtually by definition a relational investment, and a 
strong and amicable working relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur is what 
distinguishes a successful from an unsuccessful investment.  
Many factors have been identified as determinants of cooperation, but the concept of trust holds 
a special position as an especially immediate antecedent (La Porta et al., 1997; Smith et al., 
1995). Some initial trust may be needed to induce both parties to commit to the relationship (De 
109 
 
Clercq and Sapienza, 2001). Having a reputation of being honest, fair and trustworthy might 
provide the initial trust needed (Barney and Hansen, 1994), a point to which we will return 
shortly.  
A survey of German VCs showed that VCs do in fact put a great deal of importance on trust in the 
VC-E relationship, and that there was a significant reciprocal positive relationship between trust 
and venture success (Duffner et al., 2009). 
The trade sale exit process, with its potential for conflicting goals between the VC and the 
entrepreneur, should present difficulties for maintaining a relationship based on trust and 
cooperation. Trust and cooperation is, however, necessary in order to create as good an exit 
event as possible for both investor and manager (Martin et al., 2007).  
Procedural justice theory holds a possible explanation to why most VCs and entrepreneurs 
continue to cooperate even during this time, by indicating that the reaction of individuals to the 
decision process tends to be more important than the decision outcome itself (Korsgaard et al., 
1995; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). This perspective seems to hold also for the VC-E relationship, 
where entrepreneurs have been found to more willingly accept decisions, regardless of whether 
or not they agree with the outcome, if they found the procedure with which it was made to be 
fair (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). More specifically with regards to exit, Busenitz et al. (2004) 
found that the greater the perception of procedural justice, the more likely there would be a 
successful exit event.  
By acting fairly, and keeping the entrepreneur in the loop, the VC should therefore be able to 
receive cooperation from the entrepreneur even though he might not necessarily agree with the 
trade sale. Procedural justice theory therefore adds an important perspective when analyzing 
the VC-E relationship during the trade sale process.  
The Social Embeddedness Perspective 
Agency theory, with its assumptions of economically rational actors, seems to present an 
“undersocialized”  (Granovetter, 1985) understanding of the complex VC-E relationship (Cable 
and Shane, 1997). Transactions between actors in the market of VCs and entrepreneurs, as is 
true for all markets, are embedded in a system of continuously evolving social relations 
(Granovetter, 1985). Past interaction between actors in this community can be an efficient trust-
building mechanism:  
Better than the statement that someone is known to be reliable is information from a 
trusted informant that he has dealt with that individual and found him so. Even better is 
information from one’s own past dealing with that person (Granovetter, 1985).  
The venture capital community is closely knit, with both VCFs and entrepreneurial firms 
embedded in a common network structure where social relations play a crucial role (Black and 
Gilson, 1998; Sahlman, 1990). This is easily observable, with VCFs relying heavily on networks in 
their operations (Hochberg et al., 2007). Syndication of investment deals between several VCFs 
is commonplace in the venture capital industry (Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave, 1988; Lerner, 1994; 
Wright and Lockett, 2003). Similarly, VCs draw on their network of service providers when 
seeking to add value to their portfolio ventures (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Hochberg et al., 
2007; Sahlman, 1990).  
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The highly networked structure of the VC-E community ensures that reputation effects echo 
loudly. Being of a less cooperative inclination therefore easily damages one’s reputation, directly 
influencing one’s ability to secure the best deals in later rounds (Black and Gilson, 1998; Cable 
and Shane, 1997; Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). Being known for bullying 
entrepreneurs into trade sale exits they do not want would quickly halt the line of quality 
entrepreneurs looking for investment. Similarly, the access to good deals via syndicates would 
likely diminish, as syndicate partners interested in keeping a good reputation would not want to 
risk the association with a partner they cannot trust will cooperate. In fact, syndicates are 
governed more by non-legal sanctions relating to effects on an actor’s reputation than by 
contractual arrangements (Wright and Lockett, 2003).  
VCs, being long term actors in the capital market, therefore have a strong incentive for 
maintaining an impeccable reputation in the marketplace. Hence, it should be rational for the VC 
to make sure that he does not utilize brute force during the trade sale exit process, but instead 
focuses on maintaining a good working relationship with the entrepreneur. This may be true 
even when it means foregoing some financial return on a specific deal, as the opportunity cost of 
missed future deals may outweigh the present value of increased return.  
Further, acquisitions typically trigger a process of entrepreneurial recycling (Mason and 
Harrison, 2006; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). Such recycling effects mean that many 
entrepreneurs return to start new ventures, or perhaps become business angels or VCs 
themselves. In other words, the acquisition event often does not mean that the entrepreneur 
leaves the VC-E community. The detrimental effect to the reputation of the entrepreneur from 
refusing to cooperate therefore is likely to be taken into consideration. As for the VC, the 
opportunity cost of missed future deals may act as an incentive for entrepreneurs to cooperate. 
Thus, the social embeddedness of exit transactions may hold explanatory insights when 
analyzing the VC-E relationship during a trade sale exit process.  
Theoretical Insights 
Hence, our review of the relevant literature paints a multifaceted picture. Agency problems seem 
to be relevant for trade sale exit processes, as divergent interests between the VC and the 
entrepreneur are likely. Control mechanisms specifically aimed at exits are therefore 
incorporated into term sheets. Based on the preceding discussion, control does not seem to be 
enough to fully understand the VC-E relationship, however.  
Cooperation between the VC and the entrepreneur is instrumental for venture success. However, 
procedurally just decisions have a tendency to be accepted, even when all parties do not 
necessarily agree with the outcome. Further, the fact that the transactions between VCs and 
entrepreneurs are socially embedded into a tightly knit entrepreneurial community means that 
actors’ reputation for cooperation is important. As such, contributions from the concepts of 
procedural justice and social embeddedness may be important when analyzing our empirical 
data.  
Finally, the acquisition as courtship view highlights that management teams of a target in an 
acquisition may in fact take a proactive stance towards being acquired. If this is the case, the 
VC-E relationship during a trade sale exit process may be more harmonious than expected.  
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Based on this broad theoretical backdrop, and in light of the empirical data gathered, we address 
our two research questions in section IV. First, however, the following section discusses the 
research methods used and gives a short presentation of the cases covered.    
Methodology 
The research design utilized in this study is a multiple-case, inductive study involving 18 
venture-backed trade sale exit processes. Multiple cases allow for replication logic, where each 
case can be looked upon as an experiment. Inferences drawn from one experiment serves to 
confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others (Yin, 1994). Multiple-case studies 
therefore allow for more generalizable and better grounded results than those of single-case 
studies.   
Research setting   
We chose venture capital trade sale exit processes as our research setting due to the significant 
potential for conflict in the VC-E relationship during these processes. Entrepreneurs are typically 
assumed to prefer an IPO exit over a trade sale exit, while VCs might prefer a trade sale 
depending on the specific portfolio company (Brickley et al., 1994; Cumming, 2008; Cumming 
and Johan, 2008b; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Hellmann, 2006). Simultaneously, cooperation in the VC-E 
dyad is necessary in order to ensure maximum gains from the transaction for all parties involved 
(Martin et al., 2007).     
Further, trade sale exit processes are an intrinsic part of the venture capital business model. 
With trade sales by far being the most common exit vehicle, their success to a large part dictates 
the success of the venture capital industry as a whole. However, this practical significance of the 
process is not reflected in the current venture capital research, where trade sale exit processes 
are still somewhat of a black box. Taking the first steps towards opening that box was a major 
motivation for the chosen research setting.  
The fact that very little research has been done on venture capital trade sale exit processes 
motivated us to make this an inductive study. The VC-E relationship during a trade sale is a 
complex social process, and poorly understood. Quantitative research strategies would not be 
able to offer the same insights into the process as rich, qualitative data would. Further, trade sale 
exits are laden with sensitive issues. An interview performed under the promise of 
confidentiality was viewed as the best method for gaining access to rich data.   
Sampling 
The cases included were based on a strategic sampling of completed trade sale exit processes. In 
total, we sampled 18 different cases. Several of the cases were identified as interesting by the 
researchers prior to initiating contact with the informants. As we immersed ourselves in the 
venture capital-entrepreneur community we were also introduced to several cases included in 
the sample by actors lending a helping hand. Given the fact that we were seeking to understand 
the VC-E relationship during the entire process, we sampled only cases in which the trade sale 
had been completed. As an added bonus, this reliance on retrospective data increased the 
efficiency of data collection, allowing for the inclusion of more cases in the study.  
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We sampled firms from various industries. Further, trade sales completed by both Norwegian 
and U.S. VCs and entrepreneurs were included in the sample. By including various industries and 
different geographical regions in our sample, the generalizability of our results should improve. 
Seven of the 18 cases included in the sample are trade sales exits performed by U.S. VCs, while 
the remaining eleven were performed by Norwegian VCs. The table below presents a brief 
overview of the 18 cases included in the sample. 
Table 1 - Overview of Cases 
Case Industry Acquired Informants 
Avalanche Cable 2006 VC 
Blackhawk Sensors 1998 CEO 
Bruin Electronics 2006 VC, CEO 
Canuck Networking hardware 2005 VC 
Coyote Electronics 2007 2 VCs, CEO 
Flame Networking hardware 1996 VC 
Flyer Software 2007 2 VCs 
Hurricane Energy 2007 VC 
Islander Oil service 2007 CEO 
Lightning Software 2010 VC 
Oiler Wireless 2006 CEO 
Panther Energy 2007 VC 
Penguin Software 2009 CEO 
Ranger Oil service 2008 VC 
Sabre Networking hardware 1999 VC 
Senator Electronics 2011 VC 
Star Telecom 2006 VC 
Thrasher Healthcare 2011 VC 
The trade sales included in this study were completed between 1996 and 2011. This time period 
experienced very different market circumstances, from the hot market of the late 1990’s to the 
financial crisis in the late 2000’s and the depression that followed. As such, the rationale for, and 
the opportunities to complete, trade sale exits for VCs have varied considerably over the time 
period covered. While it was relatively easy to launch an IPO in the U.S. in the late 1990’s, it was 
next to impossible in 2008. Since entrepreneurs often are assumed to prefer an IPO exit over an 
acquisition, this variance allowed for controlling for the influence of market circumstances. 
Different economic cycles did not seem to have an influence on our findings.  
Ten of the cases included involved a founder-CEO. Further, eleven of the cases included were 
syndicated deals. We found that the same factors influenced the VC-E relationship in all cases, 
regardless of these two variables. 
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Data Sources 
The study is based on several data sources: (1) qualitative data from semi-structured interviews 
with VCs and/or entrepreneurs, (2) e-mails to follow up interviews and ensure that we 
understood the accounts given correctly, and (3) archival data, including press clippings, web 
sites and discussion forums.  
We started with pilot interviews with informants who had considerable practical experience 
with trade sale exit processes, as well as academics with significant experience from the field of 
venture capital research. These interviews helped us form the two distinct interview guides to 
be used in VC and entrepreneur interviews respectively. In addition, it made sure that we as 
interviewers were well prepared before entering the next phase of the study.  
The following four months we conducted 20 interviews with our key informants. We conducted 
interviews with both VCs and entrepreneurs in order to ensure that we were getting both sides 
of the story, and to help mitigate subject biases (Golden, 1992; Miller et al., 1997). Utilizing 
multiple informants and seeing the picture painted by both ends of the VC-E relationship, also 
helps build a richer and more elaborated model (Schwenk, 1985).  
The interviews varied in length from 30 to 70 minutes, and followed the aforementioned 
interview guides. The interviews followed a “courtroom” procedure, with the interviewers 
emphasizing the need to focus on facts and events rather than on interpretations (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). We always began the interviews by asking the respondents to recount the story of why 
they invested/sought investment, followed by a short recap of what developments took place 
within the portfolio company up until the actual exit process was initiated. Seeing that we were 
seeking retrospective reports, such open-ended questioning should lead to higher accuracy in 
our data (Lipton, 1977; Miller et al., 1997).  
All of the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim, totaling 185 pages of single-
spaced transcriptions. As mentioned, we followed up the interviews with e-mails asking 
clarifying questions on an as-needed basis. Interviews with Norwegian informants were 
conducted in Norwegian, and translated into English by the authors. We strived to ensure that 
nothing was lost in translation.  
When possible, we took steps to minimize informant biases. We interviewed both entrepreneurs 
and VCs; individuals who are likely to have different perspectives and goals during the trade sale 
process. Thus, one would expect significant differences in their accounts of the events should 
retrospective bias be an issue (Seidler, 1974). We found no such difference. In addition, we 
always held the data provided in the interviews up against the archival data collected from 
secondary sources, in order to ensure that we were not suffering from being fed biased 
information.  
Our informants were all highly knowledgeable and influential with regards to the exit process. 
Such informants are the most reliable (Huber and Power, 1985; Kumar et al., 1993; Seidler, 
1974). Further, we emphasized during the interviews that we were interested in case-specific 
facts and events. Thus, the information provided is less likely to be subject to cognitive biases 
and impression management (Golden, 1992; Huber and Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997). Finally, 
the trade sale exit process is highly sensitive, both on a personal level and business wise. We 
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therefore promised confidentiality to our informants, in order to further motivate for the 
provision of accurate data (Huber and Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997). 
Data Analysis 
Based on the triangulation of data from our different sources, rich and reliable mini-cases of 
each of the trade sale exits could be built (Jick, 1979). Thereafter, within-case and cross-case 
analyses were performed. The analysis started by looking closer at each case on a stand-alone 
basis. In the spirit of the inductive process, this analysis allowed for the emergence of constructs 
and relationships, and was not guided by specific hypotheses. 
Following the stand-alone analysis of all cases, cross-case analysis was performed. Replication 
logic allowed for the confirming and disconfirming of tentative constructs and propositions. This 
process was highly iterative, with the researchers stepping back and forth between data and 
analysis many times. Further, a significant amount of time was set aside for discussion both 
within the team and with external researchers in order to ensure the validity of the emergent 
constructs.  
Finally, as the findings from the study were ready for presentation, a sanity check was 
performed. All informants were contacted and asked to correct any final misunderstandings, as 
well as perform a citation check. In addition, they were given the chance to comment on the 
propositions put forward and the logic behind our argumentation, in order to ensure a close 
connection between our results and the world as it is perceived by the practitioners.  
Limitations 
This study is based on a strategic sampling of completed trade sale exit processes. As such, the 
results are not statistically representative. The cases included took place over a long period of 
time. While this helped control for market conditions, it does mean that the informants from the 
oldest cases may have remembered events inaccurately. Similarly, only two of our cases have 
both the VC and the entrepreneur as informants. Although we took steps to minimize informant 
biases, we cannot be sure that the information provided is how other stakeholders in the 
process experienced it. Bias and partial information may have affected our data. Interview data 
was triangulated with data from other sources in order to minimize the effect of this potential 
problem.     
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The Ending of a Relationship  
I like to say that this raising money and building a business is like dating and 
relationships. Some relationships end. Sometimes the divorce is amicable, and everybody 
ends up with something, and maybe they even come back together in the future. 
Sometimes the divorce is not amicable. I think a lot of it depends upon what the 
relationship is between the investors and the founders (Sabre VC). 
Trade sale exit processes are typically rather lengthy. In the cases covered in this study, the 
actual time elapsed from the decision was made to seek a sale of the company until the deal was 
closed varied from a low of two months to over a year. The implication is that both entrepreneur 
and VC know that the relationship is drawing towards an end, and have ample time to act 
opportunistically during the unwinding of the relationship.  
It has been claimed that there might be differing goals during this process, making agency 
problems likely. In fact, it has also been claimed that it would be rational for both parties to act 
opportunistically after the exit process has been initiated, as the importance of future 
transactions decrease as the exit and the ending of the relationship draws nearer (Berg-Utby et 
al., 2007).   
Addressing research question one, we therefore looked closer at what actually characterized the 
VC-E relationship during the trade sale exit process in our 18 cases. What we found was more a 
situation of consensus-driven decision making than the image of conflict and the use of power. 
One might argue that since all cases covered were completed trade sales, some sort of 
agreement must have emerged. However, as discussed, VCs often include special legal rights in 
contracts that entail the possibility to force a sale. Similarly, it is possible to put the exit decision 
up to a formal vote in the board of directors. Such situations were not found in any of the cases 
covered. It is the image of a peaceful ending to the relationship which is the dominant picture in 
our findings from the breakup of 18 VC-E relationships. Supporting empirical data can be found 
in Appendix 1. 
Some of the exit processes were actually truly harmonious. In the Coyote case, for example, the 
CEO was very interested in selling the company to the acquirer: “I did not feel like the VCs were 
pushing for an exit. In fact, from where I was sitting, it almost felt like I was the major driving 
force.” Simultaneously, the investors were the ones who had suggested testing the market for a 
potential acquisition offer, and were very much in favor of moving the process forward as 
indicative bids were received.   
This is not to say that there were no conflicts. In several of the cases, discussion and different 
views being uttered was a prevalent part of the process. While all actors held the same interests 
in the Coyote case, management, lead VC, and other investors often had different views on what 
was the desired path forward in others.  
The Senator case acts as a good illustration of this situation. The portfolio company in this case 
had been funded by a seed investor prior to the VC investing. As the VC entered the relationship, 
the plan was to build substantial revenue growth by launching several of the company’s 
products in international markets. While the product development side of the business 
performed well, the marketing and sales side underperformed. Selling through its own 
distribution channels did not perform in line with the expectations, with a substantial revenue 
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shortfall as the result. Seeking a solution, the company increased its focus on signing deals with 
strategic go-to-market partners.  
This process of seeking go-to-market partners exposed the company and its line of products to 
many potential acquirers. Seeing the potential offered by the technology developed, several of 
these potential partners indicated that they were interested, but that they would prefer to 
acquire the company rather than being a non-exclusive marketing partner. Thus, an exit 
opportunity arose that was not sought after, and earlier than any of the stakeholders had 
planned for. Deciding whether or not to act on this opportunity was a difficult discussion. The 
Senator VC explains:  
This exit process was very difficult. The exit opportunity arose significantly earlier than 
what had been the plan. So the cost price of the equity holders – the founders, the seed 
investor and ourselves – was significantly different. Therefore, the time horizons and the 
returns generated on the capital injected were very different. So this was definitely not a 
process where everybody agreed all the time. Instead, we developed two separate plans 
for what the future of the company could be. The different stakeholders preferred 
different alternatives – although it actually varied which one they preferred. 
In other words, the Senator exit process started out with three stakeholders, all with different 
motivations, and with a substantially different financial result from the exit opportunity. One 
might very well expect that such a process would be ripe with major conflicts, and potentially 
end up with the most powerful stakeholder forcing through his point of view. That was not the 
end result, however: “In the end, it was an all agreed to solution to proceed with the trade sale” 
(Senator VC).  
As mentioned, such discussion, and in the end, consensus-based decision making was the result 
in all the cases covered where some difference of opinion, and even outright conflict, was 
prevalent. Our data therefore left us with the clear impression that trade sale exit processes, 
though not in any way void of conflict, are characterized more by cooperation and 
interdependence than on formal power and opportunistic behavior.  
Further, addressing research question number two, our analysis showed that there are several 
different factors influencing whether the process could best be described as harmonious or as a 
conflicted consensus. In the following parts we will document the influence of the pre-
investment alignment of interests, the strategic hurdles and personal motives faced by the 
entrepreneur, and the social embeddedness of the trade sale exit process.  
The Alignment of Interests  
As discussed, prior literature often holds that entrepreneurs will oppose trade sale exits 
(Brickley et al., 1994; Cumming, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Hellmann, 2006). However, our 
informants often described a situation where both entrepreneur and VC held a similar interest in 
achieving a trade sale exit pre-investment. Such goal congruence was not expected, due to the 
loss of non-pecuniary benefits experienced by entrepreneurs as their private, independent 
companies are merged into larger organizations. What emerged, however, was that investors in 
most cases made a point of emphasizing their need for an exit during the pre-investment 
process, making sure that there was an alignment of interests.  
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The most extreme example of focus on alignment of goals prior to investment came from the 
Star case. The eventual portfolio company approached the VCF looking for investment, and was 
met with great interest from the VCs who recognized the potential for success. However, the 
founding team, consisting of two entrepreneurs, had a different view of the future and where the 
company should be heading strategically. Faced with differing views of the correct path to take, 
the VCF hesitated to invest: “… we insisted on the fact that we were interested in investing, but 
that we would only do it if we followed our strategy of working towards a trade sale to a 
strategic partner” (Star VC). This dialogue continued for more than a year, but the VC would not 
invest unless the founders aligned their interests with those of the potential investors: “In the 
end, one of the founders actually withdrew from the company because he didn’t agree, but that 
meant that our strategy was anchored incredibly well with the founder that remained” (Star VC).  
As such, the VC in the Star case made sure that there was sufficient goal congruence between the 
entrepreneur and investor prior to entering into the relationship. Such goal congruence has 
been found to lead to cooperative behavior (Apfelbaum, 1974). In fact, if the principal and agent 
have the same goals and interests, there exists no agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Our 
finding that many of the VCs emphasized building aligned interests around a trade sale prior to 
investing therefore seems to give some merit to Arthurs and Busenitz’ (2003) claim that agency 
problems are taken care of pre-investment. 
As shown in the table below, in ten of our cases the investors had a pre-planned trade sale exit 
strategy (Cumming and Johan, 2008b). While it may not be surprising that our sample involves 
many cases where the strategy was to exit via trade sale from the very beginning, it does nuance 
the picture with regard to VCs’ preferred exit vehicle. The IPO exit is what is usually looked upon 
as the home run and as the obvious goal for VCs when investing (Bascha and Walz, 2001; De 
Clercq et al., 2006; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). However, many of our investor informants 
emphasized the fact that it is easy to determine for many potential investment targets that they 
are highly unlikely to go to IPO.  
Table 2 - The Alignment of Interests 
Case Do You Want What I Want? 
Avalanche 
VC: “The founders didn’t have the ego need. In other words, they were looking to 
get a good financial return, and to build a good company. It was probably more 
from [our] side to say that we should take it to an IPO.” 
Bruin 
VC: “We had discussed that trade sale was the only relevant exit prior to 
investment.” 
Canuck 
VC: ”Exit strategy was not discussed prior to investment. In the back of the 
investors’ minds, it was always the case that this was more likely to be an 
acquisition than an IPO.” 
Coyote 
VC1: “We quickly decided that this would have to be a trade sale exit. So we made 
sure that the management was well incentivized to want to take part in such a 
process.”  
VC2: “We always discuss what the potential exit possibilities are prior to 
investment. In this case, with this being a one-product company, trade sale was the 
obvious vehicle. So we made sure that everybody saw that as the goal. It’s 
important, because the issue of exit strategy can be quite the sensitive topic.”  
Flame 
VC: “I had to decide what I thought [the entrepreneur] wanted before I gave him 
money. If I saw that he was trying to build a family business, that he wanted his 
kids to go to work there, and he wanted this to go on forever, that he had an 
unrealistic expectation of his own capabilities, I wouldn’t have invested.” 
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Flyer 
VC1: “There was a well established picture with both other investors and the 
management of what was going to happen before we invested. We were going to 
help build the company for a while, and then [the company] was going to be sold to 
an industrial buyer.” 
VC2: “It was already decided before we invested that it was going to be a trade 
sale. The type of actor who was likely to be the acquirer was identified, and our 
ambition of exiting within a three to five year time period was known. So that was 
our stated intention from the point of investment, and we made sure that all 
stakeholders agreed.”  
Hurricane  
VC: “We always discuss exit possibilities with the management team and other 
owners prior to investment, and in this case it was pretty clear that it was going to 
be a trade sale exit. When you’re operating a closed fund you have to know that all 
actors enter into the relationship with the right motivation.” 
Lightning 
VC: “There’s a lot of talk about these exits. I have a fundamental belief in that 
building a solid, well-performing company makes you attractive … Of course; we 
also made sure that potential buyers existed. So it wasn’t a big issue. An IPO was 
also an attractive option for this company. When it comes to the management, they 
were intelligent people. They understood that since we were operating a fund with 
a defined life time, we had to exit at some point.” 
Panther 
VC: “We discussed exit possibilities prior to investment with the management 
team. It is an important part of the investment decision process. In this case, trade 
sale was the most likely alternative, but we didn’t discard the IPO opportunity.” 
Ranger 
VC: “The company had a single product, so trade sale was the only natural way to 
exit a case like this. So that was the exit strategy from the very beginning.” 
Sabre 
VC: “We didn’t have any thoughts with regards to this being a trade sale or IPO 
case. Seed and early stage investing is a bit like investing in a field of dreams. 
You’re hoping that the one’s that do work out have very large exits, but to try and 
predict it is very difficult.” 
Senator 
VC: “We explicitly discussed the expectations for valuation, time horizon and so on 
prior to investment. To the degree that it is possible, we strive to make sure that 
management and investors have aligned interests. It’s not possible to achieve 
100 % alignment, but it’s important to make sure that we’re as aligned as possible.” 
Star 
VC: “We always discuss exit possibilities prior to investment. And in this case it 
was a very tough discussion, because the founders had a very different view of the 
opportunities and exit perspective.” 
Thrasher VC: “IPO was definitely not a target. … And the founders were on board with that.” 
Trade sale exits, although associated with less prestige and reputation building (Chaplinsky and 
Gupta-Mukherjee, 2010), can be just as, or even more, profitable than IPO exits (Cumming and 
Johan, 2008a). It is therefore only reasonable that many VCs invest in portfolio companies with 
the intention of exiting via trade sale. Realizing that some entrepreneurs might not be interested 
in selling their company to another entity, many of our informants therefore emphasized that it 
was very important to ensure that interests were aligned prior to investment. One of the Flyer 
VCs put it like this: “The first thing that we have to agree on is that the entrepreneurs want the 
same thing as we do. Because if they don’t, we’re not on the same page, and there probably won’t 
be an investment.”   
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Other than simply emphasizing the need for an exit, drag-along rights were found to be used by 
investors in order to make sure that goals were aligned prior to investment. The Hurricane VC 
offered some interesting comments on why his firm insisted on implementing such rights in all 
investment term sheets:  
Drag rights are effective in smoking out those entrepreneurs who are in it to build a 
lasting empire that they want to hand over to their son and then their grandson. If they 
sign a term sheet including such rights, their motivations are revealed to be more aligned 
with ours. But it has happened that entrepreneurs have said: ‘Oh, wait, what if it isn’t a 
good time for me to sell? Can’t I just build a going concern that pays dividends instead?’ 
So having that discussion around exit rights becomes a self-selection mechanism.  
Thus, drag-along rights were put in place in order to make sure that the entrepreneur would be 
willing to participate in a trade sale should that be the resultant exit vehicle. However, the 
Hurricane VC also stated that such rights were not put in place with the intention of actually 
having to use them: “The main intention behind the inclusion of drag rights in the term sheets is 
not that we actually are going to force anyone to sell. We have never done so, so far.”  
Since such control rights were utilized in order to smoke out entrepreneurs more interested in 
building a lasting enterprise, it can be expected that focusing on such rights might indeed further 
make sure that goals are aligned prior to investment. This rationale behind the use of strong 
control rights also holds a possible explanation to why they have been shown to be associated 
with trade sale exits (Cumming, 2008).  
These findings seem to indicate that interests in fact are aligned prior to investment, effectively 
ending the potential for agency problems. However, we also documented several cases where 
such discussions were not part of the pre-investment process. Similarly, while the investor 
might have believed that a trade sale exit was the most likely result, this was not always shared 
with the entrepreneur, leaving significant potential for differing expectations with regards to 
what the exit event would look like. Further, as is shown, there were cases where the investor 
had not generated a clear expectation of what the exit vehicle would be, nor spent significant 
effort on the issue of exiting prior to investment. Thus, while we found some support for Arthurs 
and Busenitz’ claim (2003) of goal congruency prior to investment, it was in no way an accurate 
description of all our cases.  
Following the logic of agency theory, goal congruence and the alignment of interests might 
therefore be part of the explanation why we observed consensus-driven decision making during 
the exit process. Our argument is supported by the fact that exit agreement prior to the process 
being initiated has been found to significantly increase the confidence in cooperation in the VC-E 
relationship (Berg-Utby et al., 2007).   
The Fairness of the Exit 
As shown, however, not all of the VCs interviewed emphasized the alignment of interests pre-
investment. Procedural justice theory might lend a helping hand in understanding why these 
relationships did not degenerate into one of opposing views and conflict. According to this view, 
when the VC emphasizes that his business model relies on the exit event prior to the investment, 
it might be easier for the entrepreneur to accept the exit process as it arrives, regardless of 
whether or not the VC and entrepreneur have the same goals and interests. The Panther VC 
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made a point of the importance of maintaining an open process and good dialogue with the 
entrepreneurs:  
We run a very open process, making sure that everybody is well informed, perhaps even 
to an excessive degree. It’s because nobody should be able to claim that they weren’t 
informed, or that they didn’t understand or didn’t know.   
Based on the notion that entrepreneurs seeking funding know that an exit process is a necessary 
implication when inviting along VCs, it might be deemed fair when the VC asks for cooperation a 
few years down the line. Further, we argue that this is especially true when it is apparent to all 
actors involved in the venture that it is not capable of becoming an IPO candidate, as the trade 
sale exit is the only relevant option left.  
This realization of the entrepreneurs of what it would mean to bring along venture capital was 
also emphasized by all five entrepreneur informants interviewed. They all clearly stated that 
they knew what the VC’s business model was like, and that they realized prior to 
seeking/receiving venture capital that inviting such investors to help fund the venture meant 
that there would have to be an exit event some years down the road. Supporting empirical 
evidence can be found in Appendix 2.  
Entrepreneurs might therefore be willing to accept the trade sale exit process even when they 
don’t necessarily like it, because they realize that it is part of the cost of acquiring venture 
capital. Especially when dealing with investors who value the importance of having an open 
process around what their expectations are and where they see the venture going, the 
appreciation of such procedural justice from the entrepreneur’s point of view is likely to be 
prevalent. The Penguin CEO emphasized the importance of knowing that the exit event would 
arrive:  
The relationship between us and the VCs was fine. We knew very well that in the end it 
would be the calculator that would be the determinant factor for the VC, and we entered 
into that relationship with open eyes. 
Thus, the perceived fairness of the exit decision and process might be another important part of 
understanding why the conflict level documented in our exit processes was not higher. The 
entrepreneurs had realized this hidden cost of venture capital. This argument is supported by 
the finding that the greater the perception of procedural justice, the more likely there will be a 
favorable venture exit (Busenitz et al., 2004).  
However, an important point to raise here is that these entrepreneurs did not have their dreams 
shattered by being acquired. In fact, the entrepreneurs in the Blackhawk and Oiler cases, for 
example, made a point of the fact that they were highly motivated to sell. In these cases, the 
cooperative basis of the relationship clearly was not based on the aligned goals of the VC and 
entrepreneur around the need for VC exit prior to investment, nor was it the result of the 
entrepreneur accepting the decision since it was deemed to be fair. Instead, as further discussed 
below, the entrepreneurs took a proactive approach towards being acquired – they wanted their 
company to be sold to the acquiring entity.  
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Strategic Hurdles, Personal Motives, and the Motivation to Sell 
What we found was that in the cases where the entrepreneur faced difficult strategic hurdles 
and/or significant personal motivations to sell, this affected their attitude going into the trade 
sale exit process. In line with the acquisition as courtship view put forward by Graebner and 
Eisenhardt (2004), we therefore argue that these factors influence the behaviors of the 
entrepreneur during the trade sale exit process.  
The Canuck case offers a striking example of a situation where the management team took a 
leading role in pursuing the sale of the company. In response to a rapid increase in the demand 
for their product, the company was faced with a significant sales ramp-up hurdle. The 
organization did not have sufficient manufacturing capacity, and was worried that quality might 
drop if they were to expand too quickly. Further, the increase in demand was mainly due to one 
major customer, and the management team worried that if the customer’s customers did not end 
up buying the service offering in the numbers projected, the company might suddenly be stuck 
with capacity for which there was no demand. Other players in the industry faced similar 
worries, and it therefore was:  
… a natural evolution for one of them to call us, and offer us manufacturing capacity. I 
think that was the reason it became a logical step, both for us and for the acquirer, to 
take advantage of the single point of sale, and the manufacturing capacity that we knew 
we were starting to have trouble keeping up with (Canuck VC).  
Simultaneously, the founders had a strong personal motive from selling in terms of gaining 
access to significant wealth that had been locked up in the venture for a while: “This was an 
opportunity that they [the founders] saw to take considerable wealth out of the business in an 
acquisition” (Canuck VC).  
In the acquisition process that followed, the VC did not play a significant role:  
So it was basically the management team of [the company] that was running this process, 
and we were sitting in the back room saying: ‘Ok, if it's a good enough offer, we'll go for 
it, but we don't have any rush’ (Canuck VC). 
Interestingly, in this case the issue of exit strategy was not discussed prior to investment, so goal 
congruency or procedural justice theory cannot explain the proactive stance taken by the 
founders. Instead, we argue that it was the substantial strategic hurdles faced by management, in 
combination with the personal motivation of gaining access to significant liquidity, that lead to 
the harmonious exit process observed. The table below lists the strategic hurdles and personal 
motivations documented for each case, with supporting empirical data. 
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Table 3 - Strategic Hurdles and Personal Motivations 
Case Strategic Hurdles and Personal Motivations 
Avalanche 
Funding round: “Either we’re going to have to raise 20 million dollars, or 25 
million, and keep growing to be much bigger. Or we can respond to the inbound 
interest.” (VC)  
Sales ramp-up: “You have proven that it works, you have the promise of selling a 
lot of them, but you haven’t had the sales force to do it yet. Now you have to scale 
this.” (VC) 
Liquidity: Founders owned significant share of company.  
Blackhawk 
Liquidity: Significant shareholdings for all employees and founder. Wanted access 
to liquidity. Founder (main shareholder) was already retired.  
Bruin 
External market movement: “If [major customer] had bought a competitor of 
ours, we would have been done for. Because we couldn’t compete against them 
and their eco-system. So, we thought that we either need to be acquired, or we 
have to do something completely different.” (CEO)   
Funding round: “We could either try to take the company to the next level – but 
that would require substantial amounts of capital. Or, we could try to sell it.” (VC) 
Personal stress: “You take a look at your cash flow statement, and you realize 
that you are running out of money. At the same time, you’re responsible for the 
well-being of your employees, your wife and your child. At that point, it’s all about 
securing funding, and an acquisition was one possible solution.” (CEO) 
Canuck 
Sales ramp-up: “We were limited by how fast we could build them. And we were 
starting to get complaints from [major customer] that we couldn’t build them fast 
enough. We were worried about how much capacity we could build.” (VC) 
Strategic gap: Sales were very dependent on the success of a major customer.  
Liquidity: Founders saw acquisition as a way to access considerable wealth.  
Coyote 
Sales ramp-up: Major contract meant company was moving from a few beta 
customers to mass production.  
Strategic gap: In order to move from initial market into other verticals, a 
substantial distribution network needed to be built. The organization would have 
to grow substantially, and implement many new systems. 
Funding round: “We had basically burned through the capital that was available 
from the investors. And we would have needed more.” (CEO) 
Flame 
Sales ramp-up: Company had one customer. Needed to expand customer base 
significantly. 
Management search: “We hadn’t hired the VP of Marketing or the VP of 
Engineering. We had a lot to accomplish to turn this into a real company.” (VC) 
External market movement: “The fact that the biggest, strongest player is 
knocking on our door, the most attractive acquirer out there, is something we 
have to consider very seriously. Because there are a lot of bad outcomes. I suspect 
that if we say no to [the acquirer], they’re going to buy someone else – 
significantly changing the competitive framework.” (VC) 
Liquidity: Founder was major shareholder. Realized significant value when 
selling.  
Flyer 
Funding round: “We had a strong syndicate of investors who were willing to fund 
the company to the next level.” (VC) 
Hurricane  
Funding round: “We have limited amounts of capital, so the question was: how 
much will we increase the value of the company by funding it to the next level?” 
(VC)  
Liquidity: Founders and management positively inclined towards trade sale 
process since significant wealth could be realized.  
Islander 
Sales ramp-up: “We were struggling with growing pains, and saw that being 
acquired might help solve that.” (CEO) 
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Lightning 
Liquidity: “The acquirer made us an, what’s the term from the Godfather, ‘an offer 
you can’t refuse’. It reflected what we and the management team saw as the 
potential value of the company, so it was easy to agree that selling was the right 
thing to do.” (VC) 
Oiler 
Strategic gap: Company had large organizations both as suppliers and customers 
and would benefit from being part of a big company themselves. “And so we felt 
like, strategically, we could be a bigger, stronger business, and accomplish more, if 
we were part of a bigger company.” (CEO) 
Panther None. 
Penguin 
Personal stress: The venture capital fund that had invested in the portfolio 
company was coming to an end, and the entrepreneurs did not like the prospect of 
a host of minority shareholders. Therefore, they saw acquisition as the best 
solution.  
Ranger 
Funding round: “So far we had built the company with seed money. The question 
was whether we should try to raise more funding from other actors, and bring it to 
the next level, or sell it now.” (VC) 
Strategic gap: The company struggled with hiring well qualified personnel at a 
reasonable cost, hindering growth.  
Sabre 
Liquidity: “… I think in the end, given the price that was put out there, and people 
started doing the calculations in their head of how much money they were going 
to make, everybody walked away pretty pleased at how it ended.” (VC) 
Senator 
Strategic gap: Company realized that it would have to build a substantial 
distribution network, internally or via partners, in order to scale sales.  
Funding round: Company needed new funding in order to develop market 
channels. 
Star 
Sales ramp-up: “The company was starting to get real sales. It was accelerating 
quickly.” (VC)  
Funding round: “If we were going to scale the business, it would require 
significant funding.” (VC) 
Liquidity: “The entire team was well incentivized via ownership stakes to accept 
the exit process.” (VC) 
Thrasher 
Sales ramp-up: “We would have had to put in a lot more money to commercialize 
the product, and to really boost sales. And, there’s always an element of the risk of 
execution.” (VC) 
Funding round: Company needed more funding when moving into 
commercialization phase, but had strong syndicate of investors willing to fund it 
further.  
Liquidity: “So the management team was well incentivized to make sure that the 
acquisition happened. They were absolutely happy with their piece of the pie.” 
(VC) 
The Bruin case and the Oiler case also involved entrepreneurs motivated to be acquired. In the 
Bruin case, the entrepreneur felt the pressure of running out of funding. Simultaneously, 
external market movements were making it clear that the competitive landscape was about to 
change. In sum, these developments made the entrepreneur realize that it was a good time to 
look closer at being acquired. Similarly, the entrepreneur in the Oiler case realized the strategic 
benefits of being part of a bigger organization, and therefore responded positively to the trade 
sale exit process.  
Our findings therefore indicate that there might be a sound rationale for VCs to aim for the 
divestiture of their portfolio companies as they approach major strategic hurdles; namely that of 
entrepreneurial cooperation. Similarly, personal benefits for the entrepreneur, such as 
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significant wealth or the reduction of stress, seems to influence the VC-E relationship during a 
trade sale exit process.  
At the other end of the scale, we identified no strategic hurdles or strong personal motives in the 
Panther case. Nevertheless, the Panther exit process was of a cooperative nature, with no 
significant conflicts. Thus, while we argue that the acquisition as courtship view is relevant, it 
alone is not enough to analyze the VC-E relationship during trade sale exit processes.  
The Social Embeddedness of Exit Transactions  
VCs are usually assumed to look upon the financial return of an exit as the dominant factor, and 
therefore posited to simply choose the highest bidder in a trade sale exit. What we found, 
however, was that given the luxury of choice, both entrepreneurs and VCs often value many 
other variables when choosing the acquirer of a given organization, including the issues of 
human and strategic fit between the two entities. Surprisingly, some of the informants also 
emphasized the importance of creating a virtuous result for all actors involved in the trade sale, 
including the acquirer, denoted as a win-win-win focus in the table below.  
Table 4 - Show Me the Money 
Case Show Me the Money? 
Avalanche 
Win-win-win. Important for VC that the acquisition was a good outcome for 
investors, founding team and acquirer.  “I am very happy with the transaction. It 
was a good outcome for the investors, good outcome for the team, and a good 
outcome for the acquirer. Which is also important.” (VC) 
Blackhawk 
Strategic fit. “My company had two separate divisions. And I didn’t want a 
potential acquirer to break the company up. So all of the potential acquirers were 
companies where I could make an argument that both sides fit under their 
umbrella.” (CEO) 
Bruin 
Strategic fit. Important that the company could continue aspiring towards their 
goals. “Being acquired by [company] was a great way to get their technology out 
there. That was what was important for the founders.” (VC)  
“We planned for world domination, and they could help us get there.” (CEO) 
Human fit. “There was great chemistry between the companies. A lot of love. 
Now, had it been all love and no cash it wouldn’t have worked out. But the fact that 
we could believe in what they were doing was important. And I believe the VCs 
agreed that it was important. So we quickly made it an exclusive process.” (CEO)  
Win-win-win. Important for the VC that the trade sale ended up being a good 
acquisition for the acquirer, team and investors.  
Canuck Price of greatest importance. 
Coyote Price of greatest importance.  
Flame Price of greatest importance.  
Flyer 
Human/strategic fit. Entertained trade sale process with acquirer because of 
great fit. “This was the acquirer everybody wanted, but I don’t think the 
management team even dared dream about.” (VC) 
Hurricane  Win-win-win. Important that all parties benefit from transaction.   
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Islander 
Human fit. “It was very important to me that the employees landed in a structure 
which would maintain what we had built. So I actually blocked a sale to another, 
global actor, because I did not believe in their philosophy.” (CEO) 
Lightning 
Human fit. “You know, if it hadn’t been for the CEO, we wouldn’t have landed such 
a solid deal. He was the driving force behind the deal, and initiated the contact” 
(VC).  
Oiler 
Strategic fit. An important part of choosing the acquirer was the strategic fit 
between the visions of the future. 
Human fit. “We also thought through what was going to be the best landing zone 
for our employees, to continue having interesting, fruitful careers.” (CEO) 
Panther 
Human fit. Trade sale process directed at one acquirer due to connections 
between founders and acquirer. “Management wanted to sell to [acquirer] to keep 
ownership local, and because they had personal connections with the acquirer. 
For us it was mainly about price, but we care about keeping all parties happy.” 
(VC) 
Win-win-win. Important that all parties benefit from transaction.  
Penguin 
Strategic fit. Management was active in directing the sale towards an actor who 
would build on the current organization.   
Ranger Price of greatest importance.  
Sabre Price of greatest importance.  
Senator 
Human fit. “Human fit is very important. Do the founders and other employees 
want to be part of the acquirer, and can the acquirer see himself working with the 
incumbent team?” (VC) 
Win-win-win. “It’s important that it’s the right solution for everybody involved. In 
other words, that the acquisition ends up being a success story for the acquirer.” 
(VC) 
Star Price of greatest importance.  
Thrasher Price of greatest importance.  
An example of including other factors than simply price comes from the Penguin case:  
There were some other actors interested, who wanted to acquire us. And they may have 
been willing to acquire us at a higher valuation. But we feared that they would simply 
take the code we had written, and then shut us down. So we made it pretty clear that we 
would work harder on making an acquisition happen if we instead focused on [the 
acquirer]. And we felt that the VCs listened to our concerns (Penguin CEO). 
But why would VCs allow for other variables influencing the decision than those affecting their 
financial return? Similar findings in earlier studies have been attributed to a governance as 
syndicate view in which:  
… governance is an interdependent partnership between the board and executives in 
which each contribute unique and valuable resources in the pursuit of collective success 
and in the context of multidimensional motives (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004).  
The intriguing issue of why investors and board managers would act in such a way is suggested 
to come from personal as well as altruistic motives (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
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Our data points to the social embeddedness of transactions in the venture capital community 
(Black and Gilson, 1998; Granovetter, 1985; Sahlman, 1990) as the main explanation. A 
reputation for taking care of the founder’s concerns is important for VCs in order to attract the 
best entrepreneurs as they seek funding: “And by the way – reputation is all you have in the 
venture business, and if you get a reputation for beating up entrepreneurs, guess what, not a lot 
of them show up on your doorstep” (Sabre VC). Further, a favorable reputation will also enhance 
a VCF’s ability to attract investors and a host of service providers, such as lawyers, investment 
bankers, and auditors, who might play an important role in providing value-adding services to 
portfolio companies (MacIntosh and Cumming, 2003). In fact, well-connected VCFs have been 
shown to perform significantly better than those who are less so (Hochberg et al., 2007).  
Several of our informants confirmed the value of a strong reputation with regards to attracting 
investors and star entrepreneurs. One of the Coyote VCs commented:  
It’s been really important for us as a venture capital firm that this exit process ended up 
being great. It’s been important for us in terms of attracting new investors, but also in 
terms of attracting potential deals. Everybody wants to work with people who are 
successful.  
The Panther VC brought forward an especially interesting reason for why VCs might have a high 
focus on maintaining a strong relationship with their entrepreneurs during the exit process:  
It’s important for us to maintain a good relationship with the entrepreneurs even after 
the exit. It’s important because they might become serial entrepreneurs, but it’s also 
important in terms of raising new capital for our venture capital funds, because our 
investors typically interview entrepreneurs from our previous portfolio companies 
before investing. And they actually spend quite a lot of time on it.  
With VCs being long term actors in the entrepreneurial community it therefore is rational for 
them take into account softer values than just the financial return from the deal. As a result, 
entrepreneurial concerns and objections are listened to and rated as important in the 
discussions that arise during a trade sale exit process. Such reputational effects and the loud 
echoing of bad behavior (Cable and Shane, 1997) create a strong incentive for VCs to avert the 
myopic goal of maximizing the value of any given exit process, and instead focus on long-term 
results. In the words of one of our informants: “Reputation over return every time. Because life 
is a multi-round game” (Avalanche VC).  
As such, the social embeddedness of the transactions under scrutiny seems to restrain the level 
of conflict in the VC-E relationship during the trade sale exit process. 
Discussion 
What emerges from the empirical findings discussed in the previous sections is a picture of a 
breakup process recognized more often by its civility and cooperation than conflict. While some 
heated discussion emerged between the VC and the entrepreneur in several of our cases during 
the exit process, a consensus was reached in every single case.  
Further, our findings give support to the statement that VCs’ ability to initiate an exit process 
unilaterally is generally overstated in the literature (Smith, 2005). The acquirer in a venture 
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capital-backed trade sale process typically does not want to acquire only the organization, but 
also the human capital intrinsic in the founding team and other employees, a point emphasized 
by several of our informants. In the words of the Flame VC:  
In most cases, VCs own a majority as a pool, but they don’t really have the authority to 
sell even then. That is, they have the authority, but they don’t have the ability, because 
the buyer is going to say: ‘Okay, if he [the founder] leaves, this is a mess. I’m going to pay 
you a million bucks instead of a hundred million, because I’m going to have to fix this.’ 
Thus, a major rationale for the cooperative VC-E relationship observed in our data might be the 
interdependence inherent in the trade sale exit process; VCs require the cooperation of 
entrepreneurs in order to maximize the return generated from the exit event (Martin et al., 
2007), while the entrepreneurs are dependent on a cooperative relationship with their investors 
in order to secure venture success (Cable and Shane, 1997; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; 
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Steier and Greenwood, 1995).   
However, as indicated, the legal rights of the VC stated in the investment contract can be 
emphasized during the discussions between the VC and entrepreneurs that emerge as the trade 
sale process is initiated. As such, contracts should not be completely dismissed as an important 
variable influencing the VC-E relationship. Instead, we argue that it should be considered an 
important backdrop for the discussion, as has previously been argued for the governance of 
syndicates (Wright and Lockett, 2003).  
Following the argumentation of agency theory, contracts might therefore play a mediating role 
in the VC-E relationship by creating incentives for entrepreneurs to act in their principal’s 
interests. While agency theory therefore is instrumental in understanding aspects of the VC-E 
relationship, we argue that one needs to include the concepts of goal congruency, procedural 
justice and social embeddedness to fully appreciate the complexity of the situation.  
Alignment and Procedural Justice 
Viewed from the entrepreneur’s perspective, we have shown that all the entrepreneurs 
interviewed drew attention to the point that they knew the hidden cost of acquiring venture 
capital – namely that an exit event will have to take place in the future. As such, it is easy to agree 
with the investors who stated that “all entrepreneurs” should know that there must be an exit 
event when seeking venture capital. This entrepreneurial understanding of what it means to 
invite external investors to fund the venture might not always be the case, however. Several 
entrepreneurs are motivated more by non-pecuniary benefits such as control than the potential 
wealth that can be attained, and might not realize the trade-off they are making when attaining 
venture capital funding (Wasserman, 2008).  
When it often should be the starting point of any venture capital investment that the most likely 
exit vehicle will be that of a trade sale, it is therefore highly relevant to make sure that the 
entrepreneur is willing to participate in such a process. As such, it is puzzling that it seems that 
not all investors worry about checking alignment with regards exit. Granted, as shown, some 
investment opportunities are looked upon by investors as more likely to go all the way to an IPO, 
making an argument for why one might not stress exit alignment and willingness to exit via 
trade sale for all deals. However, under the assumption that an entrepreneur always will agree 
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to exit via an IPO, but might oppose a trade sale, it would be prudent by investors to ensure that 
the entrepreneur is willing to perform a trade sale at some point in the future.  
We therefore argue that investors should explicitly discuss the potential for a trade sale exit with 
entrepreneurs prior to investment, even when it is not the probable exit vehicle. Herein also lays 
a major rationale for the inclusion of drag-along rights in term sheets. Should they not agree 
fully when the decision is made, procedural justice theory predicts that it will be easier to accept 
the decision nonetheless, hindering conflict. If no such alignment check is performed, a higher 
potential for conflict between the VC and the entrepreneur in case of a trade sale exit process 
exists. Accordingly, we posit that: 
P1: The higher the level of alignment with regards to trade sale being an accepted exit 
vehicle prior to investment, the lesser the conflict between the VC and the entrepreneur 
during the trade sale exit process.  
Strategic Hurdles and Personal Motives 
Managers of the target in an acquisition process affect whether the buyer succeeds. In 
opposition of popular belief, however, recent research has shown that acquisition processes are 
not always viewed as a negative by the incumbent management. In fact, management teams 
might take a proactive stance towards being acquired, given the presence of significant strategic 
hurdles or personal motives (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). Our findings from 18 acquisition 
processes of venture capital-backed ventures lend support to this view also for entrepreneurial 
companies. Even though entrepreneurs are emotionally attached to their ventures (Baron, 
1998), arguably more so than hired management teams, we have documented several instances 
of entrepreneurs proactively working towards the completion of the trade sale. These 
entrepreneurial teams were not only willing to be acquired, they wanted to. As shown, such 
attitudes were closely linked to the presence of significant strategic hurdles or personal motives. 
Accordingly, we posit that:  
P2a: The greater the perception of the entrepreneur that the venture faces strategic 
hurdles, the lesser the conflict between the VC and the entrepreneur during the trade sale 
exit process.  
P2b: The greater the personal motives of the entrepreneur to be acquired, the lesser the 
conflict between the VC and the entrepreneur during the trade sale exit process.  
The Importance of a Reputation 
VCs, who over a long term have built a substantial positive reputation, are likely to enjoy 
significant benefits in terms of deal flow and deal terms. Better connected VCs also outperform 
those with a less valuable network, as measured by the proportion of investments that are 
successfully exited via IPO or trade sale (Hochberg et al., 2007). Younger VCFs, on the other 
hand, have been found to take portfolio companies public prematurely, likely in order to build a 
reputation of success towards investors (Espenlaub et al., 2009; Gompers, 1996; Neus and Walz, 
2005). These findings indicate that younger VCFs, having built no substantial reputation towards 
entrepreneurs, face a lower opportunity cost of defection in the VC-E relationship. Thus, we 
argue that a more reputable and well connected VC will have more to lose from acting in a non-
cooperative manner. Accordingly, we posit that:  
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P3a: The better connected the VC is, the lesser the conflict between the VC and the 
entrepreneur during the trade sale exit process.  
P3b: The more reputable the VC is, the lesser the conflict between the VC and the 
entrepreneur during the trade sale exit process. 
The VCs’ strong focus on maintaining their reputation, even to the degree that they are willing to 
forego financial return in order to make sure that everybody wins, seems to put them in a weak 
position vis-à-vis entrepreneurs. We argue, however, that entrepreneurs need to maintain a 
reputation of their own. The entrepreneurial recycling triggered by acquisitions (Mason and 
Harrison, 2006; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003), means that many of these entrepreneurs will soon 
find themselves in a situation where they are either seeking funding for their next venture, or 
where they in fact are sitting on the other side of the table seeking to fund entrepreneurial 
ventures themselves. With the widespread use of syndication of venture capital investments 
(Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave, 1988; Lerner, 1994; Wright and Lockett, 2003), either of these 
situations are likely to put entrepreneurs into touch with individuals who know how they 
behaved last time around. However, we realize that entrepreneurs, unlike VCFs, might not plan 
to remain in the entrepreneurial community, with retirement as one obvious reason for leaving. 
The opportunity cost of damaging one’s reputation by acting non-cooperatively is arguably 
lower if this is the case. Accordingly, we posit that:   
P4: The more likely the entrepreneur is to continue a career within the entrepreneurial 
community, the lesser the conflict between the VC and the entrepreneur during the trade 
sale exit process. 
The figure below sums up our propositions and the posited influence on the VC-E relationship 
during trade sale exit processes.   
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Figure 1 - Factors Influencing the VC-E Relationship during Trade Sale Exits 
Conclusions and Implications  
The subject of venture capital trade sale exits has received unproportionally low attention from 
scholars. Trade sale exits by far dominate as the most common venture capital exit vehicle, yet it 
is the IPO which has received all of the glory in the academic literature. Based on the notion that 
this neglected but extremely important topic was basically a black box when it came to research-
based knowledge, this study set out to take the first few steps towards opening that black box.   
Due to the importance of a cooperative relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur 
during a trade sale exit, this paper therefore sought answers to the following research questions: 
(1) What characterizes the VC-E relationship during trade sale exit processes? (2) Which, if any, 
factors influence the cooperative level of the VC-E relationship during a trade sale exit process?  
Via a multiple-case study, covering 18 trade sale exit processes performed by Norwegian and 
U.S. VCs, we have thoroughly shown that the relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur 
during trade sale exit processes is one of consensus-driven decision making and cooperation. 
While differences of opinion and heated discussion regarding which path was the correct way 
forward for the portfolio company was documented for several cases, in the end, the decision to 
proceed with the trade sale was based on consensus in all cases covered.  
Further, based on insights from the concepts of agency theory, goal congruence, acquisition as 
courtship, and social embeddedness, we have shown that several factors influence the degree of 
cooperation in the VC-E relationship during trade sales. These factors include pre-investment 
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alignment with regards to the exit, the strategic hurdles and personal motives faced by the 
entrepreneur, the reputation and network connectedness of the VC, and the probability for 
entrepreneurial recycling.  
Implications for Practitioners 
Our results indicate that there are several steps that should be taken by VCs in order to 
maximize the probability for a cooperative relationship with the entrepreneur during the trade 
sale exit process. First of all, investors should ensure alignment with regards to trade sale being 
an accepted exit vehicle pre-investment. Even when an IPO is the pre-planned strategy, ensuring 
such acceptance would be prudent. Further, VCs should take the effect of strategic hurdles and 
personal motivations into account when timing the exit process. Granted, many trade sale exit 
processes are initiated due to an unsolicited bid, in which it is hard for the VC to influence the 
timing of the process. In those cases where the process is initiated proactively, however, it can 
be beneficial for investors to overlap the timing with the existence of such challenges, in order to 
maximize entrepreneurial willingness to sell. Finally, VCs should realize the importance of a 
strong reputation towards entrepreneurs, and the potentially devastating effects of acting in a 
non-cooperative manner during a trade sale exit process. Foregoing financial return in a specific 
deal where the entrepreneur has significant objections may be significantly outweighed by the 
positive, long-term effects.  
On the other end of the relationship, entrepreneurs first of all need to realize the sheer 
prevalence of trade sale exits. As such, when entering into a relationship with a VC, the 
entrepreneur should be prepared for the possibility that there will be an acquisition event in the 
future. Entrepreneurs also need to realize the motivating effects of strategic hurdles and 
personal motives, and that timing a trade sale exit with their presence might be a beneficial way 
of ensuring a cooperative bias from the general management team. Finally, entrepreneurs who 
envision themselves continuing a career within the entrepreneurial community should also 
realize the importance of a positive reputation. 
Implications for Further Research 
The empirical data gathered in this study was based on a strategic sampling of completed trade 
sale exit processes in Norway and the U.S. Based on this data and the theoretical backdrop 
described, we have put forward several important propositions regarding the VC-E relationship 
during a trade sale exit. Cooperation between the VC and the entrepreneur during this process is 
necessary to ensure a positive outcome for all parties involved. Based on the prevalence of trade 
sale exits, high levels of VC-E cooperation during their execution may therefore be important for 
the overall well-being of the venture capital industry. As such, further research should 
investigate whether or not our propositions will survive empirical testing over a statistically 
representative sample. Thus, the next logical steps are to operationalize the propositions put 
forward into testable hypotheses, and subject them to the rigor of quantitative research 
strategies.  
Importantly, all the entrepreneurs who were informants in this study realized the VCs’ need for 
an exit event prior to seeking investments. The point of procedural justice theory that one is 
more likely to accept the decision itself if the process is deemed to be fair, could indicate that 
entrepreneurs that do not share this understanding would be more likely to deem the decision 
process regarding the exit as unfair. Therefore, they might also be more inclined towards 
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protesting and acting opportunistically towards the investor in order to block the exit. While we 
have no empirical evidence that this is the case, it would be very interesting for scholars to 
investigate whether or not such a lack of education among entrepreneurs could be part of the 
explanation why immature venture capital markets underperform established markets such as 
the U.S. 
Further, our data seems to suggest that some VCs value the importance of pre-planned exit 
strategies and pre-investment alignment more than others. Previous research have in fact hinted 
to the presence of two different types of investors, with one type being more inclined to tailor 
the company towards an exit, while the other believes in building the best possible company 
regardless of what the future exit might look like (Relander et al., 1994; Wall and Smith, 1997). 
While we have not delved into this subject in this paper, it would be very interesting to look 
closer at whether or not different investor types exist, and what the consequences of such 
different views are.  
Finally, although not elaborated on in this study, it could be very interesting to investigate the 
role of financial advisors in mediating the relationship between the entrepreneur and the VC 
during the exit process. Many trade sale exit processes involve such advisors. However, very 
little is known with regards to how these actors are chosen, why they are contracted, and 
whether or not they have a significant influence on the process itself. In fact, to the authors’ 
knowledge, there exist no studies focusing on the role of such advisors in venture capital trade 
sale exits. As such, this should be an area ripe for exploration.   
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Appendix 1 – Trade Sale Exit Processes: Conflict or Consensus? 
Case Trade Sale Exit Processes: Conflict or Consensus? 
Avalanche 
VC: “They were happy with the valuation, and I think they were happy with the 
timing as well. In the end, it was an all agreed to solution to sell. And as a matter of 
fact we still have a good relationship. I still talk to all those founders.” 
Blackhawk 
Entrepreneur: “…so, they [VCs] accepted the fact that, first of all, they were happy 
that we were in the process [initiated by management], they recognized that we 
had a competent representative, and so they were happy to sit back and just be 
informed. He [VC] was very happy with the valuation. I mean, he wound up with 
getting maybe 8 or 9 times his money.” 
Bruin 
Entrepreneur: “The exit process was stressful, but I found the VCs to be very 
empathetic. They understood our motivation for world domination, and we 
understood their need for an exit. So being acquired by [company] was the best 
way to achieve both our goals.” 
VC: “I had a clear impression that the founders were motivated to sell. The exit 
process was very smooth. We did not have any major conflicts.” 
Canuck 
VC: “I think they [the founders] were very ready for it as well. ... So they were 
excited about the prospect. And we wouldn’t have pushed it if the management 
team wasn’t prepared to do it.” 
Coyote 
Entrepreneur: “We [management and investors] were very aligned with regards 
to the exit.” 
VC1: “It was a very smooth process, with basically no conflicts.” 
VC2: “All actors, management and investors, were in agreement when it came to 
the exit process.” 
Flame 
VC: “The entrepreneur was onboard with regards to selling the company, so there 
were no major conflicts during the exit process.” 
Flyer 
VC1: “The founding team members who were still an active part of the company 
were very interested in the sale taking place. There were some discussions with 
regards to pricing, but the term sheet is pretty clear about who can stop or start a 
sale, so those discussions were rather easy. No major dispute arose.” 
VC2: “We were all very much aligned with regards to the exit.” 
Hurricane  VC: “It was very easy to agree with the founders that this was a good time to sell.” 
Islander 
Entrepreneur: “There were no conflicts or anything like that. There has never 
been any disagreement with regards to the fact that there would be an exit.” 
Lightning 
VC: “Investors and managers were in unison agreement that it was reasonable. We 
all agreed that selling was the right thing to do.” 
Oiler 
Entrepreneur: “We had a very cohesive management team that believed that the 
path that we were taking was the right path, and while there were some investors 
who thought that maybe we were selling too early, at the end of the day everybody 
kind of got on the same page and recognized the fact that it was the right thing to 
do, and were supportive of doing it.” 
Panther 
VC: “In most cases it’s no problem getting the management to go along with a 
trade sale. This case was no different. We agreed upon a trade sale, we agreed 
upon the intermediary to be used, and we initiated the process. It was no 
problem.” 
Penguin 
Entrepreneur: “We were very much in agreement with the need to sell. Now, as 
we approached the exit process, the VC increased his focus on the numbers, which 
sometimes meant that what we felt was in the long term interest of the company 
was not considered enough. It strained the relationship, but in hindsight, I have 
only good things to say about them.” 
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Ranger 
VC: “There was some heated discussion around the timing of the sale. Perhaps the 
entrepreneur wanted to take the company further, and it’s not always attractive 
being incorporated into a major entity as opposed to running an independent 
company. Some discussion and conflict arose. But in the end, after a lot of 
dialogue, we all came to agreement. And that was based on the longstanding 
relationship between us.” 
Sabre 
VC: “So, the attitude of the founders was that: ‘I think you’re selling too soon, 
you’re giving up on the company.’ So, our concern was that their motivation was 
perhaps to ride out the storm. So you have that conflict. But, I think in the end, 
given the price that was put out there, and people started doing the calculations in 
their head of how much money they were going to make, everybody walked away 
pretty pleased at how it ended.” 
Senator VC: “In the end, we all agreed that an exit was the most attractive choice…” 
Star 
VC: “It’s very important, as you enter a trade sale process, that it is deeply 
anchored with the management team – that it is something that they want to do. 
Therefore, we are very focused on being open with the founders with regards to 
these processes. So there was full agreement between us as investors and the 
management team at all times.” 
Thrasher VC: “The founders were definitely onboard with the exit.” 
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Appendix 2 – Entrepreneur: Do You Want What I Want? 
Case Do You Want What I Want? 
Blackhawk 
Entrepreneur: “Oh, yeah, exit was something that we discussed a lot with the VCs 
prior to raising funds. But, in those days, the traditional exit was always an IPO. So 
we saw ourselves as going public.” 
Bruin 
Entrepreneur: “It’s important for entrepreneurs to signal to the VCs that they 
realize there will be an exit. The venture capital business model depends on the 
exit, and if you’re going to have a good relation with your investor, you have to be 
able to align around that. If you act like you are aligned with regards to exit, but 
don’t really believe in it yourself, there’s going to be a conflict somewhere in the 
future. And that’s a conflict you’re going to lose.” 
Islander 
Entrepreneur: “You cannot invite investors, and then turn around and not want 
to sell the company. So the path towards investor exit is something that is 
discussed from day one.” 
Oiler 
Entrepreneur: “We didn’t have a ton of conversations about the exit. We talked 
about the industry that we were in, and talked about some of the type of 
acquisitions that get made in that space. But frankly, at that stage, you’re really 
less focused on the exit, and more focused on the market opportunity and what it’s 
going to take to build a great company. So, we were pretty agnostic to what the 
long term exit might be.” 
Penguin 
Entrepreneur: “It was crystal clear for us that there would be an exit when we 
sought funding. We knew what the VCs were about.” 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the factors affecting the choice of financial advisors in venture capital 
trade sale exits. A multiple-case study of 19 venture capital trade sale exits performed by both 
Norwegian and U.S. venture capitalists has been conducted in order to shed light on this 
phenomenon. We find that venture capitalists emphasize many of the factors suggested by the 
general literature on financial advisors. However, we find an extension to both the rationale for 
hiring an advisor and the factors affecting the choice of an advisor in a venture capital trade sale. 
We therefore offer a framework that integrates previous research and our findings to explain the 
process in which financial advisors are chosen in a venture capital trade sale. 
 
  
142 
 
  
143 
 
Introduction 
The ultimate event that separates the venture capitalist (VC) and the portfolio company in a 
venture capital fund is the exit event. The exit preferably takes the form of an initial public 
offering (IPO) or a trade sale (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). Entrepreneurial ventures are 
typically cash-constrained, with no ability to pay dividends, and it is capital gains from the exit 
event that will determine the return to the venture capital fund, and thereby its investors 
(Cumming et al., 2006). Thus, exit is at the heart of venture capital (Cumming and MacIntosh, 
2003).  
The sale of the entire portfolio company to a third party, i.e. a trade sale, is the most common 
exit vehicle. When turning to the empirical world, this is evident: According to the National 
Venture Capital Association, six trade sales were conducted for every IPO in the U.S. between 
2004 and 2010 (NVCA, 2011). Statistics both from Europe as a whole, and the Nordic region 
alone, support these findings (EVCA, 2010; Vækstfonden, 2009).  
Despite the importance of trade sale exits for venture capital, the research on this exit vehicle is 
lacking. Most effort in exit research is directed towards IPOs, due to data availability and the 
view of IPOs as more prestigious than other exit vehicles (Chaplinsky and Gupta-Mukherjee, 
2010; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Félix et al., 2008; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Isaksson, 
2000; Megginson, 2004). When studying merger and acquisition (M&A) issues in general, most 
research has taken the perspective of the acquirer (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004), providing 
little help to shed light on the trade sale exit vehicle. Moreover, emphasis in the M&A research 
discipline has been on publicly traded companies (Capron and Shen, 2007). However, some 
practitioners have looked at the sell-side exit process (Hansen, 2001; Rosenbaum and Pearl, 
2009).  
When completing an M&A transaction, a financial advisor can be engaged to enhance deal 
proceeds (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). Such an actor is specialized in facilitating and completing 
transactions, by having extensive networks and skills in information processing and 
negotiations. Different scholars have found different indications on how common advisors are, 
with frequencies varying from 35 % to almost 100 % for a target company (Forte et al., 2010; 
Kesner et al., 1994; Thomas, 1995). Some M&A research has taken the target’s choice of advisor 
into account (Forte et al., 2010; Kale et al., 2003; Ma, 2006). However, despite their prevalence, 
no study on the role and use of financial advisors for venture capital trade sale exits has been 
conducted.  
The aim of this study is therefore to combine insights from the literature on venture capital, 
M&A, and financial intermediaries to explore the use of financial advisors in venture capital 
trade sale exits. The following two research questions are sought answered:  
 Why do venture capital-backed companies engage financial advisors in trade sales? 
 What factors influence the choice of a specific financial advisor? 
To answer these questions, we have conducted a multiple-case study that includes 19 
Norwegian and U.S. entrepreneurial ventures that were sold between 1996 and 2011. Semi-
structured interviews with VCs and members of the top management in said cased are used to 
shed light on the decision making process with respect to the research questions.    
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The study shows that there are differences in what factors venture capital-backed companies 
and companies in general use when evaluating and choosing advisor. With respect to the first 
research question, we find that VCs put more value on the bargaining skills advisors have in 
negotiations with the opposite party than their ability to identify acquirers that allow for 
superior synergies. Regarding factors that influence the choice of an advisor, we unveil eight 
distinct categories. In line with current research-based knowledge, we find that industry 
experience and prior relations with the target company or its investors are factors that increase 
the probability of being engaged as an advisor. Additionally, we find extending factors specific 
for venture capital trade sale exits. Finally, we create a framework that integrates this 
knowledge, and explains the rationale for hiring an advisor, the factors influencing the choice, 
and the roles played by such advisors in the trade sale of a venture capital-backed company.  
The contributions from this paper can be summarized in the following points: First, this is the 
first study that explicitly examines the relation between VCs and financial advisors from an exit 
perspective and it is one of few studies that use the trade sale exit vehicle as a vantage point. 
Second, and similarly, this is one of the few studies taking the perspective of the sell-side 
company in an M&A process. Third, the study at hand contributes to the limited research on 
targets’ financial advisors, by offering explanations to why and how advisors are engaged in 
venture capital trade sale exits. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the current literature on 
financial advisors and develops a theoretical framework. Section III gives an overview of the 
methodology used in this study, while the empirical findings from the study are presented in 
section IV. Section V provides an analysis of the research questions in addition to a discussion 
that compares the theoretical framework and the empirical findings. Section VI concludes, 
suggests implications for practitioners, and offers proposals for further research on this topic. 
Theoretical Background 
As described in the previous section, no study has looked specifically at the relation between 
financial advisors and the trade sale of venture capital-backed companies. In order to develop a 
theoretical background for the following analysis, we will therefore depart by looking at the 
literature on financial advisors in general. We will continue by studying the two different types 
of company sales, before synthesizing this knowledge in a theoretical framework.  
A Review of the Literature on Financial Advisors 
The research on financial advisors in M&A transactions has focused on two areas: (1) the effects 
on shareholder wealth from advisors and factors affecting the choice of advisors, and (2) factors 
affecting the fees paid to advisors and fees’ impact on deal outcome (Forte et al., 2010). With the 
aim of this study in mind, our main focus will be on the former area, although both areas will be 
presented.  
Effects on Shareholder Wealth and Factors Affecting the Choice of Advisors 
Financial advisors are engaged in M&A processes because they are specialists in producing and 
processing information (Allen et al., 2004). A financial advisor can contribute to shareholder 
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wealth in two principal ways, denoted as the better merger hypothesis and the bargaining 
power hypothesis (Bowers and Miller, 1990).  
The better merger hypothesis, alternatively coined the matchmaking or superior deal 
hypothesis, means that the advisor can suggest targets or bidders that result in greater synergies 
(Bowers and Miller, 1990; Ma, 2006; Rau, 2000; Schiereck et al., 2009). Some scholars claim that 
transaction costs are the reason why financial intermediaries are able to propose more 
profitable M&A partners, and that transaction costs give such actors a comparative advantage 
due to economics of specialization, scale economics in information acquisition, and reduction in 
search costs (Servaes and Zenner, 1996).  
The bargaining power hypothesis is derived from the fact that the offer amount in an M&A 
process determines the distribution of gains between the acquirer and acquire. The acquirer 
wants to make an offer that is high enough to be accepted, but not transfer wealth to the 
shareholders of the target firm. On the other hand, the seller wants to reap the highest possible 
price for its assets. If an advisor possesses superior negotiation skills, he can extract a larger 
share of the acquisition benefits for the party he represents (Bowers and Miller, 1990). Other 
scholars have a slightly different interpretation of this hypothesis, claiming that bankers, with 
extensive experience in executing deals, can bring more bidders to the table, and thereby 
increase the bargaining power of targets (Ma, 2006).  
Servaes and Zenner (1996) distinguish between three functions of a financial advisor. First, an 
advisor can reduce the transaction cost of the firm by identifying potential buyers and targets, 
evaluating the deal, and putting together an offer. This is equivalent to the better merger 
hypothesis presented above. Second, an advisor can reduce asymmetric information between 
the parties (Stuart et al., 1999). The asymmetric information may be especially evident for 
entrepreneurial ventures, because the value of such ventures is to a larger degree derived from 
intangible assets and future growth opportunities than more mature companies (Gompers and 
Xuan, 2009; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2007). Third, contracting costs in an M&A process can be 
reduced by an advisor, because putting their reputation at stake sends a signal of quality. 
When turning to the empirical world, most research has focused on the acquirer’s choice of 
advisors and corresponding wealth implications (Forte et al., 2010; Ma, 2006). In order to get a 
broader view of the empirical results, we present findings from both perspectives.  
Attempts to test the wealth implications of hiring bankers in M&A transactions have been 
inconclusive. Bowers and Miller (1990) find that transactions that include a first-tier advisor (i.e. 
a prestigious and large advisor) on either side create more wealth, which supports the better 
merger hypothesis. However, the same scholars find no support for the bargaining power 
hypothesis. Servaes and Zenner (1996) find no wealth effect from advisor reputation, a result 
that is supported by Rau (2000) and Schiereck et al. (2009). By introducing a relative reputation 
measure between the bidder’s and target’s advisors, Kale et al. (2003) find that the wealth gains 
to the bidder or target increases with the relative reputation of either side’s advisor and that a 
more reputable advisor creates more gains from the transaction, providing support for both 
hypotheses. Ma (2006) looks specifically at the target’s advisor, and finds support for both 
hypotheses, although stronger evidence for the better merger hypothesis.  
When Forte et al. (2010) find that one-third of the transactions in their sample did not comprise 
an advisor, their claim that the choice of hiring an advisor is nontrivial seems reasonable. 
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Several scholars have tried to identify determinants of whether to hire an advisor or not. Forte 
et al. (2010) find that the choice of engaging an advisor on the sell-side is positively correlated 
with the complexity of the deal and the reputation of the bidder’s advisor. Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) explores reasons for the acquirer to hire an advisor, and find that limited acquisition 
experience, deal complexity, and a diversified target are all factors that enhance the likelihood of 
engaging an advisor. Kale et al. (2003) explore both the bidder’s and target’s rationale for 
engaging an advisor, and find that a hostile bid, a large deal and little experience are driving 
factors for the bidder. Deal complexity and size of target and bidder are factors increasing the 
probability of hiring an advisor for a target company.  
As an extension of this issue, a part of the literature has focused on factors that influence the 
choice of a specific financial advisor. Chang et al. (2010) find that industry expertise and a prior 
relationship with the prospective client increases the probability of an advisor to be chosen by a 
specific bidder or target. In addition, these scholars find that if an advisor has done business 
with the bidder (target), it is more likely to be chosen by the target (bidder). Further, a target 
company’s relationship closeness with its main bank increases the likelihood of this bank being 
chosen as a financial advisor (Forte et al., 2010). 
As this section shows, scholars have found different motivations for hiring an advisor and what 
factors that lead to the choice of a specific advisor. Moreover, the advisor’s effect on the wealth 
creation in M&A transactions is disputed. This has led scholars to explore the incentive structure 
offered to advisors by their principals, an issue to be examined in the following paragraphs.  
Fee Determinants and Fee Influence on Transaction Outcome 
Typically, merger fees are around one per cent of the transaction value (Hunter and Jagtiani, 
2003; Servaes and Zenner, 1996). These fees are paid according to contracts agreed upon 
between the company and its advisor. In general, an advisor can be incentivized by one of the 
following contract forms: share-based contracts, value-based contracts, and fixed fees. 
(McLaughlin, 1990; McLaughlin, 1992).  
Share-based contracts are most relevant for buy-side advisors, because the advisor is 
remunerated based on the number of shares it is able to acquire in the target. The fee can either 
be a linear or a step function. Value-based contracts are divided in two different types, total-
value fees and incremental-value fees. Total-value fees can provide the advisor with a constant 
percentage fee of the deal value, a constant dollar fee upon completion of the transaction, or a 
variable percentage fee, where the percentage fee is dependent on the deal value. The constant 
percentage fee is the most common for a target advisor, while the constant dollar fee is more 
common for advisors on the buy-side (Calomiris and Hitscherich, 2007). Incremental-value fees 
specify a benchmark transaction price, and the advisor is only granted a fee if the transaction 
value exceeds this benchmark price. Fixed-fee contracts give the advisor the same fee whether 
the transaction consummates or not, and are thereby not contingent on outcome. These 
contracts are mostly used in combination with the other two contract forms. Fixed-fee contracts 
can be of two different kinds: a retainer fee that is paid to the advisor every month it is engaged, 
and an opinion fee that is paid in order to have the advisor complete a fairness opinion, 
evaluating whether the transaction is fair or not seen from a financial perspective (Calomiris and 
Hitscherich, 2007).  
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Research shows that the most common contract is a fixed fee in addition to a fee that is 
contingent on the completion of the transaction and based on the transaction value (Hunter and 
Walker, 1990; McLaughlin, 1990; McLaughlin, 1992). In a study of acquisitions of public targets, 
McLaughlin (1990) found that approximately 80 % of the fees in an average contract are 
contingent on the transaction to be completed. This means that advisors have a strong incentive 
for completing the deal (Rau, 2000), and contingent fees might actually expedite deal 
completion, according to some scholars (Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003).  
The Two Different Types of Company Sales 
Two different procedures can be applied when selling a company: one can either conduct an 
auction or a negotiated sale (Boone and Mulherin, 2007; Macey, 1990). An auction is in general 
defined as a market institution that incorporates a set of rules with the aim of allocating 
resources and prices based on bids from market participants (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). 
When applied in a company sale context, an auction means that the company for sale tries to 
generate bids from multiple prospective buyers with the aim of maximizing the price paid for 
the company (Boone and Mulherin, 2007). A negotiated sale, on the other hand, is a direct 
negotiation with one prospective buyer (Boone and Mulherin, 2007; Rosenbaum and Pearl, 
2009).  
The common understanding is that auctions lead to more competition, a higher valuation of the 
entity for sale, and thereby should be the preferred way of conducting a company sale (Boone 
and Mulherin, 2007; Macey, 1990). Moreover, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) develop a model 
that shows that an auction is always better than a negotiated sale if the auction is able to attract 
one additional bidder. However, in a study of 400 takeovers completed in the 1990s, Boone and 
Mulherin (2007) find that auctions and negotiated sales represent roughly half of the takeovers 
each. They also find that the wealth effects in a negotiated sale and an auction are comparable.  
This result may be surprising, but can be explained in different ways. Boone and Mulherin 
(2007) view the choice between auctions and negotiations as a trade-off between two different 
hypotheses: the agency cost hypothesis and the information costs hypothesis. The agency cost 
hypothesis states that an auction will generate higher revenues than a negotiated sale, and that 
shareholders will be suffering if an auction is not conducted. The information cost hypothesis, on 
the other hand, claims that conducting auctions is expensive, and that the cost of conducting the 
auction will determine what type of sale that is the most profitable. Hansen (2001) proposes 
that an auction generates a competitive information cost. This cost arises because prospective 
buyers need information to evaluate the entity for sale. Many of the potential buyers are possibly 
operating in the same industry as the auctioned company, and the information they gather as a 
part of the bidding process may also be used by the bidders in their roles as industry actors. This 
implies that releasing proprietary information may reduce the value of the entity for sale, 
because the new information can reduce the bargaining power of the target.  
The academic research on what actually happens in the sales process, be it auction or negotiated 
sale, is limited. Of course, the better merger and bargaining power hypotheses outlined in the 
literature review explains some of the advisor’s responsibilities, but a more detailed description 
is lacking. In contrast to the limited academic research on the company sales process, several 
practitioners have contributed in the field (e.g. Bruner, 2004; Frankel, 2005; Hansen, 2001; 
Hooke, 1997; Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2009).  
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With respect to auctions, Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009) model the process as consisting of the 
following stages: organization and preparation; first round; second round; negotiations; and 
closing.  
In the organization and preparation phase, the sell-side advisor gains an understanding of the 
seller’s objectives, performs a valuation, selects prospective buyers, and prepares marketing 
material such as a teaser and the confidential information memorandum. The first round is 
initiated when the advisor contacts potential buyers and distributes the teaser and a 
confidentiality agreement. The information memorandum is distributed upon signing of 
confidentiality agreements. Ultimately, initial bids are collected, and based on these some of the 
bidders are allowed to enter the second round. In the second round, site visits and management 
presentations are conducted, and selected buyers are granted access to the data room. 
Thereafter, the advisor drafts the definitive agreement and receives final bids based on this 
draft. The final bids are evaluated in the negotiation stage, and negotiations are initiated with 
the preferred buyer. This stage ends with board approval and signing of the definite agreement. 
Necessary public approvals are obtained in the closing phase.  
For a negotiated sale, Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009) claim that the process will follow roughly the 
same steps as an auction, but exclusively targeted towards a single buyer. A negotiated sale is 
likely to complete in a shorter time, because the prospective buyer often takes initiative to the 
deal, and therefore does not need to be educated on the industry and the target during the 
process. Nevertheless, the sell-side advisor needs to prepare some marketing material, 
coordinate management presentations, assemble material and provide access to the data room, 
and facilitate the negotiations.  
Theoretical Synthesis 
The literature review conducted confirms our claims given in the introduction: few studies look 
at the target’s choice of, and rationale for, hiring an advisor, and furthermore, no study looks 
specifically at these questions from a venture capital-backed company’s point of view. Therefore, 
based on the current literature on financial advisors, we have developed an initial framework to 
describe the process of hiring an advisor and the sales process that follows. This framework is 
shown in figure 1. 
The model departs from the question of whether or not the firm wants to engage an advisor. As 
described earlier, this is not a trivial choice. If the firm chooses to engage an advisor, some 
factors are found to affect the choice for the target firm, as seen in the second column of the 
model. Then the sale could take the form of an auction or negotiated sale, with their respective 
processes described in the model.  
This model is a general description of a target’s engagement of financial advisors as well as the 
actual sales process that follow. However, as suggested above, no scholars have explored these 
issues in the context of venture capital portfolio ventures that are up for sale. It is therefore 
highly interesting to explore whether the same rationale for hiring advisors is evident for 
venture capital-backed companies, if the same factors are emphasized when choosing a specific 
advisor, and if the actual sales process takes the same form as outlined above. In search for 
answers to these issues, we look to the empirical world. 
 
149 
 
 
Figure 1 - Overview of Sales Process 
R
at
io
n
al
e
fo
r 
En
ga
gi
n
g
A
d
vi
so
r
Fa
ct
o
rs
A
ff
ec
ti
n
g
th
e
C
h
o
ic
e
o
f
A
d
vi
so
r
A
u
ct
io
n
B
et
te
r 
M
er
ge
r
In
d
u
st
ry
 
E
xp
er
ti
se
B
ar
ga
in
in
g
Po
w
er
A
sy
m
m
et
ri
c
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
o
n
tr
a
ct
in
g
C
o
st
s
Fa
ir
n
es
s 
O
p
in
io
n
D
ea
lC
o
m
p
le
xi
ty
P
ri
o
r 
R
el
a
ti
o
n
R
el
a
ti
o
n
to
 
O
p
p
o
si
te
Pa
rt
y
C
lo
se
n
es
s
to
 
M
ai
n
 B
an
k
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d
 P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
Fi
rs
t R
o
u
n
d
Se
o
n
d
R
o
u
n
d
C
lo
si
n
g
N
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s
•
P
re
p
ar
e
M
ar
ke
ti
ng
 
M
at
er
ia
l
•
Se
le
ct
B
uy
er
U
ni
ve
rs
e
•
D
is
tr
ib
ut
e
M
ar
ke
ti
ng
 
M
at
er
ia
l
•
N
D
A
•
In
it
ia
l B
id
s
•
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
s
•
D
at
a 
R
oo
m
•
Fi
na
l B
id
s
•
Se
le
ct
W
in
ni
ng
B
id
de
r
•
N
eg
ot
ia
te
w
it
h
W
in
ni
ng
B
id
de
r
•
O
bt
ai
n
N
ec
es
sa
ry
A
pp
ro
va
ls
N
eg
o
ti
at
ed
Sa
le
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d
 P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
Fa
ci
lit
at
io
n
C
lo
si
n
g
N
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s
•
Pr
ep
ar
e
M
ar
ke
ti
ng
 
M
at
er
ia
l
•
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
s
•
D
at
a 
R
o
o
m
•
N
e
g
o
ti
a
te
w
it
h
B
id
d
e
r
•
O
bt
ai
n
N
ec
es
sa
ry
A
p
p
ro
va
ls
Si
ze
o
fT
a
rg
et
t
150 
 
Methodology 
The research design utilized in this study is a multiple-case, inductive study involving 19 
venture-backed trade sale exit processes. Multiple cases allow for replication logic, where each 
case can be looked upon as an experiment. Inferences drawn from one experiment serves to 
confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others (Yin, 1994). Multiple-case studies 
therefore allow for more generalizable and better grounded results than those of single-case 
studies.   
Research setting  
We chose venture capital trade sale exit processes as our research setting due to the limited 
research on the target’s choice of advisors, both in M&A transactions in general and in venture 
capital trade sales in particular. Further, trade sale exit processes are an intrinsic part of the 
venture capital business model. With trade sales by far being the most common exit vehicle, 
their success to a large part dictates the success of the venture capital industry as a whole. 
However, this practical significance of the process is not reflected in the current venture capital 
research, where trade sale exit processes are still somewhat of a black box. Taking the first steps 
towards opening that box was a major motivation for the chosen research setting.  
The fact that very little research has been done on venture capital trade sale exit processes 
motivated us to make this an inductive study. The choice of financial advisors in this setting has 
in fact never been explored before, and is therefore poorly understood. Quantitative research 
strategies would not be able to offer the same insights into the process as rich, qualitative data 
would. Further, trade sale exits are laden with sensitive issues. Interviews performed under the 
promise of confidentiality were viewed as the best method for gaining access to rich data.  
Sampling 
The cases included were based on a strategic sampling of completed trade sale exit processes. In 
total, we sampled 19 different cases. Several of the cases were identified as interesting by the 
researchers prior to initiating contact with the informants. As we immersed ourselves in the 
venture capital community, we were also introduced to several cases included in the sample by 
actors lending a helping hand. Given the fact that we were seeking to understand the entire sales 
process, we sampled only cases in which the trade sale had been completed. As an added bonus, 
this reliance on retrospective data increased the efficiency of data collection, allowing for the 
inclusion of more cases in the study.  
We sampled firms from various industries. Further, trade sales completed by both Norwegian 
and U.S. VCs and entrepreneurs were included in the sample. By including various industries and 
different geographical regions in our sample, the generalizability of our results should improve. 
Seven of the 19 cases included in the sample are trade sales exits performed by U.S. VCs, while 
the remaining twelve were performed by Norwegian VCs. Moreover, 15 out of 19 companies 
engaged an advisor to help with the sales process. Five of the cases took the form of a negotiated 
sale, while the remaining 14 were auctions. 
Table 1 below gives an overview of the cases in the sample, the type of advisor engaged, and the 
sales type. The advisors are grouped in three different clusters according to their characteristics: 
Investment Bank, Boutique M&A Firm, and Consultant. An Investment Bank is a bank that 
performs a broad range of financial services, such as M&A advisory, underwriting and stock 
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research and trading. These firms often have offices in several countries. A Boutique M&A Firm, 
on the other hand, only offers M&A related services, and often specializes in certain geographical 
areas and industries. A Consultant is an individual hired on a fixed fee. As seen from table 1, 
seven companies engaged an Investment Bank; six engaged a Boutique M&A firm; while two of 
the firms used a Consultant. 
Table 1 - Overview of Cases 
Case Industry 
Type of 
Advisor 
Type of Sale Acquired Informants 
Avalanche Cable 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 2006 VC 
Blackhawk Sensors 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 1998 CEO 
Bruin Electronics 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 2006 VC, CEO 
Canuck 
Networking 
hardware 
No advisor Negotiated Sale 2005 VC 
Coyote Electronics 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 2007 2 VCs, CEO 
Flame 
Networking 
hardware 
No advisor Auction 1996 VC 
Flyer Software No advisor Negotiated Sale 2007 2 VCs 
Hurricane Energy 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 2007 VC 
Islander Oil service 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction (terminated), 
then Negotiated Sale 
2007 CEO 
Lightning Software 
Investment 
Bank 
Negotiated Sale 2010 VC 
Oiler Wireless 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 2006 CEO 
Panther Energy 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 2007 VC 
Penguin Software 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction (terminated), 
then Negotiated Sale 
2009 CEO 
Ranger Oil service No advisor Negotiated Sale 2008 VC 
Sabre 
Networking 
hardware 
Consultant Auction 1999 VC 
Senator Electronics 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 2011 VC 
Shark Telecom 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 2010 VC 
Star Telecom 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 2006 VC 
Thrasher Healthcare Consultant Negotiated Sale 2011 VC 
 
The trade sales included in this study were completed between 1996 and 2011. This time period 
experienced very different market circumstances, from the hot market of the late 1990’s to the 
financial crisis in the late 2000’s and the depression that followed. As such, the rationale for, and 
the opportunities to complete, trade sale exits for VCs have varied considerably over the time 
152 
 
period covered. While it was relatively easy to launch an IPO in the U.S. in the late 1990’s, it was 
next to impossible in 2008. This variance allowed for controlling for the influence of market 
circumstances. The cost, of course, was the possibility of informants not remembering events 
accurately anymore.  
Data Sources 
The study is based on several data sources: (1) qualitative data from semi-structured interviews 
with VCs and/or entrepreneurs, (2) e-mails to follow up interviews and ensure that we 
understood the accounts given correctly, and (3) archival data, including press clippings, 
company web sites and discussion forums.  
We started with pilot interviews with informants who had considerable practical experience 
with trade sale exit processes, as well as academics with significant experience from the field of 
venture capital research. These interviews helped us form the two distinct interview guides to 
be used in VC and entrepreneur interviews respectively. In addition, it made sure that we as 
interviewers were well prepared before entering the next phase of the study.  
We conducted 21 interviews with our key informants. Both VCs and entrepreneurs were 
interviewed in order to ensure that we were getting both sides of the story, and help mitigate 
subject biases (Golden, 1992; Miller et al., 1997). Utilizing multiple informants and seeing the 
picture painted by both ends of the dyad, also helps build a richer and more elaborated model 
(Schwenk, 1985).  
The interviews varied in length from 30 to 70 minutes, and followed the aforementioned 
interview guides. The interviews followed a “courtroom” procedure, with the interviewers 
emphasizing the need to focus on facts and events rather than on interpretations (Eisenhardt, 
1989). We always began the interviews by asking the respondents to recount the story of why 
they invested/sought investment, followed by a short recap of what developments took place 
within the portfolio company up until the actual exit process was initiated. Seeing that we were 
seeking retrospective reports, such open-ended questioning should lead to higher accuracy in 
our data (Lipton, 1977; Miller et al., 1997).  
All of the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim, totaling 197 pages of single-
spaced transcriptions. As mentioned, we followed up the interviews with e-mails asking 
clarifying questions on an as-needed basis. Interviews with Norwegian informants were 
conducted in Norwegian, and translated into English by the authors. We strived to ensure that 
nothing was lost in translation. 
When possible, we took steps to minimize informant biases. We interviewed both entrepreneurs 
and VCs. Thus, one would expect significant differences in their accounts of the events should 
retrospective bias be an issue (Seidler, 1974). We found no such difference. In addition, we 
always held the data provided in the interviews up against the archival data collected from 
secondary sources, in order to ensure that we were not suffering from being fed biased 
information.  
Our informants were all highly knowledgeable and influential with regards to the exit process. 
Such informants are the most reliable (Seidler, 1974; Kumar et al., 1993; Huber and Power, 
1985). Further, we emphasized during the interviews that we were interested in case-specific 
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facts and events. Thus, the information provided is less likely to be subject to cognitive biases 
and impression management (Huber and Power, 1985; Golden, 1992; Miller et al., 1997). Finally, 
the trade sale exit process is highly sensitive, both on a personal level and business wise. We 
therefore promised confidentiality to our informants, in order to further motivate for the 
provision of accurate data (Huber and Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997). 
Data Analysis 
Based on the triangulation of data from our different sources, rich and reliable mini-cases of 
each of the trade sale exits could be built (Jick, 1979). Thereafter, within-case and cross-case 
analyses were performed. The analysis started by looking closer at each case on a stand-alone 
basis. In the spirit of the inductive process, this analysis allowed for the emergence of constructs 
and relationships, and was not guided by specific hypotheses. 
Following the stand-alone analysis of all cases, cross-case analysis was performed. Replication 
logic allowed for the confirming and disconfirming of tentative constructs and propositions. This 
process was highly iterative, with the researchers stepping back and forth between data and 
analysis. Further, a significant amount of time was set aside for discussion both within the team 
and with external researchers in order to ensure the validity of the emergent constructs.  
Finally, as the findings from the study were ready for presentation, a sanity check was 
performed. All informants were contacted and asked to correct any final misunderstandings, as 
well as perform a citation check. In addition, they were given the chance to comment on the 
framework put forward and the logic behind our argumentation, in order to ensure a close 
connection between our results and the world as it is perceived by the practitioners. 
Limitations 
This study is based on a strategic sampling of completed trade sale exit processes. As such, the 
results are not statistically representative. The cases included took place over a long period of 
time. While this helped control for market circumstances, it does mean that the informants from 
the oldest cases may have remembered events inaccurately. Similarly, only two of our cases have 
both the VC and the entrepreneur as informants. Although we took steps to minimize informant 
biases, we cannot be sure that the information provided is how other stakeholders in the 
process experienced it. Bias and partial information may have affected our data. Interview data 
was triangulated with data from other sources in order to minimize the effect of this potential 
problem.     
Findings 
In this section, findings from the study will be presented. The findings are divided with respect 
to the two research questions: the rationale for hiring a financial advisor, and the factors 
determining the choice of a specific financial advisor.  
Rationale for Hiring a Financial Advisor 
As seen in the literature review, the decision to employ an advisor is not trivial. Some scholars 
claim that an advisor is almost always used (Kesner et al., 1994), while others find that a 
financial advisor is not that common in M&A transactions (Forte et al., 2010; Thomas, 1995). 
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This leads us to the first research question in this paper: What motivates a venture-backed 
company to hire an advisor?  
Six different motivations became apparent when analyzing the data: Shield the Portfolio 
Company and VCs, Bad Cop, Valuation Assessment, Signal of Credibility, Create and Facilitate  an 
Auction, and Facilitate Negotiation. Appendix 1 shows what kind of advisor the case companies 
hired, the kind of sale conducted, and the rationale behind the engagement of the advisor used 
for all the cases. The factors are elaborated on below.  
Shield Portfolio Company and VCs 
A factor put forward by several of the interviewees was that having an advisor lets the 
management of the company focus more on the day-to-day operations and the investors focus 
more on their primary activities. Entrepreneurial ventures are resource constrained, and may 
not have the necessary skills or human resources to conduct such a process without 
downgrading its focus on other parts of the business. For example, the Bruin VC thinks that their 
and the advisor’s effort made it easier for the management to focus on the operation of the 
company. This was regarded as important, because the exit process took nine months from 
initiation to closing.  
Knowing that a VC in average manages eight investments and is represented on five company 
boards simultaneously (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989), it is clear that an advisor can unburden the 
VC. This is mentioned by the Hurricane VC, stating the following:  
There is a lot of work to be done: You are going to create a presentation, put up a data 
room, do a vendor due diligence, and we are not expected to do this. We are on the board 
of these companies, and this is not a board job.  
Accordingly, the Hurricane VC decided to engage an investment banker to help facilitate the 
trade sale.  
Bad Cop 
The role as a VC involves investing in and, hopefully, divesting numerous entrepreneurial 
ventures. A venture capital firm (VCF) often specializes in certain industries, which means that it 
will interact regularly with actors in these industries, including in sales processes. An advisor 
can therefore help maximize the sales price by being aggressive in the negotiations, while at the 
same time retaining a good relation between the VCF and the industry actors, who could be 
possible buyers for later portfolio companies. This is a factor presented by one of our 
informants:  
In our experience, it is preferable [to engage an advisor], because … we don’t want to 
destroy the relation to a possible buyer, we talk with these guys continuously, and a 
financial advisor can be somewhat more aggressive when approaching possible bidders 
(Hurricane VC).  
The same point can be made with respect to the management of the portfolio company for sale. 
The CEO and founder of Bruin puts it like this:  
… when we started the negotiations, the advisor took the role as ‘bad cops’, which was a 
good thing. … The advisor had the lead role in the negotiations. This was a conscious 
choice, because if the transaction closed, I was going to work for the acquirer. It was 
better to take a back seat role than being the bad guy.  
155 
 
The Sabre VC also appreciates this role of an advisor, shown by this quote:  
… when we or the intermediary had to play hardball with the potential acquirer. … If you 
put the acquire in that situation, they’re now arguing with their future boss. … So, for me, 
the value of having an intermediary for that purpose was tremendous.   
If a member of the management team is to facilitate the sales process, this can, as shown by the 
quotes above, create a conflict of interests. Is the manager going to act in the interests of his 
present or future principals? If he bargains aggressively, he will act in the interest of his current 
principals, but possibly create a bad relation with his future superiors. In the opposite case, if he 
lets the acquirer get most of the transaction proceeds, he will hurt his current principals (and his 
own wealth, assuming he is incentivized by stock), but act in the interest of his future superiors. 
In either case, having the advisor play the role of bad cop might help to solve the potential 
conflict of interest. 
Valuation Assessment 
It is not unlikely for the owners of a venture-backed entrepreneurial company to have different 
views on the timing and terms of a trade sale. A motivation for hiring an advisor may then be to 
perform an objective valuation of the entity for sale. If such a valuation shows that the price one 
can obtain from a sale is fair compared to the alternative of continued funding, it can create 
more alignment between the owners. This issue is put forward by the Oiler CEO: 
… [when] we first had a company make an offer to buy us, there was at least one investor 
who thought it was a bit premature to be selling. And so he was hopeful to get an outside 
banker's perspective on the market, and what people were paying, and what this 
company might be worth X years later as an IPO versus what we might be able to sell for 
today. 
In the case of Lightning, the valuation assessment was more to explore if the offer received was 
reasonable, than it was to align the views between different shareholders: “We engaged an 
advisor in order to look at the offer; is this reasonable? Is it realistic to get a higher offer?” 
(Lightning VC). When the third-party concluded that the offer was fair, the VCs decided they 
wanted to move forward with the bidder.  
Signal of Credibility 
Another factor that emerged from the data was that an advisor can be a signal of credibility to 
potential buyers. An advisor in general, and more specifically a well-known and respected 
advisor, can show prospective buyers that the company is serious about selling, and can also 
help reduce the contracting costs between the parties (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
As one of the interviewees formulates it: “…he [the advisor] was well respected by the acquirers 
too. He didn't come in with less attractive or challenged companies, he came in with good stuff” 
(Avalanche VC). This advisor clearly reduced the contracting costs in the Avalanche trade sale 
exit.  
When the portfolio company in the Sabre case was approached by a potential acquirer from 
another continent, the founders were becoming increasingly concerned about the consequences 
a sale would have, something the acquirer noticed. This led the Sabre VC to engage an advisor:  
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And so having him [the advisor] get involved was a signal to the potential buyer that we 
were serious about selling – at which they weren’t sure of, because of the way the 
founders were reacting. And, so we sent a clear signal that we wanted to sell the 
company. We also sent a very clear signal that we weren’t going to give the company 
away. 
As the quote shows, the engagement of an advisor created an image of credibility towards the 
potential acquirer, which in turn made the relation between the parties more professional.  
The two final factors found is related to the two different types of a company sale: auction and 
negotiated sale. As revealed in the literature review, these two distinct types of sales put 
different demands on the company for sale. This is also evident in the empirical findings, where 
an advisor performs different tasks dependent on the sales type.  
Create and Facilitate an Auction 
As many as 13 of the interviewees emphasize the role a financial advisor plays in an auction as 
an important rationale for hiring such an advisor. An example of this can be found in the Bruin 
case: “We engaged a team, a small company, … specialized in M&A, in order to create some 
competition for our case” (Bruin CEO/founder). For the Oiler CEO, this was also the rationale for 
hiring an advisor: “… we thought that maybe an intermediary might be able to bring some 
different potential buyers to the table, that we might not have relationships with.” 
However, the advisor is not always able to get new people to the table, which was the case in the 
Oiler exit process: “That [bringing new people to the table], unfortunately, turned out not to be 
the case. Everybody who came to the table were people we already knew and had relationships 
with.” (Oiler CEO). This led him to terminate the relationship with the advisor, and facilitate the 
remaining part of the process internally. And, related to this point, the advisor might get new 
people to the table, but not the right ones. In the Penguin case, in-depth presentations were held 
with several players where the contact was initiated by the advisor, but in the end, the company 
was sold to an actor that was not contacted by the banker, not even in the initial phase.   
In addition to identifying and getting potential acquirers to the table, an advisor can help with 
facilitation of the auction and negotiations. Financial advisors are deal savvy, and are specialized 
in performing such processes, something that our informants appreciate. 
Another evident finding on auctions from the empirical data is that the actual process is in line 
with the process described in the theoretical background in section II. The Coyote VC describes 
the auction process in this way: “It is teaser, NDA [Non-Disclosure Agreement], IM [Information 
Memorandum], bid; then management presentations, due diligence, and final bid.” Evidence 
from several of the other cases also supports this finding.  
Facilitate Negotiated Sales 
The VCs who were involved in negotiated sales and at the same time hired a financial advisor 
had the same rationale for this: namely to have a third-party facilitate the negotiation. As one of 
them stated: “So we hired him as an advisor and consultant, to help us shape [the deal] and 
negotiate for us, essentially” (Thrasher VC). The Lightning VC emphasizes the attention to detail 
and experience when explaining his motivation for hiring an advisor: “[They are helpful] to get 
things in place, and as a matter of fact, the devil is in the details. They have a lot of experience in 
these processes, and are able to unburden [us].” Again, this confirms the findings from the 
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auction process: advisors can clearly be of assistance during negotiations and in the process of 
closing a deal. 
Reasons for Not Hiring an Advisor 
As mentioned in the methodology section, four out of the 19 companies covered did not engage 
an advisor. In order to give a more balanced view of the decision to hire an advisor, we will 
present these companies’ view on this decision. When analyzing these four cases, three different 
factors emerged from the data. Appendix 2 gives an overview of these factors. The factors are 
elaborated on below. 
Company/VC Knows Buyer Universe and has Relevant Relations  
As described in the literature review, one rationale for hiring an advisor is described as the 
better merger hypothesis. This hypothesis states that advisors are superior at matching buyers 
and targets, something the Canuck VC does not believe in. Instead, he proposes that the VC or the 
company itself should be superior to the advisor in identifying potential buyers: “So, we didn’t 
need a banker or someone to say: ‘Oh, did you think of these people?’, because it’s unlikely that a 
banker would know more about our business than we do.” If this holds true, the motivation for 
hiring an advisor should diminish.  
As an extension of this issue, advisors often have a network with specific players, a factor 
presented earlier as a motivation for hiring an advisor. However, if the portfolio company or the 
VCs have this network themselves, this motivation perishes. This was the case in Ranger: “We 
pay for the relations, but in this case, we had these ourselves” (Ranger VC).  
No Time to Get Advisor up to Speed 
M&A transactions are time- and energy-consuming, and it is regarded as important to complete 
the transaction in as short a time period as possible. This was determining for the Flame VC 
when evaluating whether to hire an advisor or not:  
… we talked about hiring an investment banker, and decided we didn't have time, and it 
would take too long to get them up to speed. If there was going to be an auction, we could 
probably make it happen ourselves, because we decided this was happening too fast for 
us to go to brand new people. It had to be people we already had some relationship with. 
Not the Right Time for Exit 
At the time when the Flame portfolio company got an unsolicited bid, the company was 
considered to be two to three years away from an exit by its investors. This led the investors to 
have an agnostic view on whether to sell the company or not. If the price was right, they would 
sell, but if not they would continue funding the company. In addition, the chairman of the board 
in the Flame case had previously been an investment banker, and was able to facilitate the 
negotiations. Therefore, the investors found it unnecessary to engage an advisor.  
Factors Affecting the Choice of Advisors 
In this section, we will present findings from our study to shed light on the second research 
question presented in the introduction: What factors determine the choice of a specific financial 
advisor? Based on the data from the cases investigated, eight factors emerged. These eight 
factors were: Industry Experience, Size of Advisory Firm, Prior Relations and Referrals, 
Ambitions, Terms, Human Fit, Team, Network and Geographical Coverage. Appendix 3 presents 
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the factors influencing the choice of advisor in each case. In the following paragraphs we will 
show how these factors are applied in the different cases.  
Industry Experience 
As industry experience is mentioned as an important decision criteria in the literature (Chang et 
al., 2010), it may not be that surprising that this factor is the most frequently mentioned among 
the interviewees. In fact, it is mentioned in some way by all but one of the interviewees that 
represented firms who engaged an advisor. For the Avalanche VC, industry experience was the 
first priority when he was choosing an advisor: “Because he knew this segment very well. … He 
was just that banker for this market segment.” A similar point is made by the Senator VC: “One of 
the reasons we hired them was that one of the guys had first-hand experience from the industry. 
So he knew the industry intimately.”  
It should therefore be beyond doubt that industry experience is likely to increase an advisor’s 
chances of being chosen. On the other hand, lacking knowledge of the industry can disqualify an 
advisor from being engaged. In the words of one of our informants: “If you don’t know anything 
about the product, about the market, about potential acquirers or customers, you are not 
chosen” (Hurricane VC).  
Size of Advisory Firm 
The size of advisory firm versus the size of the transaction is clearly a priority for many 
entrepreneurial ventures when selecting an advisor. Many of the large investment banks, both 
internationally and nationally, aim at facilitating transactions that are considerably larger than a 
typical trade sale of a venture-backed company. If such a company undertakes a venture capital-
backed trade sale, and then receives a deal proposal from a large company whom it does, or 
wants to do, continuing business with, the venture capital deal may lose attention.  
The Hurricane VC, who actually employed a larger investment bank, suffered from this problem: 
“They were of course very skilled, but there was a problem with lack of attention due to other 
deals. As a matter of fact, we have not used this advisor in any following transactions.” 
Due to this issue, a segment of smaller M&A boutiques has emerged as viable candidates for 
advising venture-backed trade sales. These firms often specialize in a few industries, and target 
deals that are more in line with the value in a typical venture capital transaction.  
One of the Coyote VCs has made attention one of his top priorities when choosing advisor after 
experiencing a similar problem as the Hurricane VC:  
If you hire one of the big investment banks, and one of the large companies are going to 
conduct an acquisition or a secondary offering, the whole team will prioritize that deal. 
This is a very unfortunate situation, and we have learned this lesson the hard way.  
In the case of Coyote, an M&A boutique firm was hired partly because this firm was going to give 
the deal their top priority.  
Prior Relations and Referrals 
A prior relationship between the advisor and the investors is likely to have a positive influence 
on choosing that advisor. “Our relation with them was great, and we saw that this portfolio 
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company was even more suited for the advisor [than the previous company sold with the help of 
this advisor],” the Bruin VC states. Prior relations were also an important factor for the 
Avalanche VC: “I had done prior business with him, both of … [the VCFs] … had done prior 
business with him, and the guy also knew the team.” For the entrepreneur and CEO in the 
Islander case, investor relations is the only factor he puts forward when explaining the choice of 
advisor: “The venture guys had previous relations. The world, especially in Norway, is small, so 
relations to, and knowledge of, actors are very important.”  
The person or company chosen to represent the firm in a sales process does not necessarily 
need to have represented the company in such a process before. As the Sabre VC explains, they 
used an executive from a company that was previously in the VC’s portfolio: “The intermediary 
we used was actually an individual who had been a successful CFO in one of our portfolio 
companies.”  
References from actors in the VCs’ network are also found to be a relevant factor in the choice of 
advisor. The Star VC chose the advisor based on an introduction from his network. This 
relationship worked out well, and the Star VC has used the same advisor in later trade sales as 
well. The Penguin case gives another example of a referral influencing the choice of advisor: “Our 
chairman of the board [not a VC] had done business with this firm before, he knew them well, 
and knew that they were thorough and detail-oriented” (Penguin CEO).   
Ambitions 
Ambitions are clearly important when selecting an advisor. When an advisor is invited to pitch 
for a sale, it is expected to present a preliminary valuation. In order to maximize the effort made 
by advisors, some case companies have tied the compensation to this indicative valuation, for 
instance by offering the advisor a compensation package based on a sliding percentage scale. 
The Hurricane VC used this method:  
You are to a large degree able to find out what they [the advisors] think about the value 
by creating incentive structures. For instance, a deal that we did recently, was structured 
in the following way: one per cent of the value when the deal is under 100 million USD 
and two per cent of the deal value over 100 million USD. That means that it isn’t really 
working out for the advisor before the sales value exceeds 150 million USD. If one 
potential advisor then says: ‘In this case we need four per cent of the deal value,’ you 
know that their ambitions are not that high. … And if your ambitions are low, you don’t 
win the tender offer as an advisor. 
However, according to the Blackhawk CEO, too high ambitions might in fact be interpreted as 
unrealistic by the principal. He invited three advisors to pitch for the assignment, one of whom 
they knew from before: “Interestingly enough, in the case of both of the others, we felt that they 
were being unrealistic, and trying to convince us that they’d get a really high number which we 
really didn’t think was feasible” (Blackhawk CEO). This was one of the reasons that these two 
banks were not chosen for the assignment.  
Terms 
In addition to ambitions, the cost of engaging an advisor is relevant, as shown by one of the 
Coyote VCs, who explicitly states that he always looks at the price before choosing his agent. The 
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cost was also relevant for the Blackhawk CEO, who managed to cut the deal cost by 75 % after 
bargaining with the preferred advisor. This was made possible because he already had identified 
the most likely buyers, and gotten these interested:  
So we approached them [the advisor] and said: ‘We do like you guys, but we are also not 
prepared to pay your normal fee, because we have pretty much done most of your work 
for you.’ So we ended up paying them a fee that was approximately 25 % of what they 
normally would get for a transaction like ours. In addition, we offered a success fee on 
the upside, which wasn’t earned (Blackhawk CEO).  
Although not disclosed in every case, it appears that contingent fees are widely used in the 
contracts between venture capital-backed companies and their advisors. In line with the 
theoretical proposal, a percentage of the deal value (constant or sliding) in addition to a 
(possible) fixed fee is the conventional incentive structure. The amount received by the advisor 
in each case was not disclosed during the interviews, and will therefore not be discussed.  
Human Fit 
As simple a thing as the personal fit between the principal and advisor can be determining for 
the choice. This is emphasized by the Lightning and Panther VCs as well as the Blackhawk CEO: 
“Both me and the VP of Finance liked this boutique investment banking firm, who we had kind of 
known before” (Blackhawk CEO).  
The Coyote VC thinks that the personal relation between investors, management and advisor 
was an important success factor for the transaction outcome: “I believe that one of the reasons 
why the exit was so successful was that we engaged a competent advisor, who was skilled and 
worked well with the company, board, and us as investors.” 
Team 
The actual team assigned by the advisor for the engagement is viewed as important by certain 
VCs. The VC in the Shark case views this as especially important, as shown by the following 
quote: “They [the advisor] were chosen due to their competence, … and their resources. And, in 
addition, which individuals they were going to assign to the engagement.” Other informants also 
appreciate an experienced and knowledgeable team:  
If you show up [at the pitch] with two juniors that do not know anything about the 
product or the market, and deliver an average presentation, you know that these guys 
have not worked much on this (Hurricane VC).  
Network and Geographical Coverage  
An advisor might have a special relation to one or several prospective buyers. Such a relation is 
appreciated by target firms. With respect to the Thrasher case, a potential strategic buyer was 
contacted by the VC before the investment was made, in order to evaluate the acquiring interest. 
The potential acquirer confirmed its interest, and a year after the investment, the buyer 
approached the Thrasher VCF with an intention of acquiring the company. The Thrasher VCF 
then engaged an advisor that was closely related to the buyer. As the Thrasher VC notes:  
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The advisor actually used to work for the strategic buyer. So he knew the company 
intimately that was going to be purchasing us. He knew what they were looking for, and 
the way they were going to structure the deal. So we hired him as an advisor and 
consultant, to help us shape [the deal] and negotiate for us, essentially. 
The Thrasher VC believes that the choice of advisor was important for the outcome:  
Having known what the acquirers were looking for, and how they negotiate, it helped us 
to be able to go in and talk to the right people, and also go in with the right terms. And to 
focus on the right terms. 
A similar point is made by the Blackhawk CEO. Some years before the actual acquisition 
happened, a boutique M&A firm had tried to acquire the Blackhawk portfolio company, working 
for European companies. This fact led to engaging this particular firm: “[We believed that] their 
contacts in Europe would be the right kinds of people to get involved in the bidding. In fact they 
were trying to acquire us in the past, so we invited them in to make a proposal” (Blackhawk 
CEO).  
In addition to having ties to particular prospective buyers, geographical scope can be a point of 
differentiation for an advisor. As mentioned by one of the interviewees: “Most of the time, we 
use international bankers that specialize in working with relatively small companies, in a 
European context.” (Senator VC).  
In the Penguin case, its subsidiary located abroad was the most prospering. This led to choosing 
a foreign firm as advisor, the rationale being that the interest in the subsidiary’s market was 
larger than in other countries. However, being especially focused on a single market can lead to 
excluding more likely buyers from other countries. Exactly this was the case in the Penguin trade 
sale, where the actual buyer turned out to be Norwegian. Nevertheless, this buyer was not 
contacted by the advisor during the process. In the words of the Penguin VC: “The focus on a sale 
to a Norwegian entity, and finding a potential acquirer or investor in Norway, was lacking.” In 
fact, the sale was initiated by a random meeting between one of the VCs and the chairman of the 
acquiring company, not by the advisor.  
We sum up this section by giving an overview of all the categories and cases. Table 2 shows the 
factors emphasized by the companies that hired an advisor.  
162 
 
Table 2 - Factors Affecting the Choice of Advisor 
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Ambitions  X   X          
Terms  X  X           
Human Fit  X X    X X       
Team    X X   X    X   
Network  X       X  X X  X 
Analysis and Discussion 
In this section, we will address the two research questions individually, before we integrate the 
findings in a new framework that describes the advisor rationale and choice in venture capital 
trade sales. 
Addressing Research Question 1: Rationale for Hiring an Advisor 
When comparing the theoretical framework with the empirical data, a number of interesting 
insights can be drawn. The first insight is that the bargaining power hypothesis is supported by 
our data. Many informants appreciate the advisor’s ability to create competition for the target, 
and this is the informants’ main motivation for hiring an advisor when performing an auction. 
According to conventional competition theory, multiple buyers will increase the bargaining 
power of the seller, and thereby increase the sales price of the target.  
Furthermore, the advisor’s negotiation skills are perceived as valuable in a sales process, both 
when conducting an auction and facilitating a sale, a result clearly in line with the bargaining 
power hypothesis. The bad cop factor found is related to this issue: It is shown in several cases 
that the banker can extract the best possible terms, and at the same time avoid hurting the 
relation between the VC and the buyer. The life as a VC is a multi-round game when it comes to 
both investing and divesting, and to be on good terms with prospective partners or bidders for 
later portfolio companies is regarded as important.  
Regarding the better merger hypothesis, our results are mixed. Only one VC mentioned that the 
advisor was able to find a buyer that was not on the radar and represented a special strategic fit. 
Several of the VCs did not think that the advisor had been able to create better mergers. Some 
cases show that although the advisor has been able to create competition by bringing more 
bidders to the table, they have not been able to attract the buyer that represented the largest 
strategic fit, the Penguin case being the most evident example. A possible explanation can be that 
VCs are industry specific (De Clercq et al., 2006; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984). When doing deals in a specific domain, one gets to know the industry players and the 
dynamics of the industry. Thereby, a VC can be able to understand which companies that offer 
the best strategic fit for the portfolio company. 
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A couple of the informants hired an advisor to perform a valuation assessment, or a fairness 
opinion, as it is denoted in the literature. This finding confirms the suggestion offered by the 
literature; advisors may be engaged to perform an objective, third-party evaluation of the 
transaction.  
Signaling credibility was also an explanation for why one was going to hire an advisor. The 
advisor will by involving himself in the transaction put his reputation at stake, and can thereby 
reduce the contracting costs between the parties. The contracting costs rationale is therefore 
supported by the data. 
None of the informants mentioned explicitly the fact that an advisor might reduce the 
information asymmetry between the parties in a transaction. At first glance, this is somewhat 
surprising, because the information asymmetry is assumed to be larger when one of the parties 
is an entrepreneurial venture (Gompers and Xuan, 2009; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2007). However, 
as the sales process is described by the informants, the advisor creates and distributes teasers, 
information memorandums and data rooms, all elements that are supposed to reduce the 
information asymmetry between the parties. So, reduction of information asymmetry is clearly 
an important issue, and the data suggests that the advisor is hired to perform tasks that lead to 
reduction in the information asymmetry.  
This leads us to another point put forward by the interviewees, namely to hire an advisor to do 
the job that is needed to complete a transaction: create marketing material, set up an auction (if 
relevant), and facilitate the negotiations and closing. As mentioned, entrepreneurial ventures are 
particularly resource-constrained, while VCs are notoriously in lack of time, so performing these 
tasks themselves could prevent them from doing more critical tasks. This is a point not 
mentioned by the literature to date. A possible explanation is that since the focus in the 
academic research has been on large and publicly traded companies, these companies are not as 
resource-constrained as an entrepreneurial venture. Therefore, they have the resources to 
perform these tasks internally without sacrificing other pressing issues.  
Based on these similarities and differences between the literature and data, figure 2 gives an 
overview of the factors found to important from the literature review conducted in section II, as 
well as an updated figure showing factors found to be important from our data. The left column 
in the figure shows the factors found in the literature, while the right column is a framework 
developed for the venture capital trade sale exit perspective. 
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Figure 2 - Rationales for Hiring a Financial Advisor 
As seen from this comparison, many of the factors are found to be valid both in the general case 
and in the trade sale exit process. We found no indication of deal complexity and size of the 
target affecting the decision to hire an advisor. At the same time, the shielding of the portfolio 
company and VCs was not put forward by the general literature, as discussed above. 
Addressing Research Question 2: Factors Influencing the Choice of Advisor 
The need for an advisor to be experienced and skilled in the target’s industry is the factor put 
forward by most informants, and in line with the findings from Chang et al. (2010). In reality, 
this should go without saying: If one is to sell a company, it is clearly helpful to know the 
industry, the actors and the dynamics in the competitive environment.   
Another finding that supports previous research is that prior relations enhance the possibility of 
being chosen. According to social embeddedness theory, this should come as no surprise, 
because a direct relation with an actor is preferred over information about this actor being 
reliable (Granovetter, 1985). Social relations in general play an important role in the venture 
capital industry, since the industry actors are tightly knit together in a network (Black and 
Gilson, 1998; Hochberg et al., 2007; Sahlman, 1990). A further confirmation of this is the use of 
references in the decision making among our informants.  
Only one of the informants mentioned relations to the opposite party as a determining factor, a 
factor that was suggested as important from the literature. However, a closely related point is 
made by several others, namely that the advisor had done business with specific actors that 
were found to be highly interesting acquirers.  
The closeness to the main bank is not mentioned by any of the interviewees. Venture capital-
backed companies’ capital structure consists mainly of equity, partly because lenders view such 
ventures as too risky. This means that the relation between the venture and its main bank is 
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more peripheral than between the bank and a company that has taken on more debt, a possible 
explanation for this factor not being mentioned in the data. 
In addition to those factors already found in the previous academic research, five new factors 
emerged from our data. The size of advisory firm was put forward as an issue by several 
informants, since large banks are considered as more likely to not pay enough attention to a 
typical venture capital trade sale. Related to this point, the team assigned is an important 
parameter when deciding whether or not to hire an advisor. This shows that VCs are very 
concerned with the commitment of the advisor. Moreover, the economic aspects of the 
relationship were found to be important. Both the terms offered, and the ambitions shown, could 
influence the choice. Finally, the personal relations between the VC, portfolio company, and the 
advisor were found to affect the choice. 
The total of eight factors found in the data can be further grouped in two more abstract 
categories: advisor characteristics and network factors. Advisor characteristics are factors 
related to size and knowledge of the advisor, while network factors are categories that grasp the 
relational capabilities of the advisor. These categories are of course not independent. For 
instance, industry experience gained from doing numerous deals in a specific industry will of 
course extend this advisors’ network, and maybe also give rise to a direct relation between the 
advisor itself and the VCs or management affiliated with the company that is going to be sold. 
Further, the size of the advisor may affect its geographical coverage, with larger banks probably 
covering greater areas than boutique firms. However, these two categories represent a natural 
distinction and abstraction. 
Based on this comparison between the literature and data, figure 3 presents the factors found to 
influence the choice of advisors in venture capital-backed trade sales. The figure is separated in 
two columns, with the left column showing factors found to be important in the literature, and 
the right column showing the revised model for venture capital trade sales based on our data.  
 
Figure 3 - Factors Affecting the Choice of a Financial Advisor 
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A Refined Theoretical Framework 
After analyzing the findings in this study, it is clear that the theoretical framework developed in 
section II can be refined to be more suited to venture capital trade sales. The said framework 
consisted of three parts: the rationale for hiring an advisor, factors influencing the choice of a 
specific advisor and the roles played by an advisor in the sales process. As seen when addressing 
the two research questions, we have for both questions identified new factors that can tailor the 
model to venture capital trade sale exits. Further, the data suggests that the process when selling 
a company is in line with the process suggested in the theoretical framework, both for an auction 
and a negotiated sale. 
Based on these findings, figure 4 presents the refined framework. This model is the first attempt 
to model the factors underlying the rationale for, and choice of, financial advisors in venture 
capital trade sale exits.   
Several points regarding this model deserve further discussion. First, the data gives no right to 
conclude which parts of this model that comes first. As it is presented in figure 4, it is viewed as a 
linear process where one starts by figuring out if one needs an advisor, makes a choice, before 
the principal and the advisor agrees on the optimal sales process. However, the process can also 
be viewed in the opposite way, where an event (for instance an unsolicited offer) makes the 
target company choose between an auction and a negotiated sale, before it evaluates the need 
for an advisor, and then possibly engages one. The data has shown that both scenarios are 
realistic.  
Further, with respect to both research questions, no claim can be made about which factors that 
are the most important when making the decisions. However, our data suggests that the 
bargaining power hypothesis is more evident than the better merger hypothesis with respect to 
the first research question. Regarding the second question, the interdependence between the 
factors is more relevant to put forward than trying to classify importance. As shown, the size and 
quality of the network is clearly important, but on the other hand, the team assigned and the 
motivation for the task are non-negligible factors. However, the factors are likely to influence 
each other, exemplified above with the relation between industry experience and network.  
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Figure 4 – The Choice and Role of Financial Advisors in Venture Capital Trade Sales 
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Conclusions and Implications 
This paper started out by arguing that the choice of the target’s advisor has been the scope of 
few studies compared to the acquirer’s choice. Further, little attention has been given to sell-side 
dynamics in the M&A literature. Finally, no research has been done on the relation between VCs 
and financial advisors in trade sale exit processes. Therefore, the aim of this study was to open 
this black box, and examine the factors affecting the choice of engaging a financial advisor in a 
venture capital-backed trade sale. Accordingly, the following two research questions have been 
formulated: (1) Why do venture capital-backed companies engage financial advisors in trade 
sales, and (2) what factors influence the choice of a specific financial advisor? 
In order to answers these questions, we have performed a multiple-case study covering 19 
venture-backed companies in Norway and the U.S. that were acquired in the period 1996-2011. 
With respect to the first research question, we have added to the present knowledge by showing 
that VCs believe advisors are more valuable when participating in and facilitating deals, than 
when proposing prospective buyers. That means that our result is more in line with the 
bargaining power hypothesis than the better merger hypothesis. Further, we argue that since 
both a VC and an entrepreneur are participating in a multi-round game, an advisor can help 
maximize the deal proceedings through a bad cop role, while at the same time maintain a good 
relation between prospective buyers, the VC and the entrepreneur. 
When analyzing the factors influencing the choice of advisor, we have found support for 
preceding research-based knowledge in that industry experience and prior relations and 
referrals enhance the possibility of being chosen. Moreover, we have in total identified eight 
factors that are found to influence the possibility for an advisor to be chosen. At last, we have 
integrated the findings from these two research questions in a refined framework, describing 
the venture capital trade sale process from initiation to closing.  
Implications for Practitioners 
There is no doubt that a venture capital-backed company has other demands than a larger, 
publicly traded company when facing an M&A transaction. It seems that many VCs are 
concerned about the advisor giving top attention to the case at hand, and therefore believe that 
so-called boutique M&A firms, specializing in M&A transactions, as well as in certain industries, 
are more likely to give top attention and assign experienced team members than larger 
investment banks. Unsurprisingly, experience through previous deal completion in the relevant 
industry, prior relations with the VCs or the portfolio company, and high confidence in the case 
enhances the possibility of being chosen. 
Therefore, financial advisors aiming to advise venture capital-backed trade sales should put 
forward their best men, accept to be incentivized based on their indicative valuation assessment, 
and show proof of successfully selling similar companies to potential buyers in order to be 
assigned.  
As for the VC and the portfolio company, some advice can be given with respect to the advisor 
decision. Some of the informants mentioned factors that have not been unveiled in previous 
studies, for instance the size of the advisory firm and the team assigned. This could be factors 
that VCs and portfolio companies should take into consideration before deciding what advisor to 
hire. Undoubtedly, attention from the advisor is important, and choosing an advisor that does 
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not prioritize the venture capital trade sale can have severe wealth implications for the 
investors.  
Implications for Further Research  
As this is a study exploring factors that influence decision making with respect to engaging an 
advisor, we have no reason to claim which factors that are most important in deciding if to 
choose a financial advisor, and what factors that are most important when choosing a specific 
one. However, our refined theoretical framework suggests that the factors relevant for venture 
capital-backed companies are somewhat different than for companies in general. Further studies 
can therefore contribute to the literature by exploring what factors are the most important in 
venture capital trade sale exits when answering these two questions.  
Moreover, as previous studies suggest, and this study confirms, the decision to hire an advisor is 
not trivial. A departing point with respect to this decision can therefore be if advisors are more 
often hired for venture capital-backed companies than for companies in general. However, as 
our data has shown, different VCs also have different attitudes towards said advisors. An 
extension of this issue could be if some archetypes of VCs are more likely to hire a financial 
advisor than others. Previous research in this field has suggested that such archetypes exist with 
respect to exit (Relander et al., 1994; Wall and Smith, 1997), so it is not unlikely that this also 
goes for the attitude towards, and use of, financial advisors.  
As studies on the wealth effects of hiring an advisor are inconclusive, a study that explores the 
wealth effects of hiring an advisor in venture capital trade sales could be highly interesting. 
Further, such a study could unveil if some types of advisors are more successful than others. For 
instance, does an M&A boutique firm create more value than an individual or a larger 
investment bank? Similarly, the literature and our findings suggest two different types of trade 
sales; auction and negotiated sale. Two related questions that scholars could investigate are 
therefore: Through what kind of sale is a VC more likely to assign a banker, and in what sales 
type is the advisor able to create most value? 
We have also found that an advisor can help eliminate potential incentive problems for an 
entrepreneur/top management member. However, it is yet to be explored if this actually is an 
issue. Is it likely that the entrepreneur will behave opportunistically in the closing of a trade sale 
process? Studies that explore the relationship between the investors, entrepreneurs and 
potential advisors during the exit process could shed light on this issue.  
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Appendix 1 – Rationale for Hiring a Financial Advisor 
Case 
Type of 
Advisor 
Type of Sale Factors Identified 
Avalanche 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: And you get 
an inbound interest. As a banker, that's easy, 
right. So there was no teaser, no nothing. 
Basically he just called six or seven people. 
Signal of Credibility: …he [the advisor] was 
well respected by the acquirers too. He didn't 
come in with less attractive or challenged 
companies, he came in with good stuff. 
Blackhawk 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: We invited 
the five companies who had been following us, 
but we also engaged an investment banker to 
bring other people in. 
Bruin 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: We engaged 
a team, a small company, … specialized in M&A, 
in order to create some competition for our 
case. (E) 
Bad Cop: … when we started the negotiations, 
the advisor took the role as ‘bad cops’, which 
was a good thing. … The advisor had the lead 
role in the negotiations. This was a conscious 
choice, because if the transaction closed, I was 
going to work for the acquirer. It was better to 
take a back seat role than being the bad guy. (E) 
Shield Portfolio Company and VCs: It was the 
investment banker and us as investors that 
were in the front seat. (VC) 
Canuck No Advisor 
Negotiated 
Sale 
- 
Coyote 
Boutique 
M&A Firm 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: We had to 
test the market and see if it was possible to sell. 
… We spent some time figuring out who the 
advisor should be. (VC1) 
Flame No Advisor Auction - 
Flyer No Advisor 
Negotiated 
Sale 
- 
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Case 
Type of 
Advisor 
Type of Sale Factors Identified 
Hurricane  
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 
Bad Cop: In our experience, this is preferable 
[to engage an advisor], because … we don’t 
want to destroy the relation to a possible buyer, 
we talk with these guys continuously, and a 
financial advisor can be somewhat more 
aggressive when approaching possible bidders. 
Shield Portfolio Company and VCs: There is a 
lot of work to be done: You are going to create a 
presentation, put up a data room, do a vendor 
due diligence, and we are not expected to do 
this. We are on the board of these companies, 
and this is not a board job.  
Create and Facilitate an Auction: We tested 
the market for other buyers when they came in. 
We wanted to know if other actors were 
possible buyers. 
Islander 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 
(terminated), 
then 
Negotiated 
Sale 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: A prospect 
was created, and it was presented to different 
actors. We went to three or four actors. 
Lightning 
Investment 
Bank 
Negotiated 
Sale 
Valuation Assessment: We engaged an 
advisor in order to look at the offer, is this 
reasonable? Is it realistic to get a higher offer? 
Facilitate Negotiation: [They are helpful] to 
get things in place, and as a matter of fact, the 
devil is in the details. They have a lot of 
experience in these processes, and are able to 
unburden [us]. 
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Case 
Type of 
Advisor 
Type of Sale Factors Identified 
Oiler 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: You know, I 
think the reason why we brought an 
intermediary on was probably two-fold. One is 
we thought that maybe an intermediary might 
be able to bring some different potential buyers 
to the table, that we might not have 
relationships with. That, unfortunately, turned 
out not to be the case. Everybody who came to 
the table were people we already knew and had 
relationships with. But that was part of it. 
Valuation Assessment: … [when] we first had 
a company make an offer to buy us, there was 
at least one investor who thought it was a bit 
premature to be selling. And so he was hopeful 
to get an outside banker's perspective on the 
market, and what people were paying, and 
what this company might be worth X years 
later as an IPO versus what we might be able to 
sell for today. 
Panther 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: We decided 
to engage an advisor, something we typically 
do, to test if there was any interest for this case.  
Penguin 
Boutique M&A 
Firm 
Auction 
(terminated), 
then 
Negotiated 
Sale 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: Such 
companies typically create a teaser… And this 
teaser is then sent out to prospective buyers. 
Ranger No Advisor 
Negotiated 
Sale 
- 
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Case 
Type of 
Advisor 
Type of Sale Factors Identified 
Sabre Consultant Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: So when 
you’re looking at exits and M&A exits – right, 
the only way to really get a good exit is to 
create an auction. Or at least the appearance of 
scarcity. … And, so we sent a clear signal that 
we wanted to sell the company. We also sent a 
very clear signal that we weren’t going to give 
the company away. 
Shield Portfolio Company and VCs: They 
were getting very nervous about the 
relationship, they were very nervous about 
how the relationship was going, and the 
questions being asked and the way they were 
conducting due diligence. So, the decision was 
made fairly quickly to, as we call it here, circle 
the wagons. An old western term – right? And 
put an intermediary in place. 
Bad Cop: … when we or the intermediary had 
to play hardball with … the potential acquirer. 
… If you put the acquire in that situation, 
they’re now arguing … with their future boss. … 
So, for me, the value of having an intermediary 
for that purpose was tremendous.   
Signal of Credibility: And so having him [the 
advisor] get involved was a signal to the 
potential buyer that we were serious about 
selling - at which they weren’t sure of, because 
of the way the founders were reacting. And, so 
we sent a clear signal that we wanted to sell the 
company. We also sent a very clear signal that 
we weren’t going to give the company away. 
Senator 
Boutique M&A 
Firm 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: Yes, that [to 
create an auction] is an essential part. You have 
to create competition. The banker was in 
charge of handling the communication with the 
potential acquirers.  
Shark 
Investment 
Bank 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: It was a full 
auction.  
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Case 
Type of 
Advisor 
Type of Sale Factors Identified 
Star 
Boutique M&A 
Firm 
Auction 
Create and Facilitate an Auction: We hired a 
banker, and conducted a traditional process: 
we created a memorandum and contacted 
possible buyers.  
Shield Portfolio Company and VCs: In our 
experience the investment banker is a channel 
that can shield us, and position the company. 
Bad Cop: Yes, there was no doubt about that 
[banker being a bad cop]. 
Thrasher Consultant 
Negotiated 
Sale 
Facilitate Negotiation: So we hired him as an 
advisor and consultant, to help us shape [the 
deal] and negotiate for us, essentially. 
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Appendix 2 – Rationale for Not Hiring a Financial Advisor 
Case Quote From Interviewees Factor 
Canuck 
So, we didn't need a banker or someone to say 'Oh, did you think 
of these people?', because it's unlikely that a banker would know 
more about our business than we do. 
Company/VC 
Knows Buyer 
Universe and 
Has Relevant 
Relations 
Flame 
… we talked about hiring an investment banker, and decided we 
didn't have time, and it would take too long to get them up to 
speed. If there was going to be an auction, we could probably 
make it happen ourselves, because we decided this was 
happening too fast for us to go to brand new people. It had to be 
people we already had some relationship with. 
No Time to get 
Advisor Up to 
Speed 
Flyer 
Funny enough, we did not do that. And that was because we felt 
that strategically, the company was very well suited for the 
bidder. At the same time, it was a bit premature for an exit. Our 
main goal was to continue funding the company and then have a 
broad process. And we were just entertaining the buyer in this 
process, in case we would be offered a satisfactory price. 
Not the Right 
Time for Exit 
Ranger We pay for the relations, but in this case, we had these ourselves. 
Company/VC 
Knows Buyer 
Universe and 
Has Relevant 
Relations 
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Appendix 3 – Factors Affecting the Choice of Financial Advisor 
Case Quotes from Interviewees 
Factors 
Identified 
Avalanche 
Because he knew this segment very well.  
I had done prior business with him, actually both of… [the 
VCFs]… had done prior business with him. 
 
Industry 
Experience 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Blackhawk 
It was one particular boutique investment firm that had tried to 
acquire us two or three times over the years, representing 
European companies. And, so we thought, number one, they 
understood us quite well … And that their contacts in Europe 
would be the right kinds of people to get involved in the bidding.  
We invited them both in [two other banks] to make a proposal 
as well. Interestingly enough, in the case of both of the others, 
we felt that they were being unrealistic [with respect to 
valuation]. 
Both myself and the VP of Finance liked this boutique 
investment banking firm, who we had kind of known before.  
So we approached them [the advisor] and said: ‘We do like you 
guys, but we are also not prepared to pay your normal fee, 
because we have pretty much done most of your work for you.’ 
So we ended up paying them a fee that was approximately 25 % 
of what they normally would get for a transaction like ours. In 
addition, we offered a success fee on the upside, which wasn’t 
earned 
Industry 
Experience 
Ambitions 
Network and 
Geographical 
Coverage 
Human Fit 
Terms 
Bruin 
Our relation with them was great, and we saw that this portfolio 
company was even more suited for the advisor [than the 
previous company sold with the help of this advisor]. (VC) 
… companies like Merrill Lynch would have been too large, they 
wouldn’t fit us. (E) 
It was also a bit of personal relation, I met with them, and I liked 
them. (E) 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Industry 
Experience 
Size of 
Advisory Firm 
Human Fit 
Canuck - - 
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Case Quotes from Interviewees 
Factors 
Identified 
Coyote 
And of course we had a reference from our co-investor covering 
this firm, so we felt comfortable with them being a good team. 
(VC1)  
The reason for choosing them before someone like Merrill Lynch 
or other large banks is that you are more certain of getting top 
attention. (VC1)  
… and that they have done transactions that are relevant for 
what we want to do. That is, sold comparable companies to 
comparable buyers. (VC2)  
And terms, what they want for completing the transaction. (VC2) 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Team 
Size of 
Advisory Firm 
Industry 
Experience 
Terms 
Flame - - 
Flyer - - 
Hurricane  
They are clearly a competent team. 
And if your ambitions are low, you don’t win the tender offer as 
an advisor. 
If you don’t know anything about the product, about the market, 
about potential acquirers, or customers, you are not chosen. 
If you show up [at the pitch] with two juniors that do not know 
anything about the product or the market, and deliver an 
average presentation, you know that these guys have not 
worked much on this. 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Ambitions 
Industry 
Experience 
Team 
Islander 
The venture guys had previous relations. The world, especially 
in Norway, is small, so relations and knowledge to actors are 
very important. 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Lightning 
… they had experience in this field, they are a large and well-
known bank, and they had a good relation with the [portfolio] 
company. 
Industry 
Experience 
Size of 
Advisory Firm 
Human Fit 
Oiler Not disclosed. - 
Panther 
… and if we like the people, their experience and knowledge of 
the industry, and the team that they are likely to assign.  
Human Fit 
Industry 
Experience 
Team 
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Case Quotes from Interviewees 
Factors 
Identified 
Penguin 
… this time it was a company in [a foreign country] that was 
engaged. The reason for this was that one of our foreign 
subsidiaries was successful and well-known.  
Our chairman of the board [not a VC] had done business with 
this firm before, he knew them well, and knew that they were 
thorough and detail-oriented. 
They had sold IT companies for many years, so they knew their 
stuff 
Network and 
Geographical 
Coverage 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Industry 
Experience 
Ranger - - 
Sabre 
The intermediary we used, actually, was an individual, who had 
been a successful CFO in another one of our portfolio companies. 
He had done the process; he had a track-record of success. 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Industry 
Experience 
Senator 
I had a previous relation with [the advisor], as I had used them 
before. That’s part of why we chose them.  
One of the reasons we hired them was that one of the guys had 
first-hand experience from the industry. So he knew the industry 
intimately. Most of the time, we use international bankers that 
specialize in working with relatively small companies, in a 
European context. 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Industry 
Experience 
Size of 
Advisory Firm 
Network and 
Geographical 
Coverage 
Shark 
They [the advisor] were chosen due to their competence … and 
their resources. And, in addition, which individuals they were 
going to assign to the engagement. 
Industry 
Experience 
Network and 
Geographical 
Coverage 
Team 
Star 
… an introduction from our network in the US. 
It is these two things [that count]: domain expertise, that is 
knowledge of the specific market, and that the size of the deal is 
typical for them. 
Prior Relations 
and Referrals 
Industry 
Experience 
Size of 
Advisory Firm 
Thrasher 
… [he] actually used to work for the strategic buyer. And, so he 
knew the company intimately that was going to be purchasing 
us. 
Industry 
Experience 
Network and 
Geographical 
Coverage 
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